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POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE CREATION  
OF A FRENCH TEACHER TRAINING  
INSTITUTE IN MANITOBA

by




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A THESIS

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## DEDICACE

A mes parents, une reconnaissance particulière,  
pour leur confiance qui m'a toujours servi  
d'appui dans mes travaux;

A mon épouse Lorraine, pour son amour et  
sa patience dans ce long trajet;

A Michelle et Roxanne, à leur question,  
"As-tu fini ta thèse papa?" à moi de vous  
répondre mes chéries, "Oui, c'est fini!"

A Léo et Alma, merci!





about implementation success. An additional conclusion is that building a supportive coalition is important in ensuring that support for the policy is sustained throughout the implementation process and in countering opposition. Finally, two secondary conclusions which should be given attention are: (1) the hiring of a personnel committed to the policy, and (2) the allocation of financial resources. Both of these serve to buttress the verbal and written intentions of policymakers.

A major implication emerging from this study is that policy implementation is a highly complex process. Therefore, administrators involved in implementation ought to be cognizant of the multifaceted nature and the many factors which define the process.

A special acknowledgment is extended to all those who consented to participate through interviews or otherwise. Specifically, I would like to express my gratitude to Laurent Desjardins for his time, his recollections and his personal files. Without these this study would have been most difficult.

Finally, to Gisèle Gobeil an expression of thanks for the time and patience in the typing of this report. It just kept appearing interminable.





## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A study of this nature is never the product of the writer only. The study is certainly an experience in research. However, it is also a very human venture reflecting the dynamics of a group of people - an advisory committee and the writer. Advising a student is a commitment and I should like to recognize most sincerely the sound advice and generous critique provided by Dr. Seger, my advisor, and Dr. Miklos. To Dr. Byrne and Dr. Fris a special thanks. Despite their later involvement, the final report was greatly enhanced. To Dr. Haché, the external examiner, merci! Undoubtedly, the additions suggested make for a more complete report.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . .	xii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE . . . . .	2
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY . . . . .	3
DELIMITATIONS . . . . .	8
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY . . . . .	9
DATA SOURCES . . . . .	10
IDENTIFICATION OF INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS . . . .	12
METHODOLOGY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS . . . . .	13
Description of the Policy Implementa- tion Process . . . . .	13
Explanation of the Policy Implementa- tion Process . . . . .	17
ORGANIZATION OF STUDY . . . . .	19
II REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE . . . . .	22
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION . . . . .	22
IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED . . . . .	28
POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLICY-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION . . . . .	31
ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS AND POLICY IMPLE- MENTATION . . . . .	37
Propositions for the Four Models . . . . .	39
Utility and Contribution of the Models to Policy Implementation . . . . .	43





II (cont'd)

On the use of Alternative Models . . . . . 46

CONCLUSION . . . . . 47

III A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY . . . 49

Roblin's Legacy to Franco-Manitobans . . . . . 49

A Search for an Alternative . . . . . 52

Federalism or a New Canadian Nationalism . . . 55

The Constitutional Conference . . . . . 60

The Grand Experiment . . . . . 62

A Significant Incident . . . . . 68

"La Société Franco-Manitobaine" is Born! . . . 72

The Stirrings of Change . . . . . 74

A Gentlemen's Agreement . . . . . 76

The Final Phase . . . . . 82

SUMMARY . . . . . 84

AUTHOR'S TRANSLATION . . . . . 87

IV A DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION  
PROCESS . . . . . 90

Characteristics of the Implementing  
Agency . . . . . 90

Standards and Objectives . . . . . 99

Site . . . . . 99

The Manitoba Case . . . . . 101

Interprovincial Exchanges and  
Federal Involvement . . . . . 109

Costs . . . . . 125

Clientele. . . . . 134





## IV (cont'd)

Programs . . . . .	139
Staff and Personnel . . . . .	143
Affiliation . . . . .	148
Summary . . . . .	152
Resources . . . . .	153
Financial Resources . . . . .	154
Human Resources . . . . .	157
Political Resources . . . . .	161
Interorganizational Communication and Enforcement Activities . . . . .	165
The Secretariat, the Department of Education, and the S.F.M. . . . .	166
Relations with the University of Manitoba and the Faculty of Education . .	169
E.F.M., F.P.M., and A.C.E.L.F.M. . . . .	174
Enforcement Activities . . . . .	177
Social, Political and Economic Factors . . .	179
A New Federalism . . . . .	180
Trudeau and Trudeaumania . . . . .	181
Schreyer's rise to power . . . . .	183
The Economic Link . . . . .	184
CONCLUSION . . . . .	187
AUTHOR'S TRANSLATION . . . . .	189

V	AN EXPLANATION OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS . . . . .	200
I(i)	THE FORM AND TYPE OF POLICY . . . . .	200
I(ii)	SUPPORT, DEMAND AND SCOPE OF THE POLICY . . . . .	205



V	(cont'd)	
	II	FACTORS CRITICAL TO THE IMPLEMENTA- TION PROCESS . . . . . 208
	III	THE SHAPING OF THE POLICY DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION . . . . . 223
		SUMMARY . . . . . 225
VI		SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 227
		SUMMARY . . . . . 227
		The Nature and Shaping of the Policy . . . . . 228
		Nature of Resources and Their Impact . . . . . 231
		The Agency and its Characteristics . . . . . 232
		Involvement of Individuals, Groups, Associations, and Organizations . . . . . 233
		Contextual Conditions . . . . . 234
		CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 235
		IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 239
		BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 243
	APPENDIX A	General Interview Guide . . . . . 253
	APPENDIX B	Letter sent to aid in identification of principal actors and List of names identified in documents. . . . . 257
	APPENDIX C	List of Interview Respondents . . . . . 260
	APPENDIX D	Letter of S. Valiquette, s.j. and First Report of Ad-Hoc Committee . . . . . 263
	APPENDIX E	Report by Scott Bateman, University Grants Commission - Possible costs of Institute and Critique of Estimates by A. Corriveau . . . . . 274
	APPENDIX F	Lettre de G. Pelletier au Premier Ministre M. Schreyer - Accord et modalités de la participation financière du gouvernement fédérale . . . . . 291





	PAGE
APPENDIX G Final Report of Ad-Hoc Committee . . . . .	297
APPENDIX H Report of the Committee of Inquiry . . . . .	328
APPENDIX I Chronological Events Matrix . . . . .	369
APPENDIX J Individuals, Committees, and Organizations . . . . .	374





## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Van Meter and Van Horn Policy Implementation Model (1975)	14
2. Organizational Chart of the Secretariat of Dominion - Provincial Cultural Relations	96
3. The Secretariat's Political Environment	98
4. Interorganizational Linkages	169



## Chapter I

### INTRODUCTION

In 1916 the Manitoba government abolished the legal use of French as a language of instruction in the schools of the province. As a result, the training of teachers in the French language was terminated, and this situation remained unchanged for the next fifty-six years. In December of 1969, however, the Premier of Manitoba enunciated a policy to re-establish a French language teacher training institute. Premier Schreyer (December 6, 1969) in addressing the annual general meeting of the "Société Franco-Manitobaine" declared that amendments to the Public Schools Act were forthcoming and that:

Un tel programme exigera évidemment un grand nombre de professeurs qualifiés et dont la formation académique tiendra compte des aspirations et de l'évolution linguistique. Pour cela nous espérons d'établir dès l'an prochain un collège pédagogique pour la formation de ces professeurs.\*

As a result of this policy statement, the institute was officially opened in September, 1972.

The establishment of the institute may be regarded as the terminal point in a process which was activated by the

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#### \*Translation

Such a program will require a good number of qualified teachers whose academic training will take into account their aspirations and linguistic evolution. To this end, we hope to establish, in the coming year, a pedagogical institute for the professional training of those teachers.





Premier's policy statement. The process of translating policy into practice is generally referred to as policy implementation. In recent years the importance of the process has been recognized and it has received more focused attention from students of the policymaking process. Some analysts have viewed implementation as the "missing link" between the development of policies and the impact of those policies. This shift in emphasis from policy development and policy impact to policy implementation appears to be based on the assumption that the study of implementation may reveal some of the factors that contribute to the realization or non-realization of the policy objective.

#### STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The general purpose of this study was to analyze the policy implementation process as it relates to the establishment of a French teacher training institute in Manitoba. The specific purposes of the analysis may be stated as follows:

1. to describe the process of policy implementation which led to the establishment of a French teacher training institute in Manitoba, and,
2. to explain the process of policy implementation by identifying those elements which affected the achievement of the policy objectives.

As a case study in policy implementation, the investigation addressed the following questions:

1. How was the policy shaped prior to and during the implementation process?



2. What resources were made available, and what was the impact of these resources upon the implementation process?

3. What were the relevant characteristics of the agency which assumed responsibility for the implementation process?

4. What other organizations, associations, groups, and individuals were involved, and what was their impact upon the implementation process?

5. How did the major contextual conditions (economic, social, and political) influence the implementation process?

These five major questions served as guiding elements for reviewing the development of the policy, describing the implementation process and explaining the process of implementation.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Policy research has adopted essentially two domains of analysis, namely, policy development and policy impact. This research trend probably accounts for the paucity of research and theoretical formulations in the area of policy implementation. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:446-7) state that in the past quarter century efforts in policy research have been directed at "the character of economic and social problems, the claims made for government action, and the processes by which policy decisions are made." Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:447) add that recent analyses have given attention to impacts or effects which policies may have had on people and problems at which they were directed. While this research may well have proven important and useful to





the understanding of the policymaking process, Hargrove (1975) suggests that the intervening phase of implementation has been neglected. There is now a growing desire on the part of policy researchers to shift their focus of analysis to the linkage process between policy development and policy impact. Notwithstanding this desire, theoretical developments to date have not evolved from research specifically oriented to policy implementation. Empirical research is practically nonexistent and as Williams (1975:556) states: "this lack of research on social policy implementation is baffling . . ."

In order to breach this gap, some theorists have relied upon other disciplines to develop guiding principles for the analysis of policy implementation. Examples of this may be found in the works of Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Smith (1973) and Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980). Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:453) have been particularly interested in organization theory since, "it has the greatest contribution to make." Baum (1976) has adopted a similar perspective, arguing that organizational analysis offers a promising approach to the development of a conceptual framework for the examination of the implementation process. Out of the general area of organization theory, the theories of change and control are viewed as especially important. In a similar vein, Smith (1973) reviewed how change had been conceptualized and discussed by such writers as Buckley (1976), Chin (1966) and Zollschan (1967).

This organizational approach is promising because implementation is usually the responsibility of organizational



personnel; however, others (Hargrove, 1976; Williams, 1975) have emphasized a need for studies in policy implementation. Such research endeavours would ostensibly clarify problems and issues endemic to the implementation process. Hargrove (1975:14) notes:

the best way to begin to develop theory might be to explore the specific problems in separate program areas . . . Better theory than we now have might emerge over time which would be grounded in actual experience.

Williams (1975:557) suggests:

Scholars simply have not done enough research, including theory building, on social policy implementation to be good appraisers of the more subtle relevance of the past work in social sciences . . . The biggest research need is to focus directly on social policy implementation probably through careful case studies.

Clearly the study of policy implementation is in an incipient stage with various emphases being advocated by different theorists. In this sense, if one were to borrow from Kuhn (1962), this might be described as a pre-paradigm stage, in which it would be premature to ascribe greater importance to any of these approaches or, indeed, to suggest a mixing of various perspectives. Other social sciences could contribute to identifying some of the important considerations which could be useful; one such discipline would certainly be political science.

In terms of practical considerations, the study of policy implementation may be regarded as providing important insights and needed information for policy makers, administrators, and students of politics and educational administration. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:450) allow that the study of





## policy implementation

gives student of politics and policy-makers a new understanding of how the system succeeds or fails in translating general policy objectives into concrete and meaningful public service.

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:484) add:

Implementation studies alert policy makers to variables that can be manipulated to improve the delivery of public services.

From a political point of view, Rabinovitz et al., (1976:400) state:

The recognition that political processes enter into the translation of law into practice helps to account for the burgeoning literature in this . . . field of implementation.

Anderson (1975:100) catches well the essence of this political process when he states:

Those who participate in the legislative process frequently are unable or unwilling to arrive at precise settlements of the conflicting interests on many issues. Only by leaving some matters somewhat nebulous and unsettled can agreement on legislation be reached. Lack of time, interest, information and expertise may also contribute to the delegation of broad authority to agencies. The product of these factors is often a statute couched in general language, which shifts to agencies the task of filling in details, making policy more precise and concrete, and trying to make definitive adjustments among conflicting interests. Under these conditions, the administrative process becomes an extension of the legislative process and administrators find themselves immersed in politics.

Thus it would appear that the political underpinnings of policy implementation as suggested above could be of interest to policy makers and students of politics.

Educational administrators, on the other hand, are constantly called upon to develop strategies to bring to a realization policies adopted by school boards or educational



agencies. The establishment of a French teacher training institute in Manitoba, which involved representatives of various educational organizations, provided an opportunity to analyze the implementation process in an educational setting. As such, the study offers insights as to how men and material were brought together in order to realize the objective of the policy.

In a more general way, study of this particular case is timely insofar as it relates to the Canadian national unity debate. This debate has been predicated on the recognition of the constitutional rights of the two official language groups in Canada, French and English. Since the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was established in 1963, the federal government has been particularly interested in developing services to enhance the language rights of the official minority. Clearly, provincial governments have had a crucial role to play in view of the fact that such services were in many instances of an educational nature. In Western Canada, for example, schooling and teacher training in the French language have been a primary concern of the French minorities.\* The establishment of a French teacher training institute in Manitoba may be viewed as an outcome of initiatives by the federal and provincial governments to respond to the desires and needs of the French minority in Manitoba.

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\*For a discussion of this concern as it related to Manitoba see LeBlanc, 1968; LeTourneau, 1977.





In conclusion, therefore, the study was seen as significant from both a theoretical and a practical point of view, in that it provided needed research on the implementation of policies.

#### DELIMITATIONS

The study was delimited as outlined below:

1. The study was bounded by the time period from December 9, 1969, when Premier Schreyer announced his government's intention to establish a French teacher training institute in Manitoba, to March 28, 1972, when the Minister of Tourism and Cultural Affairs, Laurent Desjardins, announced the establishment of the institute.

2. The study focused on the implementation of the policy in the province of Manitoba. Events and factors outside Manitoba were considered only to the extent that they were relevant to the implementation process in Manitoba.

3. The Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial and Cultural Relations was identified as the implementing agency and as such became the focus of the analysis. Its relations to groups, associations, and organizations were considered to the extent that these relations are deemed important to the implementation process.

4. The study was based only the primary actors who were defined as the officials of the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations and the representatives of groups, associations and organizations involved in the implementation process.



## LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The following factors placed limitations on the study.

1. The investigation was a case study of a process bounded by a time period; therefore, conclusions are limited by the case and, in some respects, to the time period in which it occurred.

2. The conceptualization of the process appeared to provide an adequate and satisfactory explanation of the implementation of the policy; however, a different conceptualization might suggest different explanations.

3. The reconstruction of the policy implementation process in toto was impossible. The best that could be achieved was a detailed approximation of events and factors which made up the process.

4. In a case study of this nature, the possibility of incomplete documentation must be considered a limitation. Since the process involved government agencies some documents were inaccessible.

5. There was some degree of subjectivity related to the interpretation of the documents and interviews. The fact that the study was ex-post facto in nature increased this subjectivity. The researcher also recognized that because the study is historical there may have been inaccuracies in the recollection of facts in interviews. There was also the recognition that respondents may have been tempted to "tell their side of the story".





6. Some primary actors were reluctant to participate while others did not make themselves available for an interview. Therefore, as a result, in some instances a greater reliance had to be placed on secondary source material.

#### DATA SOURCES

Two main sources of data were deemed essential for this study; primary documents and personal interviews. These sources provided the basic material from which answers to the questions of the study could be gained. The documents examined included the following:

1. official documents of the Government of Manitoba and the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations;
2. correspondence between the Government of Manitoba and the Secretary of State of Canada, the governments of British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan;
3. correspondence between the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations and the "Collège de Saint-Boniface," the University of Manitoba, the "Société Franco-Manitobaine," the "Educateurs Franco-Manitobains," the "Associations des Commissaires de Langue Française du Manitoba," the "Association des Parents et Maîtres du Manitoba";
4. reports of study groups, organizations, associations, commissions or individuals requested by the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations;
5. the report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the report of the Committee of Inquiry



on French language teacher training in the Western Provinces both of which were commissioned by the Government of Canada;

6. minutes of meetings between the French associations of Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba;

7. minutes of meetings between the Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, the Premier of Manitoba, Edward Schreyer and the Director of the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations, Laurent Desjardins;

8. press releases of the Government of Canada and the Government of Manitoba;

9. articles from the Manitoba daily newspapers and the French weekly, La Liberté;

10. personal documents provided by interviewees; and,

11. official publications in public or limited circulation, mimeographed or printed.

In addition, fifteen in-depth interviews were conducted with individuals involved in the policy implementation process to obtain information about and insights into the implementation process. Specifically, interviews were designed to achieve the following purposes:

1. to corroborate specific events and developments;

2. to gain interpretations of events and their significance to the implementation process;

3. to determine the point of view of individuals to the establishment of a French teacher training institute in Manitoba;

4. to describe the interests of groups and organizations in the establishment of a French teacher training institute; and,



5. to assess the influence of certain individuals, groups, associations and organizations, in the implementation of the policy.

Interviews were semi-structured with some questions common to all respondents. Within a general interview guide (cf. Appendix A), interviews were tailored to the respondent's experience and position. Interviews varied in length from one half hour to over one hour and were recorded in note form. Those respondents deeply involved in the policy implementation process were interviewed more than once.

#### IDENTIFICATION OF INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS

The identification of interviewees was carried out according to the reputational approach (Bauer and Gergen, 1968). A list of twenty possible respondents was compiled from names appearing in the primary source documents (cf. Appendix B). This list was sent to five individuals, known to have been actively involved in the process, and these referees were asked to modify the list to the extent that it include the names of people judged to be the most important in the process. On the basis of the responses, a final list was drawn consisting of sixteen people (cf. Appendix C). In a first contact by telephone all agreed on a time and place for an interview; however, two individuals were unavailable for the scheduled interview due to other demands and commitments.





## METHODOLOGY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The purpose of this section is to outline the plan for the description and explanation of the process of policy implementation. One aspect of this report consists of a description of the process by outlining what happened during the various stages; another aspect involves an explanation of the process by indicating why events evolved the way it did. Taken together these two functions of description and explanation constitute the analysis of the policy implementation process.

### Description of the Policy Implementation Process

The descriptive part of the study is a comprehensive account of events and factors related to the implementation of the policy. A simple chronological narrative was deemed inappropriate because of the complexity and multifaceted nature of policy implementation, and as an alternative, the Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model was adapted for the description. The essential characteristic of description is to tell what happened during the implementation process. To this end, the Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model is helpful in three ways: (1) to order and simplify different components of the process, (2) to identify the significant aspects of the process and, (3) to help direct inquiry and research.

The Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model is presented in Figure 1.






Figure 1. Van Meter and Van Horn Policy Implementation Model

Component I - Policy standards and objectives. Standards and objectives elaborate on the overall goals of the policy decision and are used as performance indicators in assessing the extent to which the intent of the policy has been realized. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1973:XIV) suggest, ". . . implementation cannot succeed or fail without a goal (standards and objectives) against which to judge it".

Component II - Policy resources. These resources comprise financial support and other incentives which will facilitate and encourage the implementation of the policy.

Component III - Interorganizational communication and enforcement activities. To assume successful implementation of a policy, it is important that the standards and objectives be





clearly stated, that they be stated accurately to the implementors, and that these communications be consistent as they are emitted from various sources.

Component IV - Characteristics of the implementing agencies.

Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:420-1) view this component as consisting of both the "formal and structural features of organizations and the informal attributes of their personnel". They list six elements which might impinge on an organization's capacity to implement a policy:

- (1) the competence and size of an agency's staff;
- (2) the degree of hierarchical control of subunit decisions and processes within the implementing agencies;
- (3) an agency's political resources (e.g. support among legislators and executives);
- (4) the vitality of an organization;
- (5) the degree of openness in communications within an organization (i.e. networks of communication with free horizontal and vertical communication, and a relatively high degree of freedom in communications with persons outside the organization); and,
- (6) the agency's formal and informal relations with the "policymaking" or "policy-enforcing" body.

Component V - Economic, social and political conditions. Van

Meter and Van Horn (1975) state that much has been written about these factors in political science and policy analyses and suggest that the same factors may also have significant effects upon the implementation process. For illustrative



purposes, they raise the following questions:

(1) Are the economic resources available within the implementing jurisdiction (or organization) sufficient to support successful implementation?

(2) To what extent (and how) will prevailing economic and social conditions be affected by the implementation of the policy in question?

(3) What is the nature of public opinion; how salient is the related policy issue?

(4) Do elites favor or oppose implementation of the policy?

(5) What is the partisan character of the implementing jurisdiction (or organization); is there partisan opposition or support for the policy?

(6) To what extent are private interest groups mobilized in support of or opposition to the policy?

Component VI - The disposition of implementors. Each component of the model must be filtered through the perceptions of the implementors. Three elements of the implementors' response may affect their ability and willingness to carry out the policy: their cognition (comprehension, understanding) of the policy, the direction of their response toward it (acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of that response.

The model presented above is used, however, in a modified form. The problem in using the model as presented is twofold: order and redundancy. The first problem lies in



the ordering of the components. Specifically, Component IV - Characteristics of the Implementing Agency, withholds to a late point in the description information pertinent to the discussion in the preceding components. To solve this problem the sequence has been altered and Component IV replaced Component I; thereafter, the sequence is maintained. The second problem has to do with Component VI - The Disposition of the Implementors. This component in and of itself is important; however, appearing as it does at the end of the sequence, the component provides redundant information. This redundancy is due in large measure to the fact that the information it provides appears in the preceding components. In the descriptive part of this study, Component IV has been deleted. With these modifications the model was used in the description.

#### Explanation of the Policy Implementation Process

In the analysis of the policy implementation process there is also interest in providing an explanation. Specifically, after describing what happened during the process the analysis goes on to explain why it happened the way it did.

For the purpose of providing an explanation of the policy implementation process, the following three points served as categories of examination.

1. The form and type of policy together with the support, demand, and scope of the policy to be implemented. This category is developed in response to the perceived





inadequacies of policy implementation models raised by Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980). Their concern was that insufficient attention was being paid to the policy per se in structuring the implementation process. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980:540) remark that the policy may in fact, ". . . determine the number of veto/clearance points, the formal access of various actors to the implementation process, and to some extent, the probable predispositions of implementation officials."

2. The identification of factors which were critical for achieving the policy objective.

This category is based on the criterion of the usefulness of models put forth by Dye (1975). Models ought to offer more than mere descriptive categories. Indeed, they ought to at least suggest some explanations. The Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model, therefore, is viewed as offering more than description. The categories do suggest some explanations and are used for this purpose.

3. The shaping of the policy as the process evolved over time.

If policies are general statements as Anderson (1975) and others contend, then there is a need to inquire into the process whereby such statements are operationalized. This category in effect identifies those elements of the process through which the general policy acquires specificity by the efforts of the actors involved in policy implementation.

The above constitute the main elements of explanation. Each draws upon the implementation literature for



insights and support.

## ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I outlines the nature of the study while Chapter II reviews the literature related to policy implementation. In Chapter III a review of the development of the policy is provided which serves as background information for the analyses. Chapter IV presents a description of the policy implementation process. Chapter V provides an explanation and interpretation of policy implementation process and contrasts with the descriptive character of the preceding chapter. Chapter VI includes a summary of events concerning the implementation process. In addition, some general conclusions and recommendations are presented. Finally, some implications which emerge from the study are identified.

As indicated above, a chronological description of the implementation process was seen as inappropriate. However, in order to give the reader a sense of the order of the events, a chronological events matrix is provided in Appendix I of the report. Furthermore, Appendix J has been added listing the individuals, committees, and organizations which recur with frequency in the report.





## ERRATUM

Pages 20 and 21 do not appear in the thesis because of an error in pagination. Thus, Chapter I ends with page 19 and Chapter II begins with page 22.



## Chapter II

### REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

In broad terms, this chapter is a review of the literature dealing with the policy implementation process.

In more specific terms the chapter:

1. describes how implementation drew its importance as a focus of analysis from the need to understand the problems and failures of policy conversion during the sixties and seventies;
2. defines policy implementation;
3. reviews selected political science literature in terms of its changing emphases and its emerging concern with policy implementation; and,
4. reviews four major organizational models and assesses their potential for insights into the analysis of the policy implementation process.

### POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

The implementation of policy as a focus of analysis has only recently caught the attention of policy researchers. The problem being addressed by the proponents of an implementation focus (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Smith, 1973; Williams, 1971, 1975; Hargrove, 1975, 1976; Bardach, 1977; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1980) is that governments in general, and administrative agencies in particular, have been less than



successful in converting policies to programs. This lack of success, and, in a more general sense, the lack of attention accorded to implementation, is the result, according to Smith (1973:198), of a naive notion that once a policy is stated implementation follows and the desired results are achieved ipso facto. Policy impact studies, however, have made explicit the discrepancies between legislative articulation and actual practice. Richard Elmore (1978:186) remarks that

a large collection of carefully documented case studies -- in education, manpower, housing and economic development -- points consistently to the same basic pattern: grand pretensions, faulty execution, puny results.

Reflecting on the "War on Poverty" in the United States, Levine (1968:86) noted that troubles arose not from the nature of the programs but from the difficulties of administration. In a similar vein, Hargrove (1975:6) suggested that there was a new awareness in the aftermath of the Great Society that many of its daring social programs did not work as well as had been hoped. Rabinovitz, Pressman, and Rein (1976:402) spoke of the discrepancies between the apparent goals of legislation aimed at coping with very complex problems and the actual results achieved by legislation.

While reasons for the failures of policies formulated in the sixties and early seventies are perhaps too numerous to state and would no doubt constitute quite an extended discussion, it may, however, be helpful to enumerate some recurring themes. Berman (1978:162) states that





public policy in the sixties and seventies often followed an R and D approach that assumed technological dominance and ignored implementation. ...The social planners of the sixties focused on translating the best and brightest ideas into public policies, not on implementing policies.

Thus, the technological approach which served as a model to place man on the moon was transposed to social settings even if policies in these areas did not involve "hard" technologies. It was assumed, therefore, that existing or specially created organizations would automatically carry out policies in much the same way as in situations where technology dominated.

Thus, Berman (1978:162-3) maintains that social planners

failed to heed the lessons of a considerable body of organizational analysis: (1) stable organizations, whether public bureaucracies or private firms, implement standard decisions in a programmed and predictable, if not optimal or desirable, way (implementation exists, though it is essentially mechanical) but (2) implementation becomes problematic when an organization confronts a non-standard decision that implies a departure from routine behavior.

If policies are non-standard decisions, as March and Simon (1958:174) observed, then we can better appreciate the problem raised by Berman. Berman (1978:163) in paraphrasing Schultz and Slevin (1975), rejects the hope that a policy's technical validity -- how "good" the policy idea, law or technology is -- can be known before it is implemented. Schultz and Slevin's (1975) starting point is that policy in the social arena exists only as it is implemented and, therefore, the "goodness" of most ideas cannot be tested apart from their implementation.

Other factors are often cited to explain implementation problems or failures. Murphy (1971) suggests that because



diverse interests join forces on particular proposals, the resultant policy will be ambiguous. Indeed, as Anderson (1975) has noted, this ambiguity is often sought to respond to the many interested parties. The effect of this ambiguity, however, is to leave the intent of the policy to the interpretation of a large number of people. Another obstacle raised by Murphy (1971) is the difference between the value sets of people or groups of people at different levels of government or within various agencies. These different value sets will cause people to understand policies in different ways. Finally, the fact that there exists a decentralization of power in a federalist state causes, according to Murphy (1971), a dispersion of authority and influence among many constituencies. The notion of a coordinated federalism is quickly dismissed by Sundquist (1969), Seidman (1970), and Reagan (1972). The neat rational link from federal-to-state-to-local jurisdiction is regarded as a paper hierarchy. A truer picture would be a marble cake cooperative federalism as opposed to the ideal layer cake of coordinated federalism (Berman, 1978:165).

In essence, implementation is now being viewed as a crucial phase for converting policy statements into action. Since implementation is viewed as problematic it has become a legitimate focus of analysis. Indeed, Hargrove (1975) suggests that implementation must be regarded as the "missing link." Rabinovitz, Pressman, and Rein (1975:399) state that

between the development of policies and the impact of these policies, however, lies a much less explored terrain -- the question of how policies are translated from law into practice.





If policy-making as a field of intellectual activity has directed little attention to implementation, other intellectual areas have not fared much better. In the area of planned change, where there is a profusion of literature dealing with innovations, the phase of implementation is given but cursory review. Indeed, even when they are discussed, implementation strategies tend to be highly normative and tentative with no supporting evidence to support the many "facilitators" mentioned. As Gross et al. (1971:31) note, "A great deal of the literature turns out to be speculative or hortative in nature." As an example, Gross et al. (1971:31) state that Bennis (1969) describes the problem of implementation as a "continually vexing one." Despite this, Bennis (1969) goes on to identify, without supporting evidence, a number of facilitators or "shoulds" to be adhered to during the implementation efforts. Gross et al. (1971:35) in reviewing the literature on planned organizational change conclude that it is deficient in discussing implementation:

First, there has been little concern for testing theories or generating hypotheses about factors influencing the degree of implementation. Second, data used to isolate conditions having an impact on implementation are typically obtained only from the perspective of those who initiate them; they generally ignored the point of view of organizational members who must make the behavioral changes specified by the innovation. Third, the method used to assess the degree of implementation of an innovation in many studies is open to serious question; careful measurement would require collecting and analyzing data based on systematic observations and not using data about "effects" as indices of successful implementation.



As a conclusion to their review of the literature, Gross et al. (1971:39) stated

Our review of implementation studies corroborated the observations of Bennis, Guba, Heathers and Stufflebeam about the paucity of knowledge concerning the conditions influencing the implementation of organizational innovations.

Thus, while the area of planned change may not offer the underpinnings for a theoretical and empirical beginning in the analysis of implementation, in the last few years, some policy analysts have been addressing the problem. The "missing link" has been identified as requiring serious attention. Indeed, many analysts (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975; Berman, 1978; Allison, 1969; Elmore, 1978, and others) have joined forces to fill the void. As more case studies have come to the fore, some analysts are finding traces of a coherent intellectual advance. In charting recent developments in the field of implementation analysis, Moore and Allison (1978:154) state that advances have been taking place along three fronts, namely, the following:

- (a) analysts are becoming much more systematic and self-confident in framing the problem that implementation analysis is supposed to solve: in designing and advocating policies, we must be able to anticipate the actual performance of the government in adopting and implementing the proposed policy;
- (b) analysts are developing a rich set of case studies of the implementation process;
- (c) analysts try to apply the methods and insights newly won from the analyses and case studies ...to specify professional tasks involved in the process of policy design and choice.



While the above statements are of a general nature, they do point to some areas that are especially critical in establishing a basis for the analysis of implementation. Berman (1978:159), however, is more specific and notes that there appears to be convergence toward three areas of agreement:

- (1) consensus...about the meaning of implementation and the nature of the implementation problem;
- (2) researchers, ..., seem to agree that a policy's implementation problem...derives also from the policy's relationship to its institutional setting;
- (3) most implementation researchers seem to consider the study of implementation, as a process, essential to identifying key policy levers in the social policy arena.

Thus, implementation analysis is moving from avoidance because it is a "vexing" problem and from the normative "facilitators", to case studies directed at explaining problems and failures, to traces of an intellectual convergence of important considerations such as definition, activity, and process. It is now appropriate to review some of the definitions being advanced.

#### IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED

Definitions are always appealing because they render with great economy the essence of what is meant by terms and concepts. Some definitions, however, are notoriously short and have a succinctness that aggravates the problem rather than providing clarification. Some writers, for example Jones (1970) and Cortner (1976) refer to implementation as the





"application of policy to problems". Gross (1966) and Broadnax (1976) call implementation the "activation" of policy decisions or plans. Dror (1968) in postulating a seventeen phase model of policy-making suggests the concept of "policy execution". Gergen (1968) refers to implementation as the phase of "sanction and control" referring no doubt to a managerial approach to implementation. While terms such as "application", "execution", and "activation" may well allude to some kind of activity, they yield little to the understanding of the process or to important elements subsumed in the process.

Some definitions arising from the policy implementation literature attempt to respond to the lacuna noted above. Viewed as an activity, Williams (1971:144) states

an inquiry about implementation...seeks to determine whether an organization can bring together men and material in a cohesive organizational unit and motivate them in such a way as to carry out the organization's stated objective.

In a similar vein but related to policy implementation, Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:447) note:

policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that are directed at the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions.

In both these definitions, the authors identify three important components, namely, activities conducted by people in the pursuit of objectives. Bardach (1977:36), in more evocative terms, alludes to these basic components when he states:

implementation is an assembly process...It is as if the original mandate...that set the policy or



program in motion were a blueprint for a large machine . . . Putting the machine together and making it run is, at one level, what we mean by the implementation process.

While these definitions offer insights into the process of policy implementation they appear to suggest an inevitability, namely that implementation will occur. Following Berman (1978:166), it is assumed, as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) suggest, that a policy "implies a theory relating goals to expected outcomes, ends or consequences: the theory assumes that once a policy choice, P, is made, then the outcomes, O, will occur". Berman (1978:166) suggests that implementation

challenges the theory's validity and presumes that P does not invariably lead to O. Implementation analysis is, in short, the study...(of) the conditions under which authoritative decisions do lead to desired outcomes.

It is with this added caveat, that P does not necessarily lead to O, that the statement by Rabinovitz, Pressman, and Rein (1976:401) takes on added importance in terms of process

Implementation becomes an attempt to reconcile three potentially conflicting imperatives: (1) what is legally required, (2) what is rationally defensible in the minds of the administrators, and (3) what is politically feasible to attract agreement among contending parties having a stake in the outcomes.

From this viewpoint, the implementation process is seen as unfolding in an environment within which complex forces are at work. An environment, that is, in which negotiation offers the possibility that the policy has a chance of being modified so that it does become defensible and feasible but also workable. This then leads to the question





of how to approach implementation analysis. As a point of departure, a brief summary of selected political science literature leading to policy-making and implementation is presented to provide the contextual evolution to the present concerns.

## POLITICAL SCIENCE, POLICY-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Political Science has had a long tradition of analyzing, prescribing, and describing political processes in society. Traditional writers, as Hayes and Hedlund (1970) note, centered their attention on political philosophy and emphasized an institutional perspective. Essentially, this led to discussions of the formal properties of political organizations and processes. Such studies tended to be legalistic, however, since they were based largely on constitutional and legal documents. Moreover, the activities of political philosophers tended to be normative (Isaak, 1975). In other words, value judgements were made of what "ought" to be. Plato's "just state", Rousseau's Social Contract (1912) and more recently C.C. Rodee, T.J. Anderson, and C.Q. Christol's Introduction to Political Science (1957) typify this tradition.

A change, however, was forthcoming. According to Easton (1966) the period following World War II saw the emergence of descriptive or empirical theory. The focus of political science shifted from "what ought to be" to "what is". Empirical statements were based upon evidence referring to the world of experience. According to Young (1962:2) one



approach which became influential was the view that political analysis should be concerned with the "nature, locus and utilization of power".

In more recent years, political science witnessed another important orientation. This new approach dealt basically with the relations and patterns of interaction among individuals (Vernon Van Dyke, 1970). The individual and the relationship among individuals became the unit of analysis. As a result, new viewpoints emerged.

One of these dealt with the production and allocation of values to society. Easton, in developing his systems model (1965:130), declared:

A policy, in other words, whether for society, for a narrow association, or for any other group, consists of a web of decisions and actions that allocate values.

As Sharkansky (1970:6) notes, a person with a proclivity for systems theory would be concerned with relationships:

He searches for phenomena which interact with the current topic of interest, and his 'system' shows how the topic receives and transmits stimuli in relationship with each actor.

A related orientation considered the scope of analysis in terms of policy and policy-making. Sharkansky (1970:2) stated:

A primary concern deals with explanation rather than description; sophisticated comparisons of the policies...; the search for economic, social, and historical, as well as political and governmental features to aid in understanding the policies that government choose; and an effort to accumulate research to build theories about policy.



The field of policy and policy-making has indeed become one of the primary emphases in political science. Following Lasswell's (1951:3 ff.) call for the establishment of a policy science, the field of policy-making has mushroomed to the extent of being highly pervasive and gaining high profile in all areas of the social sciences. A cornucopia of models has developed which are used extensively by social scientists. Dye (1975), for example, recognizes six such models:

the elite mass model (Dye and Zeigler, 1970), the group model (Truman, 1951), the rational model (Dror, 1968), the incremental model (Lindblom, 1959), the institutional model (Friedrick, 1941), and the systems model (1965).

While these models have proven helpful as heuristic devices, the analysis arising therefrom has been focused in the main on two domains, namely, policy development and policy impact. Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:446-7) state that in the past quarter century, efforts in policy research have been directed at "the character of economic and social problems, the claims made for government action, and the processes by which policy decisions are made." Hargrove (1975:5) noted that "many political scientists are extremely sensitive to the fact that their own literature has focused primarily upon processes of popular politics and policy formation and decision". Hargrove (1975) allows that there is a new awareness among political scientists that there may be problems upon the delivery side. What can political science offer to the study of policy implementation? The question is only now being partially answered. Instead of conducting research that describes





how institutions perform, Hargrove (1975:14) suggests, "at least part of the discipline should be redirected toward asking a different kind of question, that is, how does one get something accomplished using these

A number of social scientists have raised the issue of the politics of program administration and have suggested some salient foci for implementation analyses. Anderson (1975) raises the issue of policy ambiguity resulting from contending interest. This ambiguity is carried over into the administrative sphere causing the latter to be immersed in politics. Other writers (Dolbeare and Hammond, 1975; Bunker, 1972; Rabinovitz, Pressman, and Rein, 1976; Murphy, 1971) support Anderson's approach.

Various prescriptions have also been advanced. Hargrove (1975:16), for example, remarks that:

political scientists might be able to develop formal education in a new kind of implementation analysis which would draw upon the varieties of knowledge... The policy development analytic role should contain an implementation perspective because a concern for execution should be part of every new policy idea. Budget analysts should be able to tell if program managers are drawing on knowledge about implementation in their work. Evaluation experts should know how to link institutional process and impact research. And research analysts should include social scientists who can pull together knowledge about implementation to apply to policy analysis.

Hargrove (1975:31) goes further, however, when he states that

the analyst should develop an implementation strategy for the policy maker which lays out the problems likely to be associated with getting a new idea accepted within the organization, and he should use this as a basis for action once the policy is agreed upon.



While Rabinovitz, Pressman, and Rein (1976:401) are not as definitive about the role of the analyst, they nevertheless emphasize the politics inherent in implementation:

one wants primarily to understand more about the conflicting imperatives in the politics of administration and how they can be managed.

Similarly, Anderson (1975:108) argues that:

effectiveness of an agency, what it does or accomplishes, will be affected by the political context in which it operates and the amount of political support it has -- politics affects how an agency exercises discretion and carries out its programs.

As can be deduced from the above, most writers approach implementation from the point of view that the politics inherent in program administration shift attention from the political context in which the policy evolved to the agency or organizational setting where the policy is taken over. The nature of this political process is well worth a brief discussion since it would appear to differ markedly from the politics of policy development and adoption. On this point, Bardach (1977:37) is clear:

...implementation politics is...a special kind of politics. It is a form of politics in which the very existence of an already defined policy mandate, legally and legitimately authorized in some prior political process, affects the strategy and tactics of the struggle. The dominant effect is to make the politics of the implementation process highly defensive. A great deal of energy goes into maneuvering to avoid responsibility, scrutiny and blame.

Richard Liroff (cited in Cortner, 1976:325) alludes to this defensive stance by stating

that in order to secure organizational well-being, each agency establishes predictable patterns of relationships with its clientele -- a "negotiated





environment". An agency will not willingly disrupt these basic institutional relationships; it prefers to reinforce and preserve its negotiated environment.

Hargrove (1975:69) concurs with this view but suggests that political scientists have not sufficiently researched the issue to give an understanding of this form of politics:

Implementation is a political process in which individuals and groups vie for control or defense against programs. It differs from the policy adoption process, which is aggregative in character through the creation of coalitions for agreement. In the implementation process, the consensus required for decision comes unstuck and support for the program fragments among separated groups of actors who engage in "isolated maneuvers and counter maneuvers". It is a political process, but its properties, which differ from those found in policy making, are not well understood.

Bardach (1977) discusses the differences between policy adoption and policy implementation and offers some insights to Hargrove's problem. To quote Bardach (1977:212-213) at length:

Both can be conceived as "assembly" processes, the former entailing aggregation of "support" for a given policy proposal from a large number of semi-autonomous actors, and the latter entailing the integration of numerous functional inputs to create an operating program, also obtained from a variety of semi-autonomous actors. Both processes are "political", in the sense that persuasion and bargaining, rather than brute force or coercion are employed to bring about the desired assembly of requisite elements. Both processes are somewhat sensitive to the "timing" of the various assembly activities and to the decision arenas in which persuasion and bargaining take place. Our hypothesis, then, is that actors in the implementation process are relatively more reluctant to commit their resources to a new operating program than they are to commit their support to a mere verbal proposal. ...Another reason it is relatively easier to secure commitment in the adoption stage... is



that actors generally know that the slow hard work of the implementation stage is yet to come, at which time they will still be able to revise, amend, augment and delete.

As a conclusion to the above, it appears that implementation as a process of conversion -- "as a process which attempts to study the conditions under which authoritative decisions do lead to desired outcomes" -- which entails analyzing what transpires between policy adoption and policy outcome. Implementation forces the analysis of Lasswell's "black box". But implementation analysis shifts our attention to the politics of administering policies once they are handed over to agencies or organizations whether they already exist or are set up to deal with non-standard decisions. Implementation, therefore, occurs within an organizational setting. As Elmore (1978:187) remarks, "Since virtually all policies are implemented by large public organizations, knowledge of organizations has become a critical component of policy analysis". Elmore (1978:187) adds:

Organizations are simplifiers; they work out problems by breaking them into discrete, manageable tasks and allocating responsibility for those tasks to specialized units. Only by understanding how organizations work can we understand how policies are shaped in the process of implementation.

This being the case, the discussion will now consist of a presentation of organizational models and consider their use in policy implementation.

#### ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Elmore (1978:187) noted that one of the most striking features of organization theory was its conceptual anarchy.





In seeking advice for practical organizational problems, we are faced with conflicting and contradictory conceptions (cf. Nelson, 1974:398). While this situation precludes a single coherent body of organizational theory which could serve as basis for analysis of policy implementation in organizational settings, we can cope with the diversity by identifying a number of models which could be used for such an analysis. Indeed, such a strategy was utilized by Allison (1971) in his study of the Cuban missile crisis. Allison's (1971) study shows that different models lead to different perceptions and conclusions. "What we see and judge," notes Allison (1971:2) "...depends not only on the evidence but also on the 'conceptual lenses' through which we look at the evidence." Elmore (1978:189) suggests on the one hand, that analysts have shown indifference to organizational problems and that, on the other hand, administrators have not had the luxury of time for extended analyses of organizational alternatives. Thus, forcing analysts and administrators to think about organizational alternatives might lead to policies which could be feasible and implementable.

Elmore (1978) proceeds to an analysis of four models of organization -- representing the major schools of thought -- which could be utilized for the purpose of implementation analysis. The four models are: (1) the systems management model, (2) the bureaucratic process model, (3) the organizational development model, and (4) the conflict and bargaining model. Elmore's (1978) discussion is quite extensive and contains a number of case studies reflecting the use of the models. For purposes of this study, the major propositions of the models





and their utility (or lack of) to implementation analysis will be presented here.

Elmore (1978) outlines four sets of propositions that are said to capture the essential features of the models. In each case the propositions centre on (1) the central principal of the model, (2) the distribution of power in the organization, (3) the decision-making process, and (4) a sketch of the implementation process.

### Propositions for the Four Models

#### Implementation as Systems Management

##### Propositions:

1. Organizations should operate as rational value maximizers. The essential attribute of rationality is goal-directed behavior; organizations are effective to the extent that they maximize performance on their central goals and objectives. Each task that an organization performs must contribute to at least one of a set of well-defined objectives that accurately reflect the organization's purpose.
2. Organizations should be structured on the principle of hierarchical control. Responsibility for policy-making and overall system performance rests with top management, which, in turn, allocates specific tasks and performance objectives to subordinate units and monitors their performance.
3. For every task an organization performs there is some optimal allocation of responsibilities among subunits that maximizes the organization's overall performance on its objectives. Decision-making in organizations consists of finding this optimum and maintaining it by continually adjusting the internal allocation of responsibilities to changes in the environment.
4. Implementation consists of defining a detailed set of objectives that accurately reflect the intent of a given policy, assigning responsibilities and standards of performance to



subunits consistent with these objectives, monitoring system performance, and making internal adjustments that enhance the attainment of the organization's goals. The process is dynamic, not static; the environment continually imposes new demands that require internal adjustments. But implementation is always goal-directed and value-maximizing.

(Elmore, 1978:191)

## Implementation as Bureaucratic Process

### Propositions:

1. The two central attributes of organizations are discretion and routine; all important behavior in organizations can be explained by the irreducible discretion exercised by individual workers in their day-to-day decisions and the operating routines that they develop to maintain and enhance their position in the organization.
2. The dominance of discretion and routine means that power in organizations tends to be fragmented and dispersed among small units exercising relatively strong control over specific tasks within their sphere of authority. The amount of control that any one organizational unit can exert over another--laterally or hierarchically--is hedged by the fact that, as organizations become increasingly complex, units become more highly specialized and exercise greater control over their internal operations.
3. Decision-making consists of controlling discretion and changing routine. All proposals for change are judged by organizational units in terms of the degree to which they depart from established patterns; hence, organizational decisions tend to be incremental.
4. Implementation consists of identifying where discretion is concentrated and which of an organization's repertoire of routines need changing, devising alternative routines that represent the intent of policy, and inducing organizational units to replace old routines with new ones.

(Elmore, 1978:199 and 200)





## Implementation as Organizational Development

### Propositions:

1. Organizations should function to satisfy the basic psychological and social needs of individuals--for autonomy and control over their own work, for participation in decisions affecting them and for commitment to the purposes of the organization.
2. Organizations should be structured to maximize individual control, participation, and commitment at all levels. Hierarchically structured bureaucracies maximize these things for people in upper levels of the organization at the expense of those in lower levels. Hence, the best organizational structure is one that minimizes hierarchical control and distributes responsibility for decisions among all levels of the organization.
3. Effective decision-making in organizations depends on the creation of effective work groups. The quality of interpersonal relations in organizations largely determines the quality of decisions. Effective work groups are characterized by mutual agreement on goals, open communication among individuals, mutual trust and support among groups members, full utilization of members' skills, and effective management of conflict. Decision-making consists primarily of building consensus and strong interpersonal relations among group members.
4. The implementation process is necessarily one of consensus-building and accommodation between policy-makers and implementors. The central problem of implementation is not whether implementors conform to prescribed policy but whether the implementation process results in consensus in goals, individual autonomy, and commitment to policy on the part of those who must carry it out.

(Elmore, 1978:209)

## Implementation as Conflict and Bargaining

### Propositions:

1. Organizations are arenas of conflict in which individuals and subunits with specific interests compete for relative advantage in the exercise





of power and the allocation of scarce resources.

2. The distribution of power in organizations is never stable. It depends exclusively on the temporary ability of one individual or unit to mobilize sufficient resources to manipulate the behavior of others. Formal position in the hierarchy of an organization is only one of a multitude of factors that determine the distribution of power. Other factors include specialized knowledge, control of material resources, and the ability to mobilize external political support. Hence, the exercise of power in organizations is only weakly related to their formal structure.
3. Decision-making in organizations consists of bargaining within and among organizational units. Bargained decisions are the result of convergence among actors with different preferences and resources. Bargaining does not require that parties agree on a common set of goals, nor does it even require that all parties concur in the outcome of the bargaining process. It only requires that they agree to adjust their behavior mutually in the interest of preserving the bargaining relationship as a means of allocating resources.
4. Implementation consists of a complex series of bargained decisions reflecting the preferences and resources of participants. Success or failure of implementation cannot be judged by comparing a result against a single declaration of intent, because no single set of purposes can provide an internally consistent statement of the interests of all parties to the bargaining process. Success can only be defined relative to the goals of one party to the bargaining process or in terms of the preservation of the bargaining process itself.

(Elmore, 1978:217-218)



## Utility and Contribution of the Models to Policy Implementation

Since systems management is cast in the rationalist tradition reflected by a set of normative prescriptions,\* controlling and structuring subordinate behavior becomes critical. Thus, the major utility of the model is that it directs attention to those mechanisms used by policy-makers and administrators for controlling and structuring behavior. There is a sense in which policy analysts are prone to emphasize the normative utility of the model as opposed to its descriptive utility (Elmore, 1978). The model may help simplify the implementation process but whether the implementation process should be structured around the model is another question. This might well lead to a situation where the model is used to restructure reality--a situation which may or may not be shared by people involved in the process. Further, there is an implied feeling that the model will "work" if everyone behaves according to its dictates (Elmore, 1978:199).

In the bureaucratic process model routine and discretion are the important features. The model forces us to look at the patterns of bureaucratic life when new policies are brought forward. How will new policies affect the daily routines of those who must deliver services? Another important consideration raised by the model is

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\* an example of such a set of prescriptions would be (1) specified tasks and objectives reflecting intent of the policy, (2) plan for allocation of tasks and performance standards, (3) objective measuring devices, (4) system of management controls and sanctions for accountable purposes.



that policy-makers look at global issues. Consequently when we shift to the operations sphere there is little by way of guidance for the implementors.

However, Elmore (1978:208) states, "...[the] model does not give any clear-cut prescriptions for improving the implementation process." In terms of normative advice, Weatherly and Lipsky (cited in Elmore, 1978:208) tell us:

bureaucratic coping behaviors cannot be eliminated, but they can be monitored and directed by rewarding those that most closely conform to preferred public objectives [and] discouraging objectionable practices.

The major advantages of the model are descriptive. It helps us identify the common pattern of implementation failure whereby hierarchical controls developed by top management to effect behavior changes in subordinates, or by one agency to structure the behavior of another, will fail to modify the street-level (agency to client) transactions which determine the success of a policy (Elmore 1978:208). The significant feature of the organizational development model is that the "normal" flow of policy is turned around. Instead of a top-down flow, the model states that the capacity for implementation originates at the bottom of the organization. The model suggests that those factors which affect the implementors' behavior lie outside direct management control, for example, personal motivation and commitment and within-group interaction and support. Elmore (1978:215) states





the role of those at the top of the system, then is necessarily residual; they can provide resources that implementors need to do their work, but they cannot exert direct control over the factors that determine the success or failure of the work.

and,

the only conception of implementation that makes sense under these conditions is one that emphasizes consensus building and accommodation between policy-makers and implementors...because it is the only way to insure that implementors have a direct personal stake in the performance of their jobs.

The organizational development model contrasts quite importantly with the previous models by shifting the focus of implementation from top management to subordinates because they are the ones who will determine, in the final analysis, whether or not success will be achieved.

The major criticism of the model is the fact that it ignores conflict and power and indeed, the politics of change. But this criticism might well be extended to the two previous models. Many problems encountered in the implementation might be better understood in terms of conflict and bargaining.

A major contribution of the conflict and bargaining model according to Elmore (1978:226) is:

that parties to the implementation process need not agree on anything except the necessity to bargain. The bargaining process...proceeds by convergence, adjustment and closure rather than by hierarchical control or consensus.

Of importance is the fact that participants stand to gain more by bargaining. Failure to bargain means a lost opportunity of access to goods which can be gained only through participation.



On the other hand, the greatest weakness of the model is that it does not stipulate a criterion for success or failure. The rationalist critique according to Elmore (1978: 226) is worth considering:

- 1) it elevates confusion and mindless drift to the level of principle,
- 2) it provides an easy excuse for acquiescing in results that satisfy no one, and
- 3) it provides no basis for improving the implementation process.

While these criticisms are difficult to counter, failure to consider the intricacies of bargaining might well be to the detriment of analysts in the sense of identifying the position of actors in the process and their relative advantages or disadvantages.

On the use of alternative models. One of the important consideration in using alternative models is that they permit us to distinguish certain features of implementation from others. As Elmore (1978:227) states:

every implementing agency probably has a set of management controls, a firmly entrenched collection of operating routines, some process for eliciting the involvement of implementors, and a set of internal and external bargaining relationships.

But the important point is not whether these elements exist but how they affect the implementation process. One way to determine how these factors affect the implementation process is to subject to analysis the same evidence from the perspective of different models.





A second consideration is that certain problems might be more amenable to solutions from the perspective of a particular model. This choice might well be specific to time and setting. Part of the problem is to be able, as Elmore (1978:227) puts it, "...to understand where certain tools of analysis and strategies of action are likely to pay off and when not."

### CONCLUSION

If policy-making is conceptualized as a sequential process, then policy implementation becomes the intermediate phase between policy development and policy impact and evaluation. Policy development analysis offers a description and an explanation of how a policy emerges from problems and concerns within the social and political environment of society. Policy impact and evaluation analysis tells us how successful the policy was in responding to those problems and concerns. The argument in the preceding discussion is that there has been a neglect in trying to understand how policies, once chosen, are converted into feasible and workable program. Policy implementation analysis attempts to answer to this neglect. In one sense, policy implementation analysis attempts to understand what goes on in Laswell's (1956) "black box". This idea of the "black box" expresses well the complexity which characterizes the operationalization of policies which is policy implementation.



The literature review presented above affords some analytical perspectives that might be used to cut through the complexity of the process of policy implementation. These perspectives provide assistance in looking at the nature of the politics involved, the identification and motivations of the actors in the implementation process, the shaping of the policy as it moves from general to operational terms, and the nature of the social and political environment in which the process takes place.



### Chapter III

#### A REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY

This chapter presents a reconstruction of some of the events which helped set the stage for the development of the policy to establish a French teacher training institute in Manitoba. The chapter therefore provides a background and a context for the implementation of the policy. The basis of the presentation will be chronological starting with the passage of Bill 59 by the Progressive Conservative government in 1967.

#### Roblin's Legacy to Franco-Manitobans

Bill 59, giving official recognition to French as a language of instruction, received royal assent in the Manitoba Legislature on April 27, 1967.

Reactions to the Bill were varied. The Winnipeg Tribune (April 26, 1967) wrote, "Manitoba now third in French Education." Le Devoir (March 30, 1967) was more impressed calling it "un gain substantiel." La Liberté (March 30, 1967) on a cooler note stated, "Un autre pas en avant" -- a subtle intimation that perhaps another step forward would be taken later. However, it noted that, finally, linguistic rights had been restored.

The Liberal MLA for St. Boniface, Laurent Desjardins, the most vociferous and, at times, the most acrimonious member





of the Legislature to demand French language rights and aid to parochial schools, lauded the government (Debates and Proceedings, Legislative Assembly of Manitoba, 1st session, 28th Legislature No. 68-106 pp. 1575-2539, 1966-67) by stating:

I am now pleased to express my appreciation to the Minister of Education... I wish, Sir, my congratulations to be as forceful now as my criticism was in the past.

If Bill 59 was considered by some people as a major step forward, it was not without its inherent problems, especially with respect to implementation. W.C. Lorimer, Deputy Minister of Education, indicated that he could see problems in implementating the legislation (Winnipeg Free Press, December 6, 1967). Concerns had been raised by two members of Hedlin-Menzies and Associates, consulting firm of Winnipeg. In a letter (H. Préfontaine, personal files) to Premier Roblin dated March 22, 1967, MM. B. Lagace and H. Préfontaine had declared:

The tenor of sub-sections (4), (8) and (9)(d) is unnecessarily negative and defensive and the implication of the chosen wording is a perpetuation of the "ghetto" concept of segregation by language. Evidently, this familiar concept is incompatible with proper determination of district, area, or division boundaries toward the greatest overall qualities of education, and the larger divisions will certainly make effective "ghettoizing" increasingly impracticable.

In the same letter the authors noted that a dissenting parent could restrict the implementation of the law:

...the reference to any single pupil not being required to receive instruction in the French language if his parent or guardian makes written



objection and the parallel provision for the instruction of English of any pupil whose parent or guardian makes (such) an objection not only tends to detract from the worthy motivation of the development of the legislation, but renders its implementation subject to unnecessary political, educational, and administrative problem.

Conscious planning and a proper administrative structure concerned with providing the wherewithal for the implementation of Bill 59 had not been established. It would seem that the Department of Education had little motivation to assume the responsibility. According to G.M. Davies (Winnipeg Free Press, September 18, 1968) Assistant Deputy Minister of Education, the onus of French teaching "rests with parents."

The results of the legislation were later expressed (Rallye Handbook, 1968:3):

De fait, en enlevant à la cause patriotique traditionnelle sa raison d'être et en mettant ainsi à jour toute l'indifférence et la démolition qui règnent au sein de la population francophone, la nouvelle loi lançait un défi aux Manitobains de langue française, celui de se prévaloir de leurs droits nouvellement acquis, ou d'accepter le coup de grâce porté à leur identité culturelle.<sup>1\*</sup>

As 1967 was drawing to a close, Dufferin Roblin withdrew from provincial politics. Armed with a record of economic expansion and the recognition of the French language, Roblin envisioned obtaining the leadership of the National Progressive Conservative Party. At a "Dinner with Duff" which saw sixteen hundred supporters give their best wishes to the departing

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\* Please refer to end of chapter for translation of numbered French quotations.



premier, Roblin stated (Winnipeg Tribune, November 25, 1967):

Let us strive therefore to accord newer, wider and more generous recognition and respect to both languages and both personalities of our country.

Roblin, as conventional wisdom has it, had immense sympathy for the French. His cabinet, however, had been very much divided on the issue of granting language rights to the French (Int. Laurent Desjardins, July 21, 1976)\*.

### A Search for an Alternative

During the course of 1967, the AECFM\*\* had developed a greater awareness of the full import of the changes which had affected the French community since World War II. Secularization had brought about significant attitudinal changes with respect to religious values; urbanization had destroyed the rural-parochial base of the Franco-Manitoban

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\* note: Int. refers to interview

\*\* AECFM: Association d'Education des Canadiens Français du Manitoba.

The AECFM came into being on February 29, 1916, after the Norris government abolished the bilingual system of Education in Manitoba. The Association's major purpose was to preserve the French element in the province. Throughout its entire life span (1916-1968), the AECFM's main focus was on French education. In many ways it paralleled the efforts of the Department of Education but in the French language. Another objective of the AECFM was its continued attempt to reestablish French as an official language of the province. In this it failed. Following World War II (LeTourneau, 1977; Leblanc, 1968) there is reason to believe that the Association's influence over the French community was waning. It would appear that the rural-clerical ideology which had served the Association was suffering the impact of a societal context in rapid transition. In 1968 the AECFM gave way to the "Société Franco-Manitobaine.







society; mass media had brought the community into the mainstream of North American culture and the Church had largely relinquished its traditional leadership role, thereby creating a vacuum. The AECFM had not planned for these changes. Indeed, its persistence in maintaining an obsolete ideology, blended with an elitist disposition (Teffaine, Int. July 20, 1976; Gaboury, Int. July 22, 1976) had opened a tremendous gap between itself and its population. The impact and ramifications of these changes, which seriously impinged upon the continued existence of the French community, would have to be gauged and evaluated in order to reestablish the AECFM as the cornerstone of the Franco-Manitoban community.

With these various tensions serving as a source of motivation, the executive elected in 1967 set out to explore its environment. The "congrès annuels" which served as a demonstration of unity and solidarity were now viewed by this new executive as an exercise in futility. The agenda consisted of bringing a few amendments to an outdated constitution. As Maurice Gauthier, then president of the AECFM, allowed (Int. July 15, 1976), "Il n'y aurait plus de congrès avant que l'on puisse établir son bien-fondé."<sup>2</sup>

At a January 1967 meeting in St. Leon, the executive struck upon a means of extending itself into the community. The process involved a modified form of social



animation\*. With the aid of a social animator provided by the federal government's ARDA administration\*, a seminar was held in Gimli in June (Valliancourt and Hebert, 1971). The seminar brought together "representatives" of the Franco-Manitoban community. The outcome of the seminar was a new enthusiasm which hopefully would translate itself into an animation programme. The Gimli experience caught the attention of La Liberté (June 15, 1967):

L'association fait une expérience unique... C'est l'association qui a pris l'initiative simplement parce que les Franco-Manitobains se disaient de plus en plus que cette organisation ne valait plus rien dans nos temps modernes.<sup>3</sup>

By the end of 1967, the executive of the AECFM (AECFM archives, 1967) adopted the following resolution:

Que le grand colloque 'Convention des Franco-Manitobains' soit organisé pour la fin d'avril, en se servant de la procédure des ateliers de travail et que l'on s'arrange pour que tous les secteurs de la population soient représentés.<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, an independent commission composed of five individuals was set up by the executive "en vue de découvrir et de former des chefs de file..." (Rallye Handbook, 1968:5).

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\* ARDA - Acronym for Agricultural Rehabilitation and Development Act (1961). In short, according to Lanctôt (1965:1) "...[ARDA] enabled the establishment of a federal-provincial programme... aimed primarily at alleviating the serious national problem of low income..." The ARDA administration was also involved in community development programs. Social animation, essentially synonymous with community development, is a process in which a group of people or a community participates in the creation of conditions for its economic and social progress. A social animator is essentially a community development officer and is the catalytic agent who helps the community to rely upon its own initiative. The key concepts are community participation and decision-making.



This Commission had two primary objectives: (a) to consult the Francophone population scattered throughout the province, and (b) to plan and organize the "Rallye du Manitoba Français" to be held in June of 1968.

With its mandate well defined, the Commission set out on an exploratory mission. It had approximately six months to perform a task which, according to experts (M.D.T. Associates, 1968), would normally have taken a few years.

#### Federalism or a New Canadian Nationalism

Canadian federalism took on a new élan during the Pearson years. A new conception of Canada was slowly emerging at the federal level, precipitated by a growing restlessness with the separatist movement in Quebec. Lester Pearson, the leader of the Official Opposition, was motivated to state (Hansard, December 17, 1962; cited in Arès, 1972:21):

Pour les Canadiens de langue française, la Confédération créait une nation bilingue et biculturelle. Elle protégeait leur langue et leur culture dans tout le Canada. Elle signifiait une association et non une domination. Les Canadiens francophones ont cru que cette association signifiait des chances et des possibilités égales pour les deux races fondatrices, à toutes les étapes de la croissance du pays. Les Canadiens de langue anglaise reconnaissent bien sûr, que l'entente confédérative protégeait les droits des Canadiens français dans la province du Québec, au Parlement et dans les tribunaux fédéraux. Mais la plupart avaient l'impression...qu'elle ne s'étendait pas plus loin que ces limites, du moins jusqu'à une époque encore très récente. Cela signifiait qu'à





toutes fins utiles, il existerait un Canada de langue anglaise, avec un Québec bilingue. Ce qu'on appelle le fait français, devait être quelque chose d'unique-ment provincial.<sup>5</sup>

The French Canadian conception of Confederation, as outlined by Pearson, was essentially the one proposed by Henri Bourassa at the turn of the century. Bourassa, a staunch French nationalist, had appealed for the support of a compact theory. Bourassa (cited in Cook, 1966:51) in 1917 defined the theory thus:

The Canadian nation will attain its ultimate destiny, indeed it will exist, only on the condition of being biethnic and bilingual, and by remaining faithful to the concept of the Fathers of Confederation: the free and voluntary association of two peoples, enjoying equal rights in all matters.

Cook (1966:51) adds:

For Bourassa and his followers, Confederation was a federation of two cultures, as well as of provinces in which French--and English-speaking Canadians--had a moral claim to equality of linguistic, religious, and civil rights from coast to coast.

It was during the years of crisis over the rights of French minorities outside Quebec, in Ontario in 1912 and Manitoba in 1916, that the compact theory was evolved. But countering this French nationalism was an English nationalism. According to Arès (1972) this form of nationalism can be summarized as follows: a bilingual Quebec within an English Canada. Thus the French fact would be limited to a single province, Quebec. An advocate of this view was the historian Donald Creighton. In an article entitled "The Myth of Biculturalism or the Great French-Canadian Sales Campaign,"



Creighton (Saturday Night 1966) outlined his views:

For six long years, ever since the lately deposed Premier Jean Lesage won power in the Province of Quebec, English Canadians have been subjected to what is undoubtedly the most extreme example of political hardsell in their entire experience... the advocates of French Canadian "nationalism" have used every conceivable form of persuasion, compulsion, shock and menace to compel English Canadians to buy a particular view of Confederation... They appropriated two fine, big words, "bilingualism" and "biculturalism", to describe the ideal at which Canadian society ought to aim... Their campaign had not gone very far when it was given magnificent official recognition and approval by Prime Minister Pearson, who obligingly established a Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Creighton's (1970:333) position was made yet clearer when he remarked:

By the time the Liberals gained power at Ottawa in the spring of 1963, the validity of the French-Canadian grievances, the need for reparation by English Canada, and the deficiencies of the Canadian constitution had become the nation's three most popular dogmas. They dangerously undermined Canada's cohesive strength at the very moment when its continued existence as an independent nation was threatened by the pressure of external forces.

For Creighton, the English nationalist, the compact theory stands as a false interpretation of the legal basis of Confederation. However, if Creighton appeared convinced of his interpretation, other historians appeared as convinced of the compact theory. Arès (1967) reviews the debate from 1864 to 1965, and concludes that the debate is far from resolved. Arès (1967:250) remarks "De la réponse qu'on donne à cette question dépend l'avenir du Canada, français et du Québec."



Stanley (1974) in an article entitled "Act or Pact? Another Look at Confederation" traces the origin and growth of the compact theory. Stanley (1974:95) states:

That civil strife in Canada has never degenerated into civil war has been due, in part at least, to the recognition by both peoples of the necessity of some modus vivendi and the recognition by each of the rights of the other. The recognition and definition of these rights is the basis of the entente, understanding, pact, compact...which is the foundation of our political unity...it is a gentleman's agreement, an understanding based upon mutual consent, with a moral rather than a judicial sanction.

Whatever the arguments put forth by the Anglo--or French--nationalist, to some the survival of Canada was at stake. Pierre Trudeau (1967:39-40), a staunch federalist, would state prior to his entry in politics:

Un des moyens de contrebalancer l'attrait du séparatisme, c'est d'employer un temps, une énergie et des sommes énormes au service du nationalisme fédéral... On doit faire sentir à tous les citoyens que c'est seulement dans le cadre de l'Etat Fédéral que leur langue, leur culture, leurs intentions, leurs traditions les plus sacrées et leur niveau de vie peuvent échapper aux assauts de l'extérieur et aux conflits de l'intérieur.

Separatism could be fought only through constitutional arrangements which would recognize the concept of two founding peoples, and their harmonious co-existence within a context called Canada.

Pearson (Free Press, May 21, 1963) reiterated his concern over the survival of Canada by warning:

I cannot imagine anything at this time more serious to the progress, indeed, to the survival of our country as Confederation than a successful resolution of this problem... So Quebec, to be Quebec must be Quebec in Canada.





Thus it would appear that if the compact theory is not solidly based in the legal formulations of the Constitution of 1867, the federal government was during the Pearson years and continued to be during the Trudeau years, the strongest advocate of the theory. Indeed, the most concrete support of the theory was when the Pearson government commissioned a Royal Inquiry on the question of bilingualism and biculturalism in the summer of 1963. Innis (1973:foreword) stated that the terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism were to:

...inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to recommend that steps should be taken to develop the Canadian Confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between two founding races, taking into account the contribution of the enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution.

The Preliminary Report of the Commission was tabled February 1, 1965. The ten member commission had travelled throughout Canada for months in order to comprehend the extent of the problem. What was discovered was "that Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, is passing through the greatest crisis in its history." (Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1965:13).

Two and one half years later, the Commission submitted the first report entitled Official Languages. Essentially, the report (Winnipeg Tribune, December 5, 1967) urged equality of both the French and English languages:



The Royal Commission...recommends that French Canadians outside Quebec should be accorded the linguistic equality already enjoyed by English Canadians within Quebec.

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, however, did not resolve Canada's problem or crisis. To be sure, the ethnic cleavage between French and English is as strong and as polarized as ever. The Commission undoubtedly created a greater degree of awareness of the problems confronting the Canadian population as a whole. The Commission, as most interviewees unequivocally stated, created a different climate. Gauthier (Int. July 15, 1976) stated that the "... commission B et B a donné un nouvel enthousiasme aux franco-phones." Justice Monnin (Int. July 13, 1976) intimated:

Les enquêtes de la Commission Laurendeau - Dunton créèrent un élément de crise. La communauté francophone, de par le passé, avait réussi à masquer sa faiblesse. Devant la Commission, elle dut dévoiler cette faiblesse."<sup>6</sup>

The full import of the Commission is difficult to assess. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that it gave Franco-Manitobans a resurgence of hope. Perhaps there was reason to believe, as in the case of the leadership, in efforts to revive the waning spirit of the community, since to this point the Franco-Manitoban community had had to fend for itself in its project of survival. Now the Federal Government was showing signs of being concerned.

### The Constitutional Conference

As part of the ongoing efforts to promote his federalist project, Prime Minister Pearson, acting upon the



recommendation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, called a Constitutional Conference. The major focus of the conference was to have French language rights entrenched in the Constitution. But Prime Minister Pearson (Winnipeg Tribune, February 5, 1968) reiterated before the ten provincial premiers, that "What is at stake in my opinion is no less than Canada's survival as a nation."

Essentially, according to Time - The Weekly Magazine (1968), the conference could be described as:

...an historic reversal of the first century's whittling away of French minority rights...  
The conference agreed that 'as a matter of equity and as proposed by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism; French speaking Canadians outside Quebec should have the same rights as English speaking Canadians inside Quebec.'

There was agreement by all provinces that French language rights should be recognized in all of English Canada. However, there was hesitation by both Alberta and British Columbia as to the entrenchment of linguistic rights within the Constitution. Premier Bennett of British Columbia was the most reluctant representing perhaps the most ardent anglo-nationalistic view by calling his province (Time - The Weekly Magazine 1968), "the friendly society of unhyphenated Canadians."

Manitoba's Walter Weir acknowledged that he would support the entrenchment of linguistic rights in the Constitution. However, his later pronouncements supported the concept of bringing the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada, as suggested by the other Western premiers.





Edinburgh (1969:12,15) summarized the attitudes of Weir and Strom:

The Supreme Court can rule on the constitutional validity of the proposed legislation (Official Languages Act), but it can only interpret the present Constitution; and it was to change this that the Prime Minister called the meeting that Strom and Weir so effectively disrupted. It seems very small minded to reject the present Constitution on the one hand, and then to shelter behind it on the other.

Concrete implementation of French linguistic rights in Manitoba would later be shaded by a policy of "gradualism."

### The Grand Experiment

If the Pearson government was committed to its federalist project, the French leadership in Manitoba was no less committed to its project of social animation. Following the Gimli seminar in June, 1967, the French leadership had made plans to approach the French community. By February of 1968, the Rallye organizers were ready to launch their project. At a press conference, Hubert Préfontaine, the technical director, stated:

Manitoba's French community today announced an audacious programme of social, economic and cultural development among its 80,000 members. The first stage of the scheme, which has been christened "Le Rallye du Manitoba Français" or Manitoba French Rally, includes a province-wide process of collective self-appraisal and leadership development. The principal aims...are real popular representation, and an unbiased study of current social, economic and cultural prospects... The new group responsible for the plan is independent of existing structures and organizations... The group has selected for its theme: "French-speaking Manitobans face Canada's second century." This general heading was chosen to avoid imposing any predetermined



ideology, and patriotic cause, any assumptions about specific goals and concepts. (Commission du Rallye, 1968).

The Rallye's technical director, Hubert Prefontaine, stated (Winnipeg Free Press, February 9, 1968) that the plan was designed:

... to develop leadership among French-speaking people in the province; study whatever problems we may have as a community; discover for certain just what the position of the French-speaking Manitobans really is; unify."

The president of the AECFM, Maurice Gauthier (Winnipeg Tribune, February 9, 1968) stated that he fully endorsed the Rallye and avowed that, "Le Rallye will bury once and for all the contention by certain people that the French fact is dead in Manitoba."

The Rallye was based, from its earliest state, on the principles and techniques of participation proposed by the process of social animation. During a period of three months, from March to May, five animators visited the Franco-Manitoba centers. In a first round, the local leadership was made aware of the Rallye, of its procedures and its possibilities. At a second meeting with the social animators, local organizations selected delegates to the June convention.

The time restrictions and lack of personnel posed some problems. The M.D.T. Associates' evaluation report noted (Secretariat d'Etat, Juillet 1968):

L'animation sociale proprement dite est un processus de longue haleine et il est clair que le Rallye n'a utilisé qu'une forme mitigée d'animation... Le fait



que les techniques de l'animation sociale n'ont été utilisées que partiellement...a posé plusieurs problèmes...ces lacunes se situent au niveau de la représentativité, de la directivité... Le Rallye, étant donné ses limites de temps et de personnel, n'a pu que prendre le premier pas vers une organisation réellement représentative.<sup>7</sup>

Notwithstanding the preparatory phase and the constraints therein implied, the Rallye was held from June 7 to June 9, 1968. The experience, in general, was a success. The three hundred delegates were involved in workshops dealing with four basic themes (Rallye Handbook, 1968:8):

- Politics:
  - (i) Constitutional matters; Manitoba, Quebec, and Ottawa.
  - (ii) Language rights and linguistic districts.
- Culture:
  - (i) Education, educational research, schools, and adult education.
  - (ii) Communication, radio and television, newspaper, and culture.
- Social:
  - (i) French-English relations at the institutional and organizational levels, group and individual levels.
  - (ii) Urbanization, assimilation, reorientation and adaption, immigration.
- Economic:
  - (i) Personal and family economy, professional and technical training, job and revenue, buying and saving
  - (ii) Community and political economy, industries, cooperatives, and business.

The focus of the Rallye was intentionally more pragmatic, reflecting the consensus of the larger society. Education, while not deemphasized, took its place on a level





of importance with other concerns such as economics, sociology, and politics. La Liberté (June 12, 1968) summed up the Rallye as:

Travail positif très sérieux... C'est surtout en tant que Franco-Manitobain que nous l'avons senti... Ils découvriraient tout à coup que notre vie française ne se résume pas à quelques cours de français ou à des manifestations folkloriques ou culturelles, mais qu'elle se prolonge aussi dans la politique et dans l'organisation économique et sociale...si le but du Rallye était de faire prendre conscience par tous les délégués de la nécessité pour eux de retrousser leurs manches et de travailler sans plus tarder à l'animation de leur propre milieu, nous croyons que ce but a été atteint...<sup>8</sup>

The Winnipeg Free Press (June 10, 1968) reported that "A Quiet Revolution was born this weekend in St. Boniface." The self-analysis (Winnipeg Free Press, June 10, 1968) touched upon such items as the inferiority complex of the Franco-Manitobans, lack of pride in the French language, and re-evaluation of the priest in the Franco-Manitoban community, dissatisfaction with French education of the youth both at home and at school. Apart from the self-analysis or "prise de conscience," concrete action was taken as follow-up to the convention. A ten member commission was set up by the AECFM executive with a mandate to create a new organization which would in effect reflect all sectors of the Franco-Manitoban society.

In the perception of some people (Gauthier, 1976; Monnin, 1976; Gaboury, 1976), the Rallye was a tremendous success. Indeed, it served to generate a significant amount of discussion and involved a fairly important segment of the



community. However, not every one supported this contention. Roland Marcoux (Int. July 1976), a social animator, who was extensively involved in the preparatory phase of the Rallye, expressed an opposite view: "Le Rallye 68 fut raté royalement. L'objectif du Rallye se fixait dans un cadre économique; le message a été mal compris."<sup>9</sup>

On a more fundamental note, Valiancourt and Hébert (1971:181) were highly critical of the ten-member commission:

Within a very short period of time, however, this commission had been expanded to include the five-member executive of l'Association d'Education since many members of the original ten-person commission could easily be considered members of the community's traditional elite, the balance of power within the expanded commission had in effect precluded the possibility of creation of a radically different organization, based upon broad popular participation.

Maurice Gauthier (Int. June 15, 1976) explained this move in terms of the need to preserve unity. It was his opinion that had the radical element prevailed and obtained the power they sought it might well have created a disastrous schism within the French community, a division which would have effectively alienated a large portion of Franco-Manitobans. To maintain a proper balance, Gauthier felt that both groups had to be represented, thus maintaining a certain degree of unity.

In terms of ideology\*, there is reason to believe that Gauthier's rationalization may well have stifled the development

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\* Following Sarup (1978:63) ideologies are ways to interpretation which (1) give a partial view of the world, (2) refract reality via pre-existing categories, (3) generate special and limited interests, and (4) maintain order by securing assent of people to their own situation.



of a new orientation. Moreover, it prevented the emergence of a new leadership by coopting the radical element within the existing power structure. The foment of the mid-sixties according to Valliancourt and Hebert (1971) was effectively suppressed; the visions of a "new" ideology were obscured and the traditional elite was instrumental in preserving the ambiguity of the emerging ideology.

Nonetheless, the Rallye marked a significant change in the traditional ideology. Gaboury (Int. July 22, 1976) noted:

Nous ne voulions plus du passé. Il fallait agir politiquement et économiquement afin d'obtenir des "choses." On a mis de côté la religion catholique qui, jusqu'à ce temps, nous avait conditionnés à la soumission.<sup>10</sup>

In much the same vein, Teffaine (Int, July 20, 1976) asserted:

Quant à la dualité langue-foi, le comité des quinze, organisé pour fonder la nouvelle association (S.F.M.) a supprimé tous vestiges de foi. Le concept de foi était devenu vieux jeu et d'ailleurs, les jeunes n'en voulaient plus.<sup>11</sup>

Edward Schreyer (Int. August 9, 1976) reflecting upon his personal perceptions on this subject, noted:

It was surprising to find that the issue of religion had lost its importance. I had equated both. The language-religion duality was still maintained by the older generation, but there was a marked distinction between the pre-war and post-war attitude. There was a general change of attitude.

In summation, the Rallye did initiate two fundamental changes: (a) it began a process of popular participation which brought the French leadership in face-to-face contact with its





constituents, and (b) it served to alter the composition of the French ruling elite.

### A Significant Incident

In August 1968, Philippe Rossillon, a citizen of France, made a visit to Manitoba. Rossillon's visit would have gone unnoticed had it not been for his position within the French government. As it turned out, Rossillon reported directly to France's Prime Minister Couve de Murville. As head of a special committee, Rossillon was concerned with the defence and expansion of the French language. Being a high ranking civil servant, protocol deemed it necessary that Rossillon's presence in Canada be announced through the proper channels. However, it seemed that Rossillon had wished to remain inconspicuous.

According to Rene Mulaire, the spokesman of the French group welcoming Rossillon in St. Pierre, Manitoba, the visit was strictly on a friendly basis and was not in any way related to the problems of the Francophones in Manitoba. Nonetheless, the Winnipeg Tribune (September 11, 1968) caught the reaction of the federal government: "De Gaulle Agent Invades Manitoba. French Government Agent Here to Agitate." Prime Minister Trudeau quickly expressed his resentment by calling the incident a "sureptitious and underhanded act" of pure political agitation by the French government (Winnipeg Tribune, September 11, 1968).



The RCMP had unearthed that Rossillon had previous ties with the separatists in Quebec. Thus, the federal government was afraid that the affair would result in a backlash from the English community. For its part, the Francophone leadership (La Liberté, September 18, 1968), in Manitoba dispelled the entire incident as, "Une tempête dans un verre d'eau," alluding to the fact that reactions had been grossly exaggerated. Prime Minister Trudeau (Winnipeg Tribune, September 17, 1968) used the occasion to advance the bilingual cause by saying, "It will not be sufficient for government leaders or public bodies to declare themselves in favor of bilingualism or even to pass legislation on the subject." In other words, very much convinced of contrived interference by the French government, Trudeau accused the Premier of foot-dragging. Many viewed the affair as inconsequential, a mere incident, perhaps a gaullist affront. To be sure, De Gaulle (La Liberté, September 18, 1968), stated "Les rapports franco-canadiens ne changeront pas."

The Francophone leaders, however, construed the incident as a means of piercing the federal bureaucracy. Indeed, Justice Monin, very much the "grey eminence" (Gaboury, Int. July 22, 1976) of the francophone leadership, was instrumental in causing Ottawa to look upon the Franco-Manitoban situation with a more focused attention. As Monin recalled (Int. July 13, 1976):



De passage à Ottawa, j'ai rencontré Gérard Pelletier, Secrétaire d'Etat. J'ai précisé que le fédéral avait nettement exagéré l'incident; que le fédéral avait littéralement pris le mors aux dents. J'ai de plus expliqué que la minorité francophone était en voie de disparition si le gouvernement n'était pas en mesure d'offrir de l'aide. Les conséquences éventuelles seraient très graves. Peu après, M. Gauthier, président de la Commission du Rallié, reçut un appel d'Ottawa demandant une rencontre dans le plus bref délai.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, by playing on the federal government's policy pronouncements to help French minorities outside Quebec, and by ringing the death knell of the Franco-Manitoban community if the federal aid was not forthcoming, Monnin might well have precipitated the process. To be sure, shortly thereafter a delegation arrived in Ottawa to meet MM. Trudeau and Pelletier. The Winnipeg Tribune (October 24, 1968) carried the following item, "French Manitobans will meet Trudeau... to discuss the translation into facts of the national goals of the present government." La Liberté (October 23, 1968) in a similar vein noted:

Le but sera de discuter des meilleurs moyens de faire passer dans la vie quotidienne des Franco-Manitobains les objectifs que le gouvernement actuel s'est fixés relativement aux questions de bilinguisme et de biculturalisme dans le Canada tout entier et plus particulièrement au Manitoba.

A few days later, La Liberté (October 30, 1968) reported the following:

M. Trudeau aux Franco-Manitobains: Vous pouvez compter sur des gestes concrets dans un avenir immédiat."





The Winnipeg Free Press (October 26, 1968) expressed it as "Manitobans Get Ottawa Aid Pledge; French Leaders Promised Cultural Assistance." The assistance would take the form of (La Liberté, October 30, 1968):

...assistance financière pour préparer le congrès de décembre; payer le salaire de six animateurs sociaux dont la tâche sera de combattre l'apathie chez les Franco-Manitobains; financer le maintien d'un secrétariat au service de la minorité francophone.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, the repercussions of the Rossillon Affair could be viewed as beneficial to the Franco-Manitobans. Gauthier (Winnipeg Tribune, October 26, 1968) in responding to a Winnipeg Tribune reporter stated "...it enabled us to attain our objective a bit more quickly than we expected." Gauthier (Int. July 15, 1976) reiterated that the Rossillon Affair was undoubtedly instrumental in bringing Ottawa in touch with Franco-Manitobans:

La visite de Rossillon a servi à faire démarrer Ottawa. L'incident nous a permis d'exprimer nos besoins, etc... auprès de M. Trudeau et de M. Pelletier. Cette rencontre a servi de déblocage.

Teffaine (Int. July 20, 1976) supported this contention:

L'affaire Rossillon eut des conséquences extraordinaires. Elle permit un déblocage avec le gouvernement fédéral. Lors d'une rencontre avec M. Trudeau, on lui fit part du fait que la loi concernant les langues officielles n'était pas suffisante.<sup>14</sup>

It would seem therefore that the Rossillon Affair was used successfully as a political gambit to draw the attention of the federal government to the Franco-Manitoban situation. If the affair was fortuitous, the events thereafter played into the hands of the Francophone leaders.



"La Société Franco-Manitobaine" is born!

If the federal politicians had shown a certain degree of altruism toward the Franco-Manitobans, the provincial premier, Walter Weir, did not manifest any signs of benevolence. Indeed, in response to a French delegation which had met the Premier. to discuss matters related to the French community, Weir (Free Press, November 13, 1968) was non-committal, "...to me, matters relating to the economy of the country are more important." La Liberté (November 13, 1968) reported Gauthier's frustrations:

Il semble que M. Weir nous met tous dans le même sac, avec les Indiens, les Ukrainiens, les Islandais et le reste et que nous, les Franco-Manitobains, sommes au fond du sac.

According to Gauthier, the premier indicated that everything possible was being done in the province relative to bilingualism; that he believed in multiculturalism; that problems relating to Bill 59 should be taken up with the Minister of Education. To conclude, Gauthier (La Liberté, November 13, 1968) stated, "Le seul espoir que nous avons c'est qu'on n'a pas fait claquer la porte derrière nos dos." Aubry (La Liberté, November 20, 1968), editor of the French paper, wrote, in part, about the meeting with the premier:

Il a certainement pas donné l'impression d'être habile politicien quand il a laissé entendre aux Franco-Manitobains qu'il ne pouvait pas leur accorder autant d'attention qu'au million d'autres Manitobains... Mais ce que M. Weir ne veut pas dire ou ne semble pas vouloir comprendre, c'est que la masse anglo-saxonne ne se soucierait plus depuis longtemps des différentes cultures ethniques s'il



n'y avait à la base de la constitution canadienne l'élément français qui, par sa tenacité et sa lutte acharnée, a bloqué toute assimilation, toute politique du "melting pot" si chère à l'impérialisme anglo-saxon nord américain. M. Weir, comme beaucoup d'autres de cette région du Manitoba où le spectre du sinistre Dr. Schultz est encore omniprésent, s'empresse de faire jouer la note "multiculturaliste" chaque fois qu'il se sent coincé par les exigences du bilinguisme essentiel pourtant à la réalité canadienne.<sup>15</sup>

Desjardins, (Int. July 21, 1976) reflecting on Weir's politics, intimated:

Weir jouissait d'un "backlash" contre les francophones. (Weir's claim to fame!) Weir n'était pas un chef de parti, bien qu'il s'était prouvé efficace comme ministre. Dans trois élections partielles, ce "backlash" s'était traduit en victoire pour les conservateurs. En raison de ce support, Weir adopta une politique de gradualisme par rapport au français.<sup>16</sup>

Justice Monin, looking retrospectively upon Weir's episode with power, stated (Int. July 13, 1976):

Les années de Weir au pouvoir marquèrent le creux de la vague pour les francophones. Il n'y avait rien à espérer de Craik et de Weir.<sup>17</sup>

By December 1968, the "Commission du Rallye" and the old association AECFM would fuse and form what was to become known as "La Société Franco-Manitobaine (S.F.M.)." The principal aim of the S.F.M. was (Free Press, December 9, 1968), "to promote the growth and development of economic, political, cultural, and educational values in the French population of Manitoba." Maurice Gauthier became the S.F.M.'s first president. As president, he made sure that one of the first statements in his new role would be to express his animosity toward the Premier (Winnipeg Free Press, December 9, 1968): "For Mr. Weir, English-language citizens are one







notch above all other groups, and there is no regard for the real rights of French Canadians."

As 1968 was drawing to a close, the portents of coming changes were in the air. The second report of B and B Commission was released. The report advocated the learning of French from grade 1 for English students, and the learning of English from grade 3 for French students. The Commission was providing added support to the French leadership. Weir (Winnipeg Free Press, December 10, 1968) refused to comment; Craik, Minister of Education, was unavailable for comment.

### The Stirrings of Change

By January 1969, the S.F.M. resolutely set about to make good its mandate. Information filtering out of the Boundaries Commission, set up to examine the creation of larger jurisdiction, suggested important modifications of existing school divisions. The Commission was concerned with financial efficiency. The school divisions were concerned with maintaining their status. The S.F.M., having a vested interest in maintaining the composition of those school divisions with a majority French population, would have to grapple with the problem. Further, the social animation program would be operationalized by the S.F.M. in order to jar the Franco-Manitoban population out of its "laissez faire" attitude.

In its New Year editorial, La Liberté (January 1, 1969) indicated that new Canadians were sabotaging the



fundamental forces of Canada. Their means of maintaining their culture did not lie in attacking French Canadians. A similar attitude was voiced later by Sidney Green, N.D.P. member of Parliament (Int. 1976) where, in his opinion, supporting French language rights gave credence to the safeguarding of various cultures.

Manitoba's language bill (Bill 59) also came under attack. La Liberté (February 12, 1969) rendered its verdict; "Le Bill 59: faut-il lui préférer des écoles françaises." The article explained how implementation was being stifled by "une politique de lenteur" emanating from higher sources. The Social Studies program, thought by many to be the saving element when complemented by the "Français" course, was not yet completed.

Moreover, there were additional causes for concern: Bill 59 was being only partially implemented; an insufficient number of French teachers was available; parents were ambivalent about language instruction while their support was considered the cornerstone in the implementation process; the law was discriminatory in that, if applied, it left little time for such courses as music and physical education; teachers were divided on the issue of language instruction.

On another front, the constitutional conference had closed with little consensus as to the Official Language Bill. Weir insisted (Winnipeg Free Press, February 10, 1969) that the concerns of Canadians should be focused on fiscal matters rather than constitutional matters. Gauthier (Winnipeg Free



Press, February 14, 1969) followed the conference:

...with a deep sense of disappointment and frustration. We deem it most unfortunate that the premier of Manitoba would wish to associate himself with other premiers from western Canada and engage himself in what we consider retrogressive thinking by their actions at the constitutional conference.

It seemed that Premier Weir, along with some western premiers, was questioning the constitutionality of the Official Languages Bill, (Winnipeg Free Press, April 10, 1969). "We only question the constitutionality in moving into provincial fields. The whole question of language rights is not involved..." The matter, it was felt, ought to be brought before the Supreme Court of Canada.

Whatever the motivation of the Premier, a general election was called for June 25. On that date, the face of Manitoba politics was unexpectedly transformed much to the surprise of the most astute political observers. Ed Schreyer led the New Democratic Party to a majority of seats. After the final count, however, the New Democrats had gained 28 out of the 57 available seats--a minority position.

#### A Gentlemen's Agreement

The N.D.P. needed one seat, the Conservatives, seven. Which coalition would be the most viable? Since the four liberals agreed to go as a block and not join either party, this precluded the Conservatives from forming the government. Thus, the N.D.P. was to win by default and become Manitoba's first socialistic government. The question then shifted to survival.





The man of the hour was Laurent Desjardins, Liberal M.L.A. for St. Boniface. Desjardins had made his position on the French language issue explicit during the election campaign. Schreyer had expressed agreement in relation to that position. The problem then became one of gaining the support of the St. Boniface Liberal. Sidney Green, N.D.P. Member of Parliament (Int. July 27, 1976) stated:

A key factor was convincing Larry Desjardins to join our party. Immediately following the election, I phoned the Premier saying that Larry would have to support us. Between Weir and our party there was no question.

But Desjardins' liberal ideology was well engrained after ten years as a Liberal M.L.A. It appears that from this political perspective, Desjardins was highly suspicious of the N.D.P. The democratic socialism of the N.D.P. was being viewed in some quarters as a threat to free enterprise. This was Desjardins' prime concern (R. Toupin, Int. August 1976). However, a mutual arrangement would be devised and Desjardins would become a Liberal Democrat.

An important dimension in the scenario was, according to Justice Monin (Int. July 13, 1976), "la grande amitié qui existait entre ces deux hommes politiques." Justice Monin recalled that Desjardins, as member of the Board of Directors of St. Paul's College, had been instrumental in Schreyer becoming a staff member. Further, as M.L.A. from Brokenhead, Schreyer had supported Desjardins in his search for language rights and aid to separate schools. Against this background, therefore, the dilemma was that much more intense.



Prior to the elections, Schreyer had informally met with the francophone elite. According to Gauthier (Int. July 15, 1976):

Avant le congrès à la direction du parti néo-démocratique, M. Schreyer nous avait rencontré afin de savoir si sa mise en candidature serait reçue par les Francophones. Il voulait aussi s'assurer d'avoir des candidats francophones aux prochaines élections.<sup>18</sup>

Gauthier (Int. July 15, 1976) then indicated to Schreyer that René Toupin might be a person to contact as a possible candidate. Toupin assured Schreyer, at a later meeting, that he would indeed seek election if Schreyer won the party leadership.

Rhéal Teffaine, a St. Boniface barrister and once a staunch Conservative supporter, had shifted his allegiance to the N.D.P. by virtue of his dissatisfaction with the Weir administration's stand on bilingualism. Teffaine (Int. July 20, 1976) noted:

Auparavant, je supportais Roblin étant donné que mon oncle, M. Boulic, avait siége à l'assemblée législative comme député conservateur... M. Schreyer demande de nous rencontrer à la suite d'une conférence de presse lors de laquelle il déclarait qu'il poserait sa candidature à la direction du parti néo-démocratique... D'après mes convictions personnelles, je croyais que le seul moyen de sauvegarder la langue française était bien l'école française. Nous fûmes satisfaits que M. Schreyer voulait poursuivre un tel objectif.

Gaboury (Int. July 15, 1976) another member of the francophone elite, summarized well the position which his group had adopted prior to the election:

Il fallait devenir politique--jouer la politique réelle. Weir était une nullité exceptionnelle. On ne devait plus se rattacher à un parti politique



mais plutôt aux "leaders" qui nous semblaient sympathiques et qui étaient prêts à nous accorder nos droits.<sup>19</sup>

In response to a query related to his attempt at trying to gain the favor of the French leaders, Schreyer (Int. August 9, 1976) indicated:

I took satisfaction in trying to form a government which would be representative of the Manitoba mosaic. I tried to get French representativity [sic] which would reflect, in proportion, the French minority as a whole.

Against this background, therefore, it would seem that the French elite had adopted a political position which would help them in gaining favor from politicians sympathetic to "la cause." Schreyer, it appeared, was disposed to do this, and thus the shift in allegiance was effected despite the "socialistic" underpinnings of the N.D.P.

Ostensibly, the elite's "new" orientation would bring added pressure to bear on Desjardins' attempt to preserve ideological purity. The situation called for a compromise. According to Desjardins (Int. July 21, 1976):

A la suite de plusieurs réunions avec Teffaine, Toupin et, par la suite, avec Ed Schreyer, et Doug Rowland, j'ai finalement accepté de supporter M. Schreyer.<sup>20</sup>

Gauthier (Int. July 15, 1967) corroborated this by saying:

Il y eut plusieurs rencontres avec M. Desjardins qui, essentiellement, se résumaient à lui dire qu'il n'avait rien à perdre en supportant le gouvernement.<sup>21</sup>

Notwithstanding the "behind-the-scene negotiation", which were of considerable importance, Desjardins' support was predicated on receiving due consideration for concerns





expressed during the election campaign. However, Desjardins (Int. July 21, 1976) noted:

Il ne s'agissait pas là d'un "trade-off" politique mais il est certain que les principes que j'avais énoncés durant la campagne électorale seraient certainement étudiés. J'avais certaines causes à faire avancer et celles-ci le seraient.<sup>22</sup>

Justice Monnin (Int. July 13, 1976) remarked retrospectively:

Il (Desjardins) offrirait son support au gouvernement Schreyer, qui se trouvait toujours en position minoritaire, seulement si on lui accordait certaines "choses."

But the trading did not turn out to be all that difficult, especially when consideration is given to what was at stake.

Schreyer (Int. August 9, 1976) intimated:

I met with him (Desjardins) and we discussed, and I was happy to tell him that his concerns posed no problems.

The concerns once translated into specific proposals were, according to Teffaine (Int. July 20, 1967): a language law, which later became Bill 113, a teacher training institute, and a French cultural center.

Thus, on July 1, 1969, Laurent Desjardins, Liberal M.L.A. from St. Boniface, became a Liberal-Democrat, and declared that he would grant his support to Mr. Schreyer. The Liberal leader, Bobby Bend, anticipating the support, was guardedly cautious, stating (Winnipeg Free Press, July 2, 1969) that he "would be interested to see a definition of a Liberal Democrat." Steve Patrick (Winnipeg Free Press, July 2, 1969), a liberal M.L.A., suggested that "the right winger had caught Schreyer mania. No doubt the French language question figured in Desjardins' decision." The Winnipeg Free Press (July 2, 1969) reported:



The real move began several days later (after the election) when members of the French-Canadian community suggested that Mr. Desjardins talk to the N.D.P. He did.

On July 7, 1969, the French organization "la S.F.M." issued a press release, (La Liberté, July 9, 1969) stressing its approval of Desjardins' most opportune decision:

M. Desjardins a toujours fait preuve d'honnêteté, d'intégrité et de sincérité. Ses convictions, ses principes ne sont jamais contredits. Les Manitobains ont droit a un gouvernement stable immédiatement, sans recourir à une autre élection.

It is interesting to note that the people issuing the statement were those who had in fact insisted that Desjardins support the minority government.

Desjardins had not completed the task fully. He felt obliged to present his case to his constituents in the St. Boniface riding. On July 8, 1969, before a crowd of 800 people, Desjardins presented his case to his electors. He would remain a Liberal but had decided to support the Schreyer government (Winnipeg Free Press, Winnipeg, July 9, 1969):

I did not defect. I am still a member of the Liberal Party until you kick me out. I did not join the N.D.P. party...but right now Mr. Schreyer should not be denied his time to bat.

The response was overwhelming. Desjardins was assured of support. Later he would sit on the government-side of the house next to the Premier and as a Liberal-Democrat. His special duties would constitute being legislative assistant to the Premier and director of the Secretariat of Dominion - Provincial and Cultural Relations. The main focus of the



secretariat would be to conduct a study on how the B and B Commission recommendations could be implemented.

### The Final Phase

By July 9, 1969, the Federal Parliament had adopted the Official Languages Act in a vote of 197 to 17. The Significance of the event for Manitoba was that the Act provided the necessary context within which provincial governments could henceforth promote and develop language policies. Schreyer's position in relation to French in Manitoba was based essentially on the Federal government's position. As Schreyer (Int. August 9, 1976) recalled, "I did not want to go contrary to the Official Languages Act; I wished to complement the Act."

In September, as tradition had it, the S.F.M. met with the Premier of the province to express its aspirations and desires in relation to the status of French in Manitoba. La Liberté (September 17, 1969) reported the general tenor of the proceedings, "Un entretien cordial en grande partie en français...Le Premier Ministre Schreyer reçoit l'exécutif de la S.F.M." Maurice Gauthier, S.F.M. president, remarked (La Liberté, September 17, 1969) "Après cinquante ans de bataille, nous sommes enfin reçus comme des citoyens du Manitoba."

A brief was submitted to the Premier outlining some of the most pressing concerns. The brief read, in part, (La Liberté, September 17, 1969):





1) L'établissement d'une école normale rattachée au Collège de Saint-Boniface pour la formation pédagogique d'enseignants d'expression française.

2) L'amendement de la loi scolaire afin de faire du français une langue d'enseignement sur le même pied que l'anglais.

3) La nomination au sein du ministère de l'Éducation d'un haut fonctionnaire à mentalité française directement responsable du programme d'enseignement en français.

4) L'établissement d'écoles publiques françaises -- la section secondaire du Collège de Saint-Boniface pourrait servir de projet pilote.

5) Le maintien des divisions scolaires actuelles contrairement aux recommandations de la Commission des frontières.

The Winnipeg Free Press (September 15, 1969) reported:

S.F.M. met with Ed Schreyer to request a change in legislation to allow French to become a language of instruction in certain Manitoba schools. According to Maurice Gauthier, S.F.M. president, the 50% of instructional time now devoted in French "succeeds in anglicizing the small children." The Premier was very favorable.

In part, to emphasize the need for immediate action and perhaps to ensure that the government would be true to its word, the Franco-Manitoban Trustees Association issued a statement requesting the "same rights as the English speaking minority in Quebec," (Winnipeg Free Press, November 4, 1969). La Liberté (November 5, 1969) outlined the Association's recommendations:

La vie française doit être maintenue au Manitoba; l'enseignement en français--un droit non une option; les frontières scolaires ne doivent pas être changées; amender la loi scolaire; subsides spéciaux; 50% d'enseignement en français de 7 à 12; supprimer le cours de French; une école normale française.



The Association did not represent any formidable political force. Nonetheless, it gave added impetus to the notion that other sectors of the community were concerned with the matter of linguistic rights.

On the national level, (La Liberté, October 15, 1969) the federal government was undertaking to operationalize its bilingual policy. Federal aid to support French minorities outside Quebec was to be in excess of one million dollars. Further, the government projected that 80 per cent of the civil servants in Ottawa would be bilingual by 1975.

On December 17, 1969, the B and B Commission tabled its third report dealing essentially with the "Work World." In it, the Commissioners warned of "national disintegration" and demanded (Winnipeg Tribune, December 18, 1969), "that the federal public service be transformed from an Anglophone cultural preserve into a service reflecting the equal partnership of English and French-speaking Canadians." Further, the B and B report stated (Winnipeg Free Press, December 18, 1969) that, "French be the main working language at all levels in private business and industry in Quebec."

#### SUMMARY

In this chapter, events of a provincial and national nature were presented. In summary form, these include the following:

1. the re-evaluation of the role of the AECFM.
2. the development of a social animation program,
3. the Rallye of 1968,
4. the creation of the S.F.M.,
5. the election of the N.D.P. in 1969,



6. the agreement between Schreyer and Desjardins,
7. the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,
8. the Constitutional Conference,
9. the Rossillon incident.

The re-evaluation of the role of the AECFM led to the development of a social animation and the organization of the Rallye in 1968. This phase of collective evaluation is synonymous with Friere's conscientization--a process of collective self-appraisal in light of a changing social environment. The creation of the S.F.M. resulting from this phase indicated a desire to go beyond the educational and encompass the economic, political, and social dimensions.

The election of an N.D.P. government in 1969 brought the French leaders in Manitoba in direct contact with the premier-elect, Edward Schreyer. Schreyer was viewed as being more progressive with respect to language rights than his predecessor had been. The Schreyer - Desjardins agreement made possible amendments to the School Act, the creation of a French cultural center, and the establishment of a French teacher training institute.

On the national scene, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism gave the French of Manitoba a greater degree of legitimacy to their demands for language recognition. The Constitutional Conference called by Prime Minister Pearson revived the compact theory of federalism. It was Pearson's desire to extend this version of federalism to the national context. Finally, the Rosillon incident provided an opportunity for the French leaders in Manitoba to





meet with Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier. This meeting gave the French leaders the occasion to express their concerns about the survival of the French community in Manitoba.

These events can be viewed as the contextual underpinings which will aid in clarifying the subsequent discussion and analysis of the implementation process. In the following chapter, the discussion will focus on a description of the implementation process.



## AUTHOR'S TRANSLATION

1. In fact, by removing the raison d'être from its patriotic cause and by bringing to light all the indifference and demoralization which existed within the francophone population, the new law challenged Manitobans of French expression to either avail themselves of their newly acquired rights or to accept the finishing stroke levelled at their cultural identity.
2. There would be no more annual general meeting before establishing its merit.
3. The Association is involved in a new experience... The Association took the initiative because Franco-Manitobans were expressing the view that this organization was worth little in our modern times.
4. That the conference "Convention des Franco-Manitobains" be organized for the end of April, by using a workshop approach and that all sectors of the population be represented.
5. To French speaking Canadians confederation created a bilingual and bicultural nation. It protected their language and their culture throughout the whole of Canada. It meant partnership, not domination. French speaking Canadians believed that this partnership meant equal opportunities for both the founding races to share in all phases of Canadian development. English speaking Canadians agree, of course, that the confederation arrangements protected the rights of French Canadians in Quebec, in parliament and in federal courts; but most felt -- and I think it is fair to say this -- that it did not go beyond those limits, at least until recently. This meant that, for all practical purposes, there would be an English speaking Canada with a bilingual Quebec. What is called the "French fact" was to be provincial only. (Official translation.)
6. The investigations of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission created a crisis. In the past the French community succeeded in masking its weakness. Before the commission, it had to reveal this weakness.
7. Social animation as such is a long-term process and it is clear that the Rallye utilized a modified form of animation... The fact that the techniques of social animation were only partially used...resulted



in a number of problems...these problems were evident in the representation, in the leadership... The Rallye, because of the limits of time and personnel, took but a first step toward a truly representative organization.

8. Positive and serious work... It is especially as a Franco-Manitoban that we felt it... They discovered that our life doesn't boil down to a few courses in French and a few cultural manifestations but that it finds expression in the political, social and economic organizations... If the objective of the Rallye was to have the delegates come to grips with the necessity of working hard within their milieu, then the objective was reached...
9. Rallye 68 was a total failure. The objective was economics. The message was poorly understood.
10. We had had enough of the past. We had to act politically and economically to obtain "things". We set aside the catholic religion which to this point had conditioned us into submission.
11. The "comité des quinze" suppressed all vestiges of faith in organizing the new association. The concept of faith had become out-of-date and besides the youth were not interested.
12. In going through Ottawa, I met Gerard Pelletier, Secretary of State. I stated how the federal government had exaggerated the incident; that the federal had literally flown off the handle. I also explained that the franco-phone minority would disappear if the government did not help. The consequences would be disastrous. Shortly after, M. Gauthier, president of the Rallye Commission, received a call from Ottawa requesting a meeting.
13. ...financial assistance to organize the annual meeting in December; pay the salaries of six social animateurs whose task will be to fight the apathy extent among Franco-Manitobans; finance a secretariat responsible to the development of the francophone minority.
14. The Rossillon incident had extraordinary consequences. It served to draw attention to our problems with the federal government. At a meeting with M. Trudeau, we expressed the view that the Official Languages law was insufficient.
15. He certainly did not give the impression of being a clever politician when he expressed the view to Franco-Manitobans that he could not give them as much consideration as he did to the other million Manitobans. But what Mr. Weir does not say or does not wish to understand is that the Anglo-Saxon majority would not concern itself with the





difference ethnic cultures if the French were not basic to the Canadian constitution who through their tenacity and persistence blocked all assimilation; all melting-pot policies so dear to North American Anglo-Saxon imperialism. Mr. Weir, like many others from this region of Manitoba, where the spectre of the sinister Dr. Schultz is still omnipresent, is quick to sound the "multiculturalism" note whenever he feels cornered by the exigencies of bilingualism so essential to the Canadian reality.

16. Weir enjoyed a backlash against the francophones. (Weir's claim to fame!) Weir was not a party leader despite having proven himself as a minister. In three by-elections this backlash was translated into victories. Because of this support, Weir adopted a policy of gradualism with respect to French.
17. The trough of the wave for francophones was reached when Weir was in power. There was nothing to hope for from Craik and Weir.
18. After the N.D.P. leadership convention, Mr. Schreyer met with us to determine if his leadership would be accepted by the Francophones. He also wanted francophone candidates for the next elections.
19. We had to become political -- play real politics. Weir was an exceptional nullity. We could not adhere to a political party but rather to leaders who seemed sympathetic and ready to grant us our rights.
20. Following many meetings with Teffaine and Toupin, and later with Ed Schreyer and Doug Rowland, I finally accepted to support Schreyer.
21. There were many meetings with Mr. Desjardins which amounted essentially in telling him that he had nothing to lose in supporting the government.
22. It did not amount to a political "trade-off" but certainly the principles which I put forward during the elections would be studied. There were certain causes which I wanted to pursue and those would be pursued.



## Chapter IV

### A DESCRIPTION OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

In this chapter, a description of the process of policy implementation is presented. As noted in Chapter I, the description will be based on the categories of the Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model. The chapter is therefore subdivided into five subsections organized as follows:

(1) Characteristics of the Implementing Agency, (2) Standards and Objectives, (3) Resources, (4) Interorganizational Communication and Enforcement Activities, (5) Social, Economic and Political Conditions.

#### Characteristics of the Implementing Agency

The discussion in this section will identify the implementing agency, its structural features, its functions and its personnel.

The implementing agency is the one which organizes, coordinates, initiates and gives direction to the implementation process. Because of its pivotal role in the implementation process, the Secretariat of Dominion - Provincial Cultural Relations\* is identified as the implementing agency. Indeed, it will be seen in the discussion which follows that a major purpose of the Secretariat was to take definitive

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\* The Secretariat of Dominion - Provincial Cultural Relations will henceforth be referred to as the Secretariat.



action with regards to French education in Manitoba. To this point in time no government had undertaken serious development of French education in the province. Certainly the Department of Education had done its utmost to develop courses within the prescriptions set forth in Bill 59. However, no rationalized approach had ever been presented. What the Secretariat sought was a greater flexibility in the Public Schools Act which would allow for the systematic development of French education. Added to this was the training of teachers which was viewed as a complementary facet to the amendments sought in the Public Schools Act. The Secretariat thus became the driving force behind most developments associated with French education. It became the pivotal organization acting as an umbrella to various groups and organizations interested in French education.

The duties of the Secretariat were outlined in a memorandum issued by Premier Schreyer to L. Desjardins (September 17, 1969):

In detail, Cabinet has suggested that the following are the areas of responsibility for policy origin which the Secretariat should concern itself with:

1. The provincial government's relationship to the federal Official Languages Act and recommendations leading to provincial government action (if any) under that Act.
2. Liaison with the Department of Youth and Education in regard to federal-provincial and inter-provincial aspects of the teaching of French in Manitoba and to the use of French as the official minority language in this province.
3. Liaison with the Department of Youth and Education in regard to federal-provincial and inter-provincial cultural aspects in





the establishment of a French language teachers' college and in the encouragement of French courses and French schools in Manitoba.

4. Liaison with the Minister of Cultural Affairs in agreements and arrangements between the Government of Canada and the Province of Manitoba and as between Manitoba and other provinces.
5. Liaison with the Department of Youth and Education in regard to such matters as teacher exchanges between Canadian provinces and between Manitoba and countries abroad, particularly teachers in French language courses.
6. Questions relating to recognition of cultural and linguistic groups on a national or provincial basis and the relationships of those groups with the provincial government, both in general and in regard to particular items, e.g. erection of monuments, cultural occasions, etc., etc.
7. Again in liaison with the Department of Youth and Education, aspects of such matters as shared services in education which relate particularly to cultural and linguistic survival in Manitoba.

The Secretariat was placed under the aegis of the Executive Council Office with Premier Schreyer as the minister in charge. The Director of the Secretariat, Laurent Desjardins, also held the designation of Legislative Assistant to the Premier. Desjardins' functions as Director were spelled out in a memorandum by Premier Schreyer dated October 10, 1969:

1. Assume the responsibility of the duties of the Secretariat on Dominion - Provincial Cultural Relations.
2. Take the initiative in developing the responsibilities of the Secretariat on Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations in consultation with the Minister.



3. Take whatever action is necessary to become informed about certain departmental affairs relating to the duties of the Secretariat.
4. Present the Secretariat's interests at meetings with representatives of other departments and other governments.
5. Approve and sign correspondence on the Minister's behalf to other government departments and to Ministers of the Government of Canada in regard to routine inter-governmental matters or in regard to furnishing of information when such matters are related directly to the Office of the Legislative Assistant to the Minister for Dominion-Provincial Relations.
6. Assist the Minister in the Legislative Assembly by answering some questions and defending the estimates.

Without limiting the above areas of responsibility, the Legislative Assistant to the Minister responsible for Dominion-Provincial Relations should assume the following duties:

1. On behalf of the Minister obtain information of a confidential or a non-confidential nature from officials of the Secretariat or other sources and collate such information with regard to the responsibility for policy origin as defined under the duties of the Secretariat on Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations. (N.B. - It should be noted that the Deputy Minister and his senior officials of certain departments which work in liaison with the Secretariat will have the responsibility of keeping the Legislative Assistant to the Minister for Dominion-Provincial Relations informed on matters related to the duties of the Secretariat.)
2. If requested to do so, the Legislative Assistant to the Minister will attend the meetings of Committees of Cabinet.
3. Attend the meetings with representatives of other levels of government when these meetings related to the responsibilities of the Secretariat.



4. Represent the Minister at meetings:
  - (a) of officials at inter-departmental meetings relating specifically to the liaison work to be carried on by the Secretariat.
  - (b) with different representatives in their talks with the liaison departments of the Secretariat. (N.B. - It should be noted that the Secretariat's presence will be warranted in such matters relating to the liaison work between the different departments and the Secretariat and in such matters where the Secretariat is needed for information or consultation purposes).
  - (c) with delegations or private citizens or associations or in receiving state visitors.
  - (d) of a ceremonial nature relating to the Secretariat's duties.
  - (e) of a social or informal nature relating to the Secretariat's duties.
5. Attend federal-provincial meetings as requested by the Minister and particularly in the event that he himself is not able to attend meetings of this type.
6. Commission or receive briefs and recommendations from interested persons, groups, associations and organizations.
7. Accompany the Minister at certain functions or represent him at certain functions.

As Legislative Assistant to the Minister responsible for Dominion-Provincial Relations, you should be prepared to carry out the following responsibilities:

1. Answer questions during question period by:
  - (a) providing written answers to factual questions;
  - (b) providing a full reply to a question if notice has been given previously;
  - (c) referring the question to the Minister;





- (d) having the question stand if the Minister is absent.
- 2. Assist in defending the estimates.
- 3. Table reports.
- 4. Participate in the Debate on Adjournments.
- 5. Handle minor amendments in Bills or present new Bills when requested to do so by the Minister, or in his absence.
- 6. Make some contribution to Debate on a Bill after introduction of the Bill by the Minister, if deemed advisable.
- 7. Maintain continuing liaison with Members of the Legislative Assembly in matters affecting them as elected representatives of the constituencies where changes will be undertaken in cultural matters.

The above give the duties and identifies the activities of the Secretariat and the role of its Director, Laurent Desjardins.

An area which was excluded from the Secretariat's jurisdiction was that dealing with finances and budgetary concerns. On this point Schreyer was quite explicit:

I wish to make it clear that the Secretariat will have no concern with financial affairs which have been the responsibility of the Department of Finance; moreover, it will not have responsibility for matters of economic development which remain primarily the responsibility of the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet in conjunction with the Department of Industry and Commerce.


However, while the Secretariat may not have been involved in matters concerning the Department of Finance and the Department of Industry and Commerce, it nevertheless dealt with budgetary matters concerning federal grants to the province in the promotion of the French language. In this the Secretariat took an active part. Backeland as Administrative Secretary of the



Secretariat and Yuel of the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet would consult frequently in the establishment of disbursement formulas and allocation of monies. In addition, they would meet on occasion when negotiating with Ottawa. Thus, there was, according to Marion (Int. September 20, 1979) a consultative dimension with the Planning and Priorities Committee on financial matters concerning federal grants directed toward bilingual policies.

Finally, there was an added caveat expressed by Schreyer, "It is understood that the Secretariat will have a small staff in the foreseeable future..." The purpose of this was to ensure as precise a definition of functions as possible and further, to prevent any duplication of functions with established government departments.

The organization chart of the Secretariat was as follows (see figure 2):



in addition: two secretaries




Figure 2. Organization Structure of the Secretariat



According to Marion (Int. September 20, 1979) all manner of activity to be undertaken by the Secretariat was cleared by Desjardins with Schreyer. Thus, all decisions resulting in actions upon a particular area of concern were the product of a Schreyer - Desjardins consultation. The decision would then be passed on to Backeland and in turn assigned appropriately to Corriveau or Marion or both.

Decisions were seldom taken unilaterally by the Secretariat. Indeed, the wide consultation vis-à-vis various organizations and associations attests to the desire of the Secretariat's personnel to determine opinions of various groupings. The Secretariat's personnel used this consultative process as a basis for decision-making.

Lines of communication were essentially vertical, that is, from Desjardins to Backeland to Marion and Corriveau or in the opposite direction. However, while Desjardins was the Director of the Secretariat (or Schreyer's direct responsibility when Desjardins was away) Backeland assumed responsibilities for the functioning of the Secretariat. This was corroborated by both Marion (Int. September 20, 1979), Corriveau (Int. March 6, 1978) and the Secretary, Mrs. Turenne (Int. October 24, 1979). While Backeland was involved with the establishment of the Institute he was also responsible for initiating various activities, such as France-Manitoba relations, Quebec-Manitoba relations, "l'Ecole des Langues" and bilingualism in the public service. Backeland, according to Corriveau, Marion and Turenne, was an extremely competent organizer and





administrator. The secretary, Mrs. Turenne, (Int. October 24, 1979) stated that Backeland was "a hard worker" and that he "expected the same from his staff."

The Secretariat was a simple (as opposed to complex) organization as can be noted from its organizational structure. This was due in the main to its size but was also related to its focus of activity. However, its simplicity cannot be extrapolated to its field of activities which included a highly complex set of political forces dealt with by the personnel of the Secretariat. This complexity is revealed by the number of organizations, associations, and governments involved in the process (see figure 3):




Figure 3. The Secretariat's Political Environment

The above has set out the important elements concerning the Secretariat. While not complex in form, the Secretariat's field of activity was nevertheless wide ranging.



## Standards and Objectives

Standards and Objectives give greater precision to the more general goal of a policy statement. Standards and objectives reflect more concrete and specific propositions. Further, as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:464) note, "...[they] move beyond the generalities of the legislative document to provide...more specific standards for assessing the program performance." They are used as standards against which the policy may be judged, to determine whether implementation has succeeded or failed with respect to the general goal.

As will be seen however, objectives are seldom stated precisely. They tend to evolve and are changed and modified as the implementation process itself evolves. In this manner, it is the policy itself which is being shaped acquiring as it were greater precision. Thus, the statement, "to establish a French teacher training institute," in and of itself affords little by way of what is to be done. Certain factors need to be considered as evident throughout the documents and indeed, during the interviews conducted for the purpose of this study. These factors consisted of: (1) site, (2) costs, (3) clientele, (4) programs, (5) staff, and (6) affiliation. As such these factors are not objectives but they are nonetheless translatable into statements of objectives. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn.

Site. The objective pursued with respect to this factor was to locate the institute at St. Boniface College. The reasons for this are twofold: (1) the fact that locating the institute



at St. Boniface College would complement and enhance the College's program offerings, and, (2) the fact that since the institute was to train teachers in the French language, it ought to be located within a totally French environment and St. Boniface College offered this environment. But as we will see, there was no certainty that this objective would be attained.

The question of site or location of the institute was a major concern to the people intent on creating a French teacher training institute in Manitoba. This concern had two dimensions. On the one hand, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Book II - Education:175) had stipulated that, "...one training institution be established to serve the needs of the four Western provinces." Therefore, until the submission of the Raynauld Arbitration Committee Report (August 13, 1971) there was no certainty that Manitoba would be chosen as the site. On the other hand, given that Manitoba was chosen, the French were adamant that St. Boniface College was the ideal location while a group at the Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba, saw an institute as a logical extension of their already well established programs.

The problem of choosing the province resulted in protracted interprovincial and federal negotiations. After reaching a hiatus, these negotiations gave way to a federally appointed commission which finally resolved the impasse. The problem of choosing the site in Manitoba was less problematic.





While sites other than St. Boniface College were given some consideration, it appears that most people favored the College.

The Manitoba Case. The situation in Manitoba will be treated first because it was only after Manitoba had made some progress in evolving a case for the establishment of the institute that events outside Manitoba became pre-eminent.

In the two months following the Manitoba election of June, 1969, Laurent Desjardins, M.L.A. for St. Boniface, had become parliamentary assistant to the Premier and Director of the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Relations. In a letter to the Rector of St. Boniface College (September 3, 1969; marked personal and confidential), Desjardins stated:

Bien que l'organisation de notre secrétariat ne soit pas encore complète, il importe que le Collège de St-Boniface se prépare à jouer un rôle très important dans cette période de renouvellement. La mise sur pied d'une école normale française nécessitera de votre part une période d'étude assez exhaustive. Il importe donc, ..., que le Collège de St-Boniface commence déjà à entrevoir le jour qu'il devienne une école normale dans un avenir rapproché.<sup>1\*</sup> (emphasis added)

This statement makes clear Desjardins' position, and by association, the Secretariat's, vis-à-vis the site of the Institute. At no point during the implementation process was this position in any way altered. Indeed, Desjardins (Int. March 1, 1978) stated quite definitely that there was never any doubt as to the site.

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\* Please refer to end of chapter for the translations of numbered French quotations.



On this issue of site, Desjardins enjoyed the support of the S.F.M. In a brief presented to Premier Schreyer (Sept. 15, 1969), the S.F.M., outlined a program which would see the government of Manitoba give increased attention to the Francophones in the province and indicated, "Cette école devrait être une branche du Collège de St-Boniface."<sup>2</sup>

An ad hoc committee formed by Stephane Valiquette, s.j., Rector of St. Boniface College, whose purpose it was to research the implications of placing the Institute within St. Boniface College, was firm in its position. Citing both the B and B Commission Report (Book II - Education) and the Symons Report on French Language Schools in Ontario (Cf. Ad Hoc Committee Report, Number I, Appendix D), the Ad Hoc Committee was quick to point out the pressing need for an Institute and further, that it ought to be situated at St. Boniface College. Indeed, the report was entitled, "Pour la création d'une école normale de langue française au Collège de Saint-Boniface, Manitoba". This first report received much currency among a number of organizations, namely, the Education Directorate of the S.F.M., the S.F.M., French Language School Trustees Association, French Parent-Teacher Federation, and the "Educateurs Franco-Manitobans (E.F.M.)". With the exception of the "Educateurs Franco-Manitobains", the report was endorsed without qualification. In relation to site, the E.F.M. questioned (Nov. 25, 1969) the need for a study which would determine the number of francophone students in the Western provinces and on that basis determine whether the



Institute could be located at St. Boniface College. The question was why conduct a study if the site was already a fait accompli.

The report was for all intents and purposes a document for reflection raising various issues and requesting reactions from various quarters. The Vice-President of the University of Manitoba, H. E. Duckworth offered the University's position in a letter to Desjardins (Jan. 6, 1970):

The University of Manitoba has followed with interest the suggestion that St. Boniface College might become the training institution mentioned in Recommendation 19 and we should be happy to assist in any way to further the strong claim which the College has. In addition, we have a well-developed interest of our own in Recommendation 38, that dealing with the teaching of second languages. Since the College's interest and our own are complementary, rather than competitive, and since they together represent the total teacher training program envisaged by the Commission, it might prove advantageous to both of us to correlate our plans in a manner that would be discernible to the Federal Government. Undoubtedly, our program would be strengthened by a French Normal School at St. Boniface College and, very likely, our operation could provide support to the French Normal School. But you would know whether or not the Federal Government would be receptive to the suggestion that both activities take place in the same province, with cooperation occurring between the two groups. We naturally wish to do nothing that might detract from the College's claim to the French Normal School.

Thus, the Vice-President sought approval for the University's own program of second language teacher training while supporting the College's bid for the Institute. At this stage, the University's interest in second language teacher training was not viewed by College officials as an important element. What was retained in the letter as important was the Vice-President's support. The Ad Hoc Committee's







response to the Vice-President's letter, as indicated in its second report (Jan. 12, 1970), stated:

Le comité retient comme important pour toute délibération future la volonté positive du vice-président d'appuyer le Collège de Saint-Boniface dans cette demande légitime d'un Collège pédagogique distinct de la "Faculté d'Education" par la langue d'instruction.<sup>3</sup>

However, as will be seen later, this support will become a contentious issue both from the Faculty of Education's position and the eventual terms of affiliation of the Institute with the Faculty.

In its third report (Jan. 19, 1972:2), the Ad Hoc Committee made explicit where the Institute ought to be located by reiterating both the Desjardins and Schreyer positions. Articles (2) and (3) stated:

(2) Le Secrétariat des relations fédérales-provinciales culturelles du Manitoba, par son responsable, M. Laurent Desjardins, exprime sa conviction:

- (a) que ce collège pédagogique de langue française doit être au Manitoba;
- (b) qu'il doit être situé dans la ville de Saint-Boniface;
- (c) qu'il doit être sous l'égide du Collège de Saint-Boniface.

(3) Le Premier Ministre du Manitoba, l'honorable Edward Schreyer, au congrès-rallye de la S.F.M., le 6 décembre 1969, annonce que sa province créera un collège pédagogique de langue française dès 1970 si possible. Il ne juge pas opportun de préciser le site ou la responsabilité administrative de ce collège mais par M. Desjardins, nous connaissons sa pensée sur ces points.<sup>4</sup>

Arthur Corriveau, a civil servant working with the Department of Education, had been seconded to the Secretariat principally because of his experience in French education.



In his own views, Corriveau was not considered a "good" representative of the French community. Corriveau stated (Int. March 6, 1978):

J'étais suspecte. Je n'étais de la patente.  
J'étais du Ministère.<sup>5</sup>

Corriveau was asked to submit a critical report of the Ad Hoc Committee's claim to have the Institute located at St. Boniface College. The Report reviewed all the previous Ad Hoc Committee reports. Of particular interest is the section entitled "Commentaires", which raised numerous issues ostensibly reflecting the attitudes of teachers. These attitudes, according to Corriveau, were important since they could have a preponderant influence on the project. Corriveau outlined the following conclusions but no specific reference was made as to the number of teachers interviewed:

- (1) Tous sont d'accord pour dire qu'il existe un besoin pressant de mieux préparer et de mieux former ceux qui se destinent à enseigner en français;
- (2) Tous sont d'avis qu'il y a un besoin urgent d'avoir un lieu quelconque au Manitoba où des cours de formation pédagogique en français soient disponibles dans toutes les disciplines;
- (3) Très peu serait disposé à favoriser l'idée d'un Collège pédagogique au sein du Collège de Saint-Boniface.<sup>6</sup> (emphasis added)

Corriveau continued by outlining the reasons of those teachers opposed to locating the Institute at St. Boniface College:

- (1) Même si tous ceux d'expression française qui se dirigent vers l'enseignement s'inscrivaient au Collège St-Boniface



pour le cours B, il n'y aurait pas suffisamment d'étudiants (environ 25) pour combler deux classes. (Ce chiffre est basé sur la projection de la Faculté d'Education pour 1970-71). Une situation comme celle-ci deviendrait vite intenable, à moins évidemment d'un recrutement bénéfique dans les provinces voisines - ce qui est peu probable.

- (2) Ce nombre restreint d'étudiants ne permettrait pas l'embauchement de plus de deux ou trois professeurs. Et il faudrait que ceux-ci soient suffisamment connaissant en pédagogie et assez souples pour satisfaire à toutes les disciplines. Ceci présenterait une tâche gigantesque et quasi impossible.
- (3) Pour suppléer à la pénurie de professeurs, il faudrait avoir accès sur place à toutes sortes d'aides techniques les plus modernes, et toutes sortes de facilités et de diversification. Ces aides et ces ateliers seraient très coûteux et difficiles à installer dans les locaux du Collège.
- (4) L'avantage d'une ambiance française serait probablement annulée par le désavantage d'un milieu plus maigre en fait de facilité pédagogique moderne et isolé du courant des innovations, des expériences, des recherches, etc. qui se manifestent ailleurs.<sup>7</sup>

While the document raised what seemed to be some critical issues, if indeed these were a reflection of a general concern on the part of the teachers, it does not appear that it was given much consideration. Indeed, most interviewees were aware that such a document existed but were unable to comment on its content. On this point, Corriveau (Int. March 6, 1978) indicated, "Je voulais qu'ils répondent aux questions. Le documents ne fut pas bien reçu. On poussait la chose, ça se comprend."<sup>8</sup> However, if the document was not well received, the Secretariat did, nevertheless, ask the E.F.M. to submit a





report focusing on the following points:

- (1) Le besoin d'un collège pédagogique de langue française,
- (2) L'emplacement dudit collège,
- (3) Les conséquences dudit collège du point de vue des enseignants.<sup>9</sup>

On March 8, 1970, the E.F.M. submitted its report. In essence, teachers appeared divided on most issues including the one of having an Institute. The report stated:

A cause de la diversité des choix, il est pratiquement impossible de rallier l'ensemble du groupe à un choix unique. Alors qu'un bon nombre voyait le Collège de St-Boniface comme le site idéal, d'autres en nombre difficile à déterminer favorisaient l'actuelle Faculté d'Education.<sup>10</sup> (emphasis added)

French teachers were not alone in questioning the site. Marcel Bonneau, professor at the Faculty of Education, and Robert Roy, director of French programs for the Winnipeg School Division, submitted separate reports giving reasons favoring an Institute as an adjunct to the Faculty of Education. Bonneau's (Report submitted Feb. 26, 1970) concerns, while representing a series of assertions, touched upon sociological, psychological, economical, linguistic, pedagogical and political factors. The gist of the document dealt with the dangers of "ghettoization", that is, removing French students from the mainstream of activities available on the campus of the University of Manitoba but unavailable at St. Boniface College.

Roy's (Report of Feb. 26, 1970) reasons for favoring the University of Manitoba campus were twofold. Firstly, there was the question of cross accessibility which would



make English courses available to French students and French courses available to English students. To provide such possibilities, in light of the small number of students at St. Boniface College, would be most uneconomical. More importantly and in a more cutting note, Roy remarked:

If a more extended program is envisaged, the option problem would be further compounded. The only persons in Manitoba qualified to give certain courses may not know a word of French. The exclusive use of a Quebec university for graduate programs is only a partial solution even if the money were not a problem. There are some students, such as housewives, who wouldn't leave Manitoba for a year even if they had access to sizable bursaries. There is a point beyond which it is difficult to justify offering watered-down programs for the sake of having a separate Français Faculty.

Roy also questioned the extent to which it was wise to make individual streams mutually exclusive.

The second reason given was the "value of competition".

Roy stated:

If location favors constant comparisons of programs by staff and student body, it is less likely that weak programs will be perpetuated.

It seems obvious that Roy was not at all confident in the College's ability to provide either the programs or the expertise. In any event, no further mention is made of these reports in the available documents and no one interviewed gave any indication that they were at all considered.

On March 2, 1970, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted its final report to the Secretariat. The Report spent four pages outlining the reasons for locating the Institute at St. Boniface



College. All the reasons outlined were a collection of those appearing in previous reports.

If there remained any doubt as to the site in Manitoba, those would be dispelled. In a letter dated February 13, 1970, Desjardins summoned Father Clément Cormier, c.s.c., from the Université de Moncton, previously with the B and B Commission, to conduct a study in Manitoba presumably for the purpose of "... mener les études dans le domaine du bilinguisme et la mosaïque culturelle". If the letter requested studies related to bilingualism and the cultural mosaic, Father Cormier's report was less far reaching. The title of the report was, "Etude sur le projet d'établissement au Manitoba d'un Collège Pédagogique Francophone" (March 12, 1970). The thirty-four (34) page report made it quite clear that the ideal location was St. Boniface College. The question of site in Manitoba was then a settled issue. It then became a matter of adding greater precision to such other factors as clientele, administration, programs and so on.

Interprovincial exchanges and federal involvement. On November 6, 1969, the Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, tabled in the House of Commons the Federal Government's policy relative to the recommendations of Volume II of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. To the recommendation dealing with the establishment of a French Teacher Training Institute, the policy stated:





On recommande également une subvention fédérale couvrant 75% des dépenses d'immobilisation d'une école normale en vue de desservir les provinces de l'Ouest... Nous sommes disposés à accepter que cette recommandation serve de base de discussion avec les provinces, persuadés qu'elles ont vraisemblablement des commentaires au sujet du nombre d'écoles, de leur emplacement et de leur financement.

The policy declaration was clearly well received by Schreyer and the French group in Manitoba. While the policy may have had some serious ramifications in terms of jurisdictional considerations, the Federal Government's position was essentially one of providing grants-in-aid to the provinces to promulgate its bilingual policy. The statement was particularly cautious in making sure that the Federal Government had no intentions of interfering in provincial jurisdiction:

Les propositions suivantes doivent être considérées comme une base de discussion et de consultation. Nous espérons que l'examen plus poussé de cette question pourra se poursuivre dans un esprit de collaboration. Nous sommes prêts à poursuivre nos entretiens avec les provinces afin de mettre au point des formules qui donneront satisfaction à tous les intéressés.

As a follow-up to the Federal Government's policy commitment to bilingualism, Premier Schreyer outlined his government's intentions in the area of bilingualism in a letter (Nov. 26, 1969) to the Secretary of State. In particular, Schreyer noted:

L'importance d'un centre de formation pédagogique française est aussi une des préoccupations de notre gouvernement. Afin de réaliser les changements que nous proposons de faire dans le domaine de l'éducation, il importe qu'une école normale française soit créée le plus tôt possible à Saint-Boniface.11



If Schreyer was not prepared to single out a site in public, it appears that he was more direct with Pelletier. Schreyer, however, would be more forthright to lay claim to the Institute. Following his speech to the S.F.M. in December, 1969, Schreyer, along with Desjardins, met with Pelletier in Ottawa. The meeting did not, however, result in a commitment by Ottawa. It seems clear now from subsequent events and the fact that the recommendation suggested one Institute for Western Canada, that the Federal Government would have to involve the other Western provinces in the discussions. Despite this, but perhaps also to prevent the discussions from extending into other provincial jurisdictions, Schreyer (Dec. 15, 1969) wrote Pelletier outlining the various factors which made Manitoba in general, and St. Boniface in particular, an ideal choice for the Institute. More specifically, Schreyer noted:

Nous rencontrons pleinement les intentions de la Commission d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme en suggérant que cette institution soit créée à Saint-Boniface et plus particulièrement au Collège de Saint-Boniface...<sup>12</sup> (emphasis added)

Pelletier's response (Dec. 23, 1969) was to be expected:

Tel que la Commission royale sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme l'a suggéré, la question d'une seule école normale française pour les provinces de l'Ouest semblerait mériter d'être prise en considération. Evidemment, ceci nécessite une consultation ainsi qu'un accord entre les provinces intéressées.<sup>13</sup> (emphasis added)

Clearly, even if Manitoba was to continue its unilateral negotiations with Ottawa, there was no possibility whatsoever to circumvent interprovincial negotiations. The negotiations were an indispensable condition to federal aid. Thus began a



process which was to last until August, 1971 with the submission of the Federal Arbitration Commission's recommendations. In the interim, however, much debate would result between the three Prairie Provinces (British Columbia as a possible member opted out early in the process), the Federal Government and the French associations of the three Prairie Provinces.

Manitoba persisted in demanding immediate aid from the Federal Government. Schreyer (Jan. 6, 1970) expressed this well in a letter to Pelletier:

Toutefois, permettez-moi, Monsieur le Ministre, de constater encore une fois l'importance que cette nouvelle institution occupe dans l'ensemble de la nouvelle politique de notre province envers les Canadiens d'expression française.<sup>14</sup>

Schreyer, at this point, could insist that his government had made explicit policies which complemented the Federal Government's policies. Indeed, Manitoba would soon be one of the few provinces recognizing French as an official language of instruction. Further, a French cultural center was in the offing. The Institute was part of a package and every measure would be taken to keep this package intact. Nevertheless, Pelletier could not alter his position. In response to Schreyer, Pelletier (Jan. 27, 1970) indicated:

...We will be contacting the other Western provinces to request any comments they may have.

Letters of the Sub-Committee on Official Languages were being sent to delegates from the Western provinces by Jules Léger, under Secretary of State. The content of the letter, dated January 28, 1970, invited the provincial delegates to comment







or participate in the discussions if they so wished. Leger's letter read in part:

I am therefore taking the liberty of drawing this question to your attention, in case you should wish to offer comments or consider that it would be worthwhile discussing this matter with the other provinces concerned...

In Manitoba, the French had not anticipated such an eventuality. The initial enthusiasm generated by the Secretariat, by the Premier and by Ottawa's bilingual policies may well have screened out the possibility of other provinces making a bid for such an Institute. Be that as it may, the Ad Hoc Committee's third report (Jan. 19, 1970) outlined the concern:

Malheureusement, nous avons sauté une étape qui pourrait jeter une ombre sur le tableau.

Nous voulions étudier le problème de la création d'un collège pédagogique pour les provinces de l'Ouest de concert avec la Saskatchewan et l'Alberta. Nous venons d'apprendre que c'était aussi le désir de ces provinces mais qu'un manque de communication a précipité la déclaration de l'honorable Schreyer avant que les minorités francophones des trois provinces se soient mises d'accord sur le site du collège pédagogique.

Si un autre province de l'Ouest s'avisait de demander à Ottawa de l'aide financière pour établir un collège pédagogique chez-elle, Ottawa devra peut-être partager entre les intéressés les sommes réservées à un seul collège pédagogique pour l'Ouest canadien.

Pouvons-nous maintenant rallier à notre décision les francophones de la Saskatchewan et de l'Alberta?<sup>15</sup>

Important in this statement is the defensive stance taken by the members of the Committee. Lack of communication is mentioned as the scapegoat. It is implied that perhaps



Premier Schreyer ought not to have declared himself before the other francophone associations had been involved in the discussions. Furthermore, there is a definite naivety to be noted on the part of the Committee when it suggests rallying the Albert and Saskatchewan French Associations to their cause. Finally, the Ad Hoc Committee was well aware that since one institute had been recommended, a serious demand by another province resulting in considering two Institutes might well mean sharing of monies granted for the project. Their stand on the issue would be firm -- one institute and in Manitoba.

The discussions between the Francophone associations of Western Canada began in earnest in August of 1969. The umbrella association "Fédération Canadienne-française de l'Ouest" met on consecutive days (17 and 18 of August) in Edmonton. Under the heading, "Problèmes quant à la formation des maîtres", the minutes of the meeting read in part:

(d) ....le Père Patoine (secretary)...fait remarquer que tout en comprenant d'une part l'intérêt que portent les francophones de chacune des provinces dans une institution du genre et que d'autre part, la Fédération comme telle n'a aucune autorité pour favoriser la fondation d'une seule institution (sic), pas plus que l'endroit où cette institution unique devrait être établie, il est à craindre que s'il doit en exister trois, ces trois institutions demeureront des petites facultés qui n'auront ni prestige, parce qu'elles n'auront pas le nombre d'élèves suffisant pour se développer.

(e) Le Père Patoine...propose donc que la Fédération obtienne...les services d'un



spécialiste en la matière, qui viendrait dans les trois provinces de l'Ouest faire une enquête sur ce qui existe actuellement ou sur ce qui pourrait exister plus tard et, recommander s'il serait préférable d'avoir une seule institution de formation de maîtres de français et dans un tel cas à quel endroit cette institution devrait être établie. Les associations provinciales devraient alors accepter les recommandations de ce spécialiste.

Adoptée.

What must be retained from the above is that in (d), the "Fédération" is said to have no authority to determine the number of institutions nor the location. However, three such institutions would in fact severely restrict operations due to the small number of students. In (e), a motion made by Patoine, and adopted by the assembly, foresaw the hiring of a consultant to study the problem and recommend if one Institute was preferable and, if so, where it would be located. The final recommendations would be binding on the three associations.

At its meeting in Regina (28 and 29 of August, 1969), the "Fédération" reiterated the mandate of the consultant; discussed the necessity of informing the ministers of Education about the study; discussed the funding of the study; and that Clément Cormier, c.s.c., be invited to conduct the study.

The "Fédération" met again in Regina on December 27, 1969. It was noted that after some hesitation, Cormier had accepted as consultant. It was also agreed that the "Fédération" would meet in Ottawa on the 29th of January, at which point





Cormier would outline the major components of the study. The meeting took place as scheduled and Cormier proposed a study which left no element untouched. The members' reactions were not recorded but the minutes give a possible indication:

- (A) Le principe de tenir une enquête demeure.
- (B) La tenue de cette enquête est cependant remise à plus tard alors que les positions prises entre le Collège de Saint-Boniface et le gouvernement du Manitoba et entre le Collège St-Jean et l'Université de l'Alberta seront plus précises.
- (C) Il faudrait s'assurer que cette enquête soit endossée par les gouvernements provinciaux respectifs.
- (D) Il faudrait également prévoir la possibilité d'accorder des adjoints au Père Cormier afin de faciliter son travail et de partager sa responsabilité.

Thus the study was delayed presumably until the respective positions between St. Boniface College and the Manitoba government and College St. Jean of Edmonton and the University of Alberta had been made clearer. The statement, however, appears less than convincing in view of the fact that in Manitoba, government officials and francophone representatives were anxiously waiting for federal approbation. It may well be that an impasse had been reached between those favoring one Institute and those favoring more than one. On the other hand, the "Fédération"'s position would not prevent Manitoba from pressing its point with Ottawa and would permit Alberta to develop a strategy to meet Ottawa.

Manitoba continued to press its demand on Ottawa. In a letter to Pelletier (April 16, 1970), Desjardins highlighted



the educational reforms envisaged by the Manitoba government and that such reforms were keyed on establishing an Institute. He noted:

La clef de cette réforme est la création de l'institution de formation pédagogique française au Manitoba. Afin d'accélérer le processus d'implantation d'un système équitable aux franco-manitobains, il est important que cette question, ainsi que la participation financière des parties en cause, soient débattus le plus tôt possible. A ce moment-ci de l'année, si des décisions ne sont pas prises prochainement, il serait impossible de mettre sur pied une telle institution pour l'année 1970.<sup>16</sup>

Desjardins and the Francophones were still intent that the Institute would be at St. Boniface College and that it would open its doors in September, 1970. Little did they know that two years would elapse before that objective became a reality. Pelletier would respond (May 7, 1970) by stating:

...nous serions heureux de prêter notre concours aux discussions qui pourraient avoir lieu entre les provinces intéressées. Vous comprendrez cependant qu'il ne saurait être question pour le gouvernement fédéral de s'immiscer de quelque façon que ce soit dans un problème qui est essentiellement de compétence provinciale; cependant, si les provinces en cause manifestaient le désir d'obtenir du gouvernement fédéral une assistance technique, il nous ferait plaisir de nous rendre à leur désir.

Thus, while Pelletier was adamant in his position that this was clearly a provincial problem and that it had to be resolved at that level, he did nevertheless suggest the possibility of technical assistance. What form this technical assistance was to take was unclear but certainly an arbitration panel appeared feasible. Pelletier was hopeful, however, that a joint project by the provinces could be elaborated.



To elaborate a project meant getting the provinces together, but even this appeared problematic. Indeed, in a letter to Pelletier (June 19, 1970) Desjardins stated:

Au mois de mai 1970, au cours d'une réunion avec MM. Larose et Heroux (from the Secretary of State), nous avons appris que la réunion entre les quatre provinces de l'Ouest n'aurait pas lieu, car il semblait y avoir confusion au sujet de quel gouvernement devrait convoquer la réunion. (emphasis added)

The problem centered around who would call the meeting. No one government was prepared to assume the leadership. But in his letter, Desjardins went further stating:

Au cours de la réunion du comité ministériel sur les langues officielles, la délégation manitobaine a discuté avec les autres provinces de l'Ouest de cette question et ces provinces ne voyaient pas d'objection quant au choix du Manitoba pour le collège pédagogique.<sup>17</sup>

At least at this level -- Ministerial Committee on Official Languages -- there did not appear to be much debate. Manitoba could have the Institute. But at a subsequent meeting in June one province indicated that while the Institute could be established in Manitoba, there might well be some reactions from the French associations in the other provinces. This same province (which remained unnamed in Desjardins' letter) suggested that the four francophone associations ought to attempt to resolve the problem. Desjardins was not at all enthusiastic about the suggestion:

Je ne crois pas, Monsieur le Ministre, que cette solution soit efficace. Elle ne servirait qu'à partir la question dans une arène où une discussion futile se poursuivrait pour une période indéfinie. D'ailleurs, la résolution à cette question ne se situe pas à ce niveau en ce moment.<sup>18</sup>







There is no doubt that Desjardins continued to seek a quick resolution to the problem. September, 1970, was fast approaching with no decision in sight. Premier Schreyer had promised an Institute for 1970. In another attempt to impress Pelletier with the urgency of the matter, Desjardins' letter ended by saying:

Je vous soumets enfin copie de la correspondance qui existe sur ce sujet ainsi que des copies de rapports importants...J'espère que cette documentation témoignera de l'intérêt qui existe vis-à-vis l'établissement du collège pédagogique français et qu'elle servira à relancer cette question qui, à la suite de notre nouvelle législation scolaire, est d'une importance de premier ordre.<sup>19</sup>

The Secretary of State, Pelletier, was not to be impressed. In his reaction (July 13, 1970), he reiterated his two previous positions, namely, that the question was within provincial jurisdiction and that the Federal Government would participate only if invited by the provinces.

The Minister of Education for Alberta, R.C. Clark, in a letter to Roger Motut, President of "l'Association Canadienne-Française de l'Alberta", (June 26, 1970) noted:

I have discussed this matter with my colleagues in Cabinet and the Government is agreeable to the suggestion which developed at the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Education to the effect that the Ministers of Education of the four Western provinces would ask the Presidents of the four Western French Canadian Associations to investigate the most suitable location for this institution and make their recommendation, in turn, to the provinces so that this can be forwarded to the Federal Government. (emphasis added)

If the four ministers of Education for the Western provinces redirected the problem to the French associations



for resolution, a lack of consensus among these associations became apparent. Two motions were adopted by the "Fédération Canadienne-Française de l'Ouest" at a meeting held in Regina on July 6, 1970. One motion read:

que soit relancé le projet d'étude du R.P. Cormier relativement à l'établissement d'un institut pédagogique dans l'Ouest, en lui demandant d'accorder une attention spéciale à la situation de Saskatchewan.

Thus the need for a study of the question appeared to be the saving element. The study would address itself to the various problems and as such provide information necessary to arrive at a solution. However, at the annual meeting of the "Fédération" held in Edmonton (August 8 and 9, 1970), there was an obvious schism among the representatives. The minutes of the meeting are indicative of this situation:

- (B) Le Dr Roger Motut (Alberta), appuyé par Laurent Uliac, propose que la Fédération favorise la fondation de trois collèges pédagogiques dans l'Ouest. L'assemblée générale se prononce contre cette proposition.
- (D) Il est proposé par le Père Patoine, appuyé par Albert Lepage, que Roger Motut (Alberta) et Roger Lalonde (Saskatchewan) répondent à leur Ministre d'Education respectif que le sentiment de la Fédération est qu'un seul collège de pédagogie ne semble par répondre aux besoins des Francophones de l'Ouest. Que par ailleurs la Fédération voit à ce que tout le problème de la formation des maîtres soit étudié par un ou deux spécialistes en la matière. Le vote est pris et donne le résultat suivant: 21 en faveur de la résolution, aucun contre et quatre abstentions.
- (E) Le Dr Motut demande que son opposition au Rév. Père Clément Cormier comme enquêteur soit enregistrée.



Thus, the "Fédération" was not prepared to accept a motion by Roger Motut from Alberta which called for the establishment of three Institutes -- one for each Prairie Province. But on the other hand, the "Fédération" was prepared to accept that the delegates from Alberta and Saskatchewan report to their respective Minister of Education insisting that one Institute could not possibly reflect the needs of all provinces. A study was therefore important. On this point, a conflict arose. Reverend Clément Cormier was the candidate suggested to conduct the research. However, for whatever reasons, Motut from Alberta registered his opposition for Cormier.

On October 1, 1970, Desjardins wrote a letter on behalf of Premier Schreyer, to R.C. Clark, Minister of Education for Alberta, in which he noted:

We have unofficially been informed that the Province of Alberta would be willing to cooperate with Manitoba in the establishment of a French Teachers' College in Manitoba, but that you might encounter some opposition from some French Albertans on this subject. The Province of Manitoba is willing to do anything to expedite this matter as every delay is costly to our program. We have been willing to meet with the different governments, their Ministers of Education or with the different French groups, but so far to no avail.

Clark's response came on November 12, 1970 at which point he expressed regret for the delay but added:

I feel that perhaps the best way for me to answer your letter is to provide you with a copy of my letter of October 20th to the Honorable Mr. Pelletier.

In that letter (dated October 20, 1970), Clark stated:

The Government of Alberta recognizes that the location of such an institution is within the jurisdiction of the Government of Canada. However, in the opinion of







the Government of Alberta, the existing facilities of College Saint-Jean would be most adequate. College Saint-Jean is affiliated with the University of Alberta and has sufficient facilities for such a program. The Government of Alberta requests that you consider these facilities before any final decision is made.

Clark's letter constituted, on the part of the Alberta government, an official request to have the institute, or an institute, located at College Saint-Jean. Until now, Manitoba had been the only province which had officially requested such facilities.

Another attempt was made by the francophone leaders of Manitoba and Alberta to arrive at some consensus. A meeting was held at St. Boniface College on October 23, 1970. It seems appropriate to quote these minutes in toto since they shed light on the impasse. The minutes were taken by Gerald Backeland, executive secretary of the Secretariat who was attending the meeting as an observer. The minutes read as follows:

Minutes: meeting between Franco-Manitoban and Franco-Albertan community leaders to discuss French teacher-training institution for Western Canada.

It was agreed that no written minutes would be taken of the meeting.

Discussion of the establishment of the teacher-training institution lasted for a period of three hours -- with each party explaining the reasons for establishing a teacher-training institution in the Western Canada. Alberta's proposal consisted in thinking in terms of two institutions for Western Canada in view of the geographical factors involved. Alberta's concern in essence was that centralizing this service in one province would be killing any further development of the facilities at the College St. Jean.



Manitoba's representatives discussed the proposal in terms of the Federal Government's guidelines and stressed the need to centralize if such an institution were to be feasible.

Both parties expressed concern of the Federal Government's directive to arrive at a decision before the end of the present fiscal year.

When it appeared impossible to reach any consensus among the two parties, Manitoba suggested that the decision and responsibility be handed over to the respective provincial governments. Alberta was not in agreement.

Alberta suggested that the provincial French-speaking associations have Mr. Pelletier reopen the dossier and consider establishing more than one institution. Manitoba would not concur.

Finally, it was suggested that the chairman, Msgr Gosselin, meet with Mr. Pelletier and explain the impasse and that he suggest to the Secretary of State that the four French-speaking associations (three representatives from each province) meet with him in order to explain fully their respective positions. No vote was taken as such and the meeting closed on this note.

Note: It is at this meeting that the Alberta representatives produced a copy of a letter sent by Mr. Clark, Minister of Education, to the Secretary of State.

Maurice Gauthier, a franco-Manitoba representative, described (Int. March 8, 1978) the meeting:

Les rencontres furent soldées d'engueulades -- une question de clocher. Alberta avait peut-être raison. Notre position était dotée d'une arrogance insupportable -- nous étions les seuls capables...une impasse.<sup>20</sup>

Justice Monnin (Int. March 4, 1978) was less straightforward but did indicate that the two groups had reached an impasse, "Nous n'étions pas d'accord -- impasse totale".<sup>21</sup>



This would be the last meeting. The solution would be settled by an arbitration committee. The three provinces and the Federal Government would agree that the recommendation of the committee be binding. A resolution of the problem was in the offing.

The Committee of Inquiry on French language teacher-training in the Western provinces, composed of three members, André Raynault (president), H.B. Neatby, and Paul Wyczynski, began its work in July of 1971. The Committee submitted its report on August 13, 1971. The Report (Part I; 11, 6) stated:

We do not recommend that a single teacher-training institution be established to serve the needs of the four Western provinces.

While noting that such problems as certification, financing, administrative difficulties might be overcome if one Institute were created, the Report noted that,

The insuperable difficulty is that even if a single institution was established, it would not serve the Western region. Our interviews in the Prairie Provinces made it crystal clear that any one institution, in whatever province it was located, would be considered a provincial institution... It would be a regional institution in name only.

The Report went on to state:

59. We recommend that the Federal Government pay 75% of the costs of renovations and new buildings required for a teacher-training programme in French at the Collège de Saint-Boniface.

63. Most of the prospective teachers for the French language schools of Saskatchewan will have to take some or all of their training outside of the province.





65. ...Although the total amount will be considerably less than in the case of the Collège de Saint-Boniface, the grant should be calculated on a similar basis. We recommend that the Federal Government pay 75% of the costs of renovations and equipment required for the teacher training programme at the Collège Saint-Jean.

On October 4, 1971, Secretary of State Gerald Pelletier in a letter to Premier Edward Schreyer of Manitoba, stated:

In view of their findings and recommendations, I would like to suggest that our officials meet as soon as conveniently possible to work out a solution to this question.

Costs. Costs for the establishment of a teacher training institute does not in itself constitute an objective. It becomes an objective where questions are raised as to who pays what, in what proportions, and for what purposes.

The question of costs and which level of government was to be responsible and in what proportion was first outlined in the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism later to be accepted by the Federal Government. In its statement of policy tabled in the House of Commons, November 6, 1969, the Secretary of State declared:

On recommande que la subvention du gouvernement fédéral aux provinces soit de 25% du coût afférent à chaque élève... On recommande également une subvention fédérale couvrant 75% des dépenses d'immobilisation.

It was on this participative basis that costs for the construction and operation of an Institute would be calculated.



The question of costs per se, however, was not raised by the Ad Hoc Committee until the submission of its final report in March of 1970. The Committee appeared more interested in discussing various other issues such as the rationale for an Institute, the needs related to the functioning of the Institute and less so about what the costs would be. Indeed the report was quite cursory in its section dealing with costs. In its report (March 2, 1970:15-16), the Ad Hoc Committee concluded:

Nous ne croyons pas qu'il sera facile d'établir avant de commencer le coût total de l'entreprise parce qu'elle se fera dans des circonstances ou des conditions plutôt nouvelles.<sup>22</sup>

Acknowledging the difficulties of establishing costs at such an early date, the Committee, in essence, suggested that costs would be better handled as the program evolved. Only in this manner would costs be ascertained.

However, if the Ad Hoc Committee felt constrained to supply tentative estimates, B. Scott Bateman, Chairman of the University Grants Commission, attempted to do so. In a memorandum (March 9, 1970) to Saul Miller, Minister of Education, Bateman stated:

We have found it rather difficult to produce defensible figures on the estimated cost of establishing and operating a French language teacher-training institution in Manitoba. We believe that it can be done only by making certain assumptions and then showing the basis on which these assumptions results in estimates of costs. If the assumptions are then changed, it is possible to modify the costs in accordance with the new assumptions.



Some of Bateman's assumptions are given below and contrasted with Corriveau's assumptions in a critique provided for the Secretariat.

Bateman (U.G.C.)

1. The annual intake of students will be 100. The enrolment pattern in the first 4 years would be as follows:

	<u>70-71</u>	<u>71-72</u>	<u>72-73</u>	<u>73-74</u>
1st year	100	100	100	100
2nd year		80	80	80
3rd year			70	70
	<u>100</u>	<u>180</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>250</u>

2. That the course will be a three-year course, partly because this is the length of the most recently established teacher-training course in Manitoba...; and partly because a three-year teacher-training course is probably the shortest period which would satisfy the demands of all Western provinces.

6. That there will be no additional cost for such ancillary activities as student union, etc.

10. (a) That...while awaiting the completion of an academic building by September, 1973, students be housed in trailers.

(b) A residence of 90% of enrolment...and the cost of a residence for 225 students would therefore be a maximum \$1,750,000.00

Corriveau (Secretariat)

1. A figure of 30 the first year, increasing possibly to 80 the following year, would be more realistic

2. A two-year program is best that can be offered at this juncture.

4. The need for such activities is psychologically important at the very outset in order to promote a feeling of belonging, of togetherness.

5. Rented space in the College itself would be much more suitable and probably no more expensive during the interim.

6. This does not seem like sound speculation.

9. This strikes me as too high. Furthermore, I am not convinced that residential facilities should be provided.

7. There is a danger of becoming lost in the crowd if this system is adopted. Special incentive bursaries clearly earmarked for this particular institution ought to be included in the estimates.

8. Summer programs of the inservice variety are never self-supporting.





Bateman (U.G.C.)Corriveau (Secretariat)

15. That bursaries will be the responsibility of individual provinces and that bursaries for Manitoba students will come from Education estimates and are therefore not included in any of the figures in this document.

It is my opinion that Mr. Bateman's report fails either to include or identify sufficiently two very important items, namely, the kind of "teaching hardware" so much an integral part of modern teacher training institutions, and the matter of staff.

<u>Year</u>	
1970-71	166,000
1971-72	1,001,000
1972-73	<u>2,038,000</u>
Total	<u><u>3,205,000</u></u>

<u>Year</u>	
1970-71	164,750
1971-72	377,000
1972-73	<u>501,800</u>
Total	<u><u>1,043,550</u></u>

Cf. Appendix E for the two reports

The two estimates differed considerably which led Bateman to revise his initial submission. In a memorandum (November 4, 1971) to Saul Miller, Minister of Education, Bateman offered a revised version. The introductory paragraph read as follows:

Defensible figures on the estimated cost of establishing and operating a French language teacher-training institution in Manitoba require our making certain assumptions and then showing the basis on which these assumptions result in estimates of costs.

Bateman reconsidered the student intake by decreasing it to seventy (70) from the original one hundred (100). The residence was to accommodate 125 students. Those were the major changes. The estimates were thus drastically altered and consisted of the following items:



i - Academic space for 190 students	\$1,439.910
ii - Residential space for 125 beds (10% cost sharing)	62,500
iii - Food services	150,000
iv - Start-up temporary renovations	30,000
v - Inflation estimate 4.5% per year	75,708
vi - Miscellaneous renovations and costs contingency	11,882
Total Capital	<u>\$1,770.000</u>

In the final analysis, Bateman's figures would be close to the actual costs but with some modifications.

Subsequent to the tabling of the Raynauld Arbitration Commission Report, federal and provincial officials (Int. Marion, September 29, 1979) met on numerous occasions to discuss the financial ramifications and the sharing agreements between the two levels of government.

By the end of December, 1971, the Secretary of State had not yet made any financial commitment toward the creation of the Institute. Officials at St. Boniface College were becoming increasingly impatient since any serious delay might erode any hope of a September opening. Roger St-Denis, Rector of St. Boniface College in a letter to Premier Schreyer (Dec. 29, 1971) expressed his concern:

...l'expérience nous a appris que le Gouvernement fédéral peut parfois être très lent et les membres du Conseil d'administration s'inquiètent de savoir si cette réponse arrivera vraiment au moment où nous l'entendons tous. Si elle n'arrivait pas, que se produirait-il?



Interesting in this communication is the fact that St-Denis chose to bypass the Secretariat and raise the issue with the Premier. A curtly worded reply came but from Desjardins, and read:

Je tiens à vous assurer que notre gouvernement est tout aussi conscient que le Conseil d'Administration du Collège, de l'urgence de préparer l'ouverture d'un Institut pédagogique dans un avenir rapproché.

Par contre, pour le moment, nous demeurons confiant que le gouvernement fédéral rendra sa décision avant longtemps, tel que promis. Si en réalité un autre délai nous était imposé, nous ferions tout en notre pouvoir pour exiger une décision finale du Secrétaire d'Etat.<sup>24</sup>

Subsequently, Desjardins, either through his own interest in seeing the agreement settled as early as possible or through pressures exercised by College officials, wrote Pelletier. In his letter (Jan. 25, 1972), Desjardins reiterated that January 31 was the date at which federal participation would be made known. Desjardins continued:

Nous sommes confiants que le Secrétariat d'Etat communiquera avec nous dans le délai convenu, mais tenons à vous laisser savoir que les organismes intéressés, et plus particulièrement le Collège de Saint-Boniface, surveillent de très près le calendrier, nous interrogent sur la question, et s'inquièteraient de tout retard dans cette décision si longuement attendue.<sup>25</sup>

Desjardins essentially justified his apparent impatience by stating that College officials were extremely impatient and that any delay would greatly prejudice the planning. On January 31, Premier Schreyer received a letter from the Secretary of State. The letter in part read:





I am now in a position, subject to your agreement, to recommend to my Cabinet colleagues the arrangements outlined in the annex to this letter relating to the establishment and operation of a French language teacher training institution over the next two fiscal years. While the exact amount of the federal contribution will naturally depend upon enrolment and operating cost figures, present estimates would place it at \$1,200,000.

The annex (Cf. Appendix F) made explicit the sharing arrangements and ceilings of federal contributions. In summary form, the annex stipulated:

#### Capital costs

##### A. Academic Buildings:

Reimbursement at the rate of 75% of capital costs incurred the ceiling of the federal contribution being \$1,000,000.

##### B. Cafeteria and Residence:

A federal contribution additional to the normal mortgage facilities offered by the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation for these types of buildings is not contemplated under this arrangement.

#### Operating Costs

Reimbursement at the rate of 25% of the operating expenditures of the institution. Since the operating costs might exceed those of a similar anglophone institution in Manitoba, provision would be made for this reimbursement formula to apply to actual operating costs up to a maximum of 25% more than those of similar anglophone institutions. The institution would of course be eligible for grants...concerning assistance for minority-language education at the university level in the amount of 10% of its provincial operating grant.

#### Library Acquisitions

##### A. Purchase of books. A \$25,000 reimbursement for the purchase of a basic collection of books in the French language.



- B. Other associated costs...subject to the 25% federal share...

### Understandings

A contract would be signed between the Secretary of State and the Manitoba University Grants Commission and would include the usual provisions in such contracts. It would also include the following undertakings on the part of the UGC:

- a) that it agree to make arrangements for the institution to accept candidates from the other Western provinces and that such candidates not be required to pay tuition or other fees in excess of those paid by students from Manitoba;
- b) that it agree to negotiate satisfactory arrangements with the other Western provinces concerning admission standards, equivalent certification and other such matters affecting students from those provinces wishing to study at the institution.

The arrangement was thus presented on the date previously agreed to by Pelletier. To determine whether this arrangement was satisfactory, Desjardins in a memorandum (Feb. 3, 1972) to Justice Monnin asked:

Pourrais-je avoir vos recommandations et vos opinions quant au montant que Ottawa semble vouloir accorder pour ce projet...<sup>26</sup>

Monnin (Feb. 8, 1972) responded by saying:

- 1) ...
- 2) Montant de \$1,200,000 et plafond de \$1,000,000. Ça va! D'accord!
- 3) "understandings" à page 2 du mémoire. Il faut que cet Institut de pédagogie ouvre ses portes le 1<sup>er</sup> septembre 1972. Cela est urgent. Donc il ne faudrait pas que l'on retarde cette ouverture en attendant un accord avec les personnes de l'Ouest, ce qui peut prendre des années. Donc, d'abord débiter en septembre 1972 et dès que possible entreprendre les



négociations pour satisfaire les "undertakings" du secrétaire d'état.

4) ...

5) ...

Donc, ça marche!<sup>27</sup>

Thus, as far as Monnin was concerned, priority was to be given to the signing of the agreement and the "understandings" ought to be negotiated later. Monnin was most concerned that the matter be resolved quickly in order to ensure the opening of the Institute in September, 1972. Uppermost at this time was choosing a director, hiring staff, preparing courses and getting approval from the University Grants Commission for financial disbursements.

However, by February 3, 1972, College officials had not received word of Pelletier's letter and the annex therein contained. "Le Conseil d'Administration du Collège" was becoming impatient by the apparent delay. The Rector, Roger St-Denis, was asked to write to the Saint Boniface School Division requesting the Board to send a telex to Pelletier. The College would be sending a similar communication, part of which read as follows:

Le Gouvernement provincial nous avait donné l'assurance que la réponse du Gouvernement fédéral lui parviendrait avant la fin de janvier.

Ce retard compromet sérieusement la création de l'Institut pédagogique pour septembre prochain et particulièrement l'organisation des cours de recyclage des maîtres pour l'été qui vient.

Pourriez-vous nous indiquer la date ultime à laquelle nous pouvons nous attendre à une réponse.<sup>28</sup>





Copies of the two telex were sent to Premier Schreyer. Pelletier in turn responded (Feb. 8, 1972) by a telex to Schreyer stating, "...I trust that my letter of January 31 to you regarding this matter has been received." Desjardins, in a letter (Feb. 14, 1972) to Pelletier, was quick to mention that the latter's letter had indeed been received and was somewhat apologetic when he added:

Quant aux télégrammes que vous avez récemment reçus du Conseil d'Administration du Collège... ainsi que de la Division Scolaire de Saint-Boniface, je tiens à souligner que nous du gouvernement n'avions aucune idée que ces organisations vous télégraphiaient si tôt après la fin du mois de janvier. Je suis un peu déçu de leur attitude trop impatiente devant la marche normale des événements... 29

The College's action while premature may well have been justified under the circumstances. It had taken three years to reach an agreement and in view of the fact that the target date had initially been set for September 1970, the impatience can perhaps be understood.

Clientele. Clientele became an objective when attempts were made to define the type of student to be admitted to the institute and the possible numbers which could be accommodated.

The purpose of the Institute was to prepare or train teachers to teach courses in the French language. Bill 59 assented in 1967, made possible the teaching of "Français" and History and Geography (Sciences sociales) in French. The Faculty of Education took immediate steps to provide courses and instruction for prospective teachers for schools where classes would be taught according to the provisions of Bill 59.



In a letter (Oct. 1, 1969) to G. Backeland, administrative secretary of the Secretariat, J.M. Brown, Dean of Education, University of Manitoba, explained the arrangements between the Faculty of Education and St. Boniface College:

Our two-year programme for elementary teachers was introduced in 1967-1968. This programme involves an integration of professional and academic courses. On completion of the two-year programme, students have standing in one full year of academic courses and one full year of professional courses. They receive a teaching certificate from the Department of Education and an Associateship in Education from the University of Manitoba.

When the two-year programme came into effect, we negotiated an arrangement with St. Boniface College whereby students could take one full year of academic work at that institution and then come to the Faculty of Education for a year of professional work in which they would receive instruction in the French language according to the provisions of Bill 59.

Thus, the Institute would ostensibly assume the responsibility for providing the professional training along with the academic training and such other professional training course subsequently developed (as in the case of the four-year Bachelor of Education degree) by the Faculty of Education.

As noted previously, an Ad Hoc Committee was formed whose purpose was to study the implications of establishing the Institute at St. Boniface College. The final report was to include a number of important considerations of which the clientele would be discussed. In a telephone conversation and a subsequent interview with G. Backeland (minutes of which were recorded by Laval Cloutier, secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee, October 9, 1969), Laval Cloutier wrote that the



final report ought to include the following information:

4. Le rapport doit présenter une documentation la plus poussée possible concernant:
  - a) Effectifs actuels: (à développer)
    - professeurs de l'université
    - professeurs du Québec, etc.
    - étudiants canadiens-français à l'université
    - étudiants de la Faculté d'Education.<sup>30</sup>

As a follow-up to this, the first report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee to Desjardins on October 21, 1969, reported (item 18:7):

Il faut d'abord faire une étude de la population étudiante francophone du Manitoba et des autres provinces de l'Ouest canadien, afin d'établir des projections d'inscription possible à une école normale de langue française, compte tenu évidemment des débouchés prévus pour ces nouveaux maîtres.<sup>31</sup>

At this early date, the Committee was no doubt contemplating an Institute serving the Western provinces. Thus, students would be drawn from this larger pool. This idea had been generated by the B and B Commission Report (Book II: No. 478, p. 185) which stated:

...the general principle of developing a French-language college within an existing university; this would not exclude the possibility of a French-language university in Western Canada whenever the potential enrolment makes it feasible.

In its second report (Jan. 12, 1970), the Ad Hoc Committee made explicit the admission requirements of students and an estimate of the possible number of students:

Admission: Ce cours de première année (IV) serait offert:





1. à tout étudiant d'expression française qui a complété sa 12<sup>e</sup> année avec Français 300 ou l'équivalent et quatre cours dont deux cours 300  
(note: 300 level courses constituted the academic stream)
2. aux étudiants de langue anglaise ou d'autres qui désirent compléter une éducation bilingue et enseigner dans des institutions de langue française

#### Recrutement:

Les chiffres suivants sont fournis par les principaux des diverses écoles de la province et nous permettent d'établir le nombre possible d'étudiants que le Collège pédagogique peut recevoir dès septembre 1970.

Divisions scolaires	Nombre total d'étudiants inscrits en 12 <sup>e</sup> année	Nombre d'étudiants qui prennent le Français 300
Seine	198	106
Rouge	111	80
Montagne	115	27
Cheval Blanc	55	10
Turtle Mtn.	139	3
Saint-Boniface	429	113
Norwood	150	19
TOTAL	<u>1,397</u>	<u>358</u>

Une projection généreuse prévoit que le nombre d'étudiants possible en Education IB pour septembre 1970 peut se situer entre 1/10 et 1/5 du nombre actuel d'étudiants qui prennent le Français 300 soit entre 35 et 65.<sup>32</sup>

What the report failed to explain is how the choice of 10 percent and 20 percent was made or what was the basis of these percentages. Secondly, the report did not make any



estimates as to the possible numbers of English students interested in such a training program. However, as will be seen later, the figure of 65 was close to the actual figure of 60.

In its final report, the Ad Hoc Committee was quite ambiguous in terms of recruitment:

Nous inspirant du cheminement critique ébauché plus haut, nous pressentons que le recrutement s'élargira progressivement à mesure que la formation pédagogique elle-même s'étendra, ce qui nous paraît excellent pour le département de pédagogie et pour les étudiants.

Nous ne possédons pas suffisamment de données pour projeter les inscriptions possibles à ce département de pédagogie mais nous souhaitons qu'il commence modestement. Nous savons que l'Université de Brandon a ouvert son collège pédagogique avec 14 étudiants au niveau Education I.

The modus operandi was then one of proceeding "modestly" and hope that recruitment would increase as the program evolved. If Brandon University had begun its program with 14 students, St. Boniface College was, in a similar manner, justified to initiate its program without a large initial intake.

As was seen above, however, the Chairman of the University Grants Commission, had based his initial estimates on a student intake of 100 in each year of the first four years which was later revised to 70 students. In the first estimate, we get an indication of where these students would come from when Bateman presents figures to justify the construction of a residence for 90% of the student enrolment. Bateman states:



A residence for 90% of the enrolment, 80% of the enrolment coming from Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia and half of the remaining 20% being beyond commuting distance in Manitoba.

Bateman's revised estimates of 70 students do not include a breakdown as to the origin of students. But there is no doubt, however, that much of these projections were essentially based on speculation and further, that the intent was that the Institute would serve all of Western Canada.

In the final analysis, it would appear that any number suggested would be speculative. Indeed, after a year of operation, the Director of the Institute, Origène Fillion (La Liberté, May 18, 1973) stated:

On s'attendait à environ trente (30) inscriptions:  
il y en a eut soixante-trois (63).<sup>33</sup>

If speculation was in order for the first year, Fillion (La Liberté, May 18, 1973), in relation to September 1973 recruitment, could only say:

C'est très difficile à dire; je crois que ça dépendra beaucoup de nos premiers gradués, à savoir s'ils auront pu se trouver un emploi assez facilement.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, not only was recruitment purely speculative, but much depended on whether the graduates would be able to find a teaching position. By 1974, however, the Institute had graduated 59 students with a Certificate in Education and 20 students with a two year training. On the average, there were about 40 students a year for the first two years.

Programs. At one of its first meetings, the Ad Hoc Committee addressed itself, although in a very cursory manner, to the





question of program. The minutes of the meeting (Oct. 2, 1969) asked, "Comment en préparer la formation?" In attempting to answer the question of how to train future teachers, the Committee raised the three following points:

2. Au Collège

Notre première année du B.A. est acceptée comme première année académique d'un programme de 2 années dont l'une est académique et l'autre professionnelle, la seconde étant donnée à l'université. Il y a aussi nombre d'étudiants qui complètent leur baccalauréat en éducation par des cours spéciaux.

3. Pénurie de professeurs français des sciences. Les concentrations ("majeur", "mineur") au Collège de Saint-Boniface préparent aux Arts plus qu'aux sciences.

5. Est-ce que cette école offrirait tous les cours de méthodologie?

- Oui, car il s'agit de la préparation de l'éducateur total.<sup>35</sup>

Thus, three concerns were raised: special courses, science courses, and methodology courses in all areas.

In its second report (Jan. 12, 1970), entitled "Projet d'un 'Collège pédagogique' au sein du Collège de Saint-Boniface", the Committee stated its objectives and the programs anticipated for September 1970 and for subsequent years:

Le Collège pédagogique de langue française entend poursuivre les mêmes objectifs que la Faculté d'Education par les média de la langue française, de la culture et du milieu franco-manitobain. Il s'agit plus spécifiquement de préparer des professeurs qualifiés pour l'enseignement de tous les sujets dans la langue française (sauf l'Anglais) à tous les niveaux de l'instruction publique, soit à la maternelle, au primaire, à l'élémentaire, au secondaire.<sup>36</sup>



More specifically, the following programs were discussed:

#### Education IB:

Déjà le Collège offre la première année d'un cours de deux ans en éducation: la Faculté d'Education de l'Université du Manitoba permet à des étudiants de langue française de suivre cinq (5) cours des arts en IB au Collège; ils ont ensuite à suivre cinq (5) cours en pédagogie à la Faculté d'Education pour l'année IIB.

Donc, le premier pas en vue d'une école de pédagogie au Collège serait de compléter l'année IB en offrant les deux cours de pédagogie requis à la Faculté d'Education, dès septembre 1970.

#### Education IIB:

Le cours IIB qui se donne actuellement à la Faculté d'Education de l'Université du Manitoba est offert à ceux qui ont complété avec succès quatre cours des Arts ou Sciences et deux demi-cours de pédagogie. Il comprend une série de cours des Arts ou Sciences, ainsi que les stages de propédeutique.

Le cours IIB présente assez de problèmes pour qu'on ne puisse l'introduire avant l'année académique 1971-72. ...Nous ne pouvons donc pas recommander l'introduction du cours de pédagogie IIB en 1970-71...

#### Education I:

Il s'agit ici d'une année complète d'entraînement pédagogique qui conduit au Certificat d'Etudes en pédagogie.

Les conditions d'admission requises sont la réussite de deux années du cours des Arts ou des Sciences ou de leur équivalence, donnés par une autre faculté, avec majeur dans un sujet d'enseignement:

Le programme "secondaire" comprendrait possiblement:

- Histoire et philosophie de l'éducation
- Organisation scolaire
- Psychologie de l'éducation
- Entraînement pratique
- Deux cours de méthodologie
- Deux cours de spécialisation



Le programme "élémentaire" comprendrait possible-ment:

- Histoire et philosophie de l'éducation
- Développement de l'enfant
- Entraînement pratique
- Enseignement de l'Anglais
- Enseignement du Français
- Enseignement des Sciences sociales
- Enseignement des mathématiques
- Enseignement des Sciences
- Organisation scolaire
- Un (1) des cours suivants de méthodologie
  - musique
  - éducation physique
  - santé
  - arts et
  - orientation 37

This report represented a skeleton outline of the courses which were seen as important for the training of teachers. Essentially, it served as a preliminary sketch for further discussions. The final report of the Ad Hoc Committee (March 2, 1970) allowed:

Nous estimons qu'il revient à ce chef (de l'Institut Pédagogique) avec l'aide d'un comité de définir les programmes de formation pédagogique à offrir, l'ordre et le temps où ils seront établis.

It would appear that the Ad Hoc Committee was reluctant in its final report to be more specific in the program of the Institute. Perhaps it felt that any definitive statement in this regard might well constrain the Director of the Institute once he/she was named.

In preparation for the opening of the Institute in September, 1972, the Director had prepared for three major programs: Education IB, Education I (elementary) and Education I (secondary). The array of courses offered could be chosen from five areas, namely, Foundations (2), Psychology (5),





Administration (2), Humanities (10), and Sciences (6). The choice being offered at the Faculty of Education , University of Manitoba. Indeed, the affiliation agreement between the Collège de Saint-Boniface and the University of Manitoba stated under programs:

1. Courses and other requirements at Le Collège de Saint-Boniface shall be submitted for approval to the respective faculties of Arts, Science or Education and to the Senate, and shall be comparable to courses and other requirements of the University. (emphasis added)

Staff - Personnel. The question of staffing the Institute appears to have been given consideration for the first time in an interview (Nov. 30, 1969) between S. Valiquette, s.j., Rector of St. Boniface and J. Martineau, s.j., principal and founder of the Sudbury Normal School in Ontario. In notes gathered during the interview, S. Valiquette noted:

3. Il semble préférable que le directeur ou principal de cette école normale soit un homme à cause des tractations continuelles avec le ministère de l'Education et aussi à cause de la présence d'hommes dans le personnel étudiant.
4. Il faut que le directeur soit une personne agréable au ministère de l'Education et à la communauté franco-Manitobaine.
5. Les professeurs de l'école normale doivent être recrutés dans le système scolaire lui-même. Les inspecteurs seront d'un grand secours pour les choisir. Ne pas négliger les femmes qui abondent et réussissent dans l'enseignement primaire.
6. Le directeur devra posséder au moins une Maîtrise en Education ou Pédagogie et de l'expérience dans l'enseignement primaire



et secondaire. Son salaire peut aller de \$19,000 pour une petite école normale à \$21,000 pour une grande école (150 étudiants et plus).

7. Les professeurs doivent posséder un certificat permanent d'enseignant, leur B.A. et au moins sept années d'expérience dans le cours primaire. En Ontario, salaire minimum \$12,000, maximum \$16,500, augmentation annuelle de \$500.
13. Le premier pas: engager le directeur et la bibliothécaire au plus tôt.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, the interview spelled out the prerequisite qualifications for the director or principal and the staff. Both men seemed to agree that the director ought to be male and while this criterion should hold for staff, recruiting females for the primary level should not overlook females because of their numbers and good work!

In its second report (Jan. 12, 1970), "Projet d'un Collège pédagogique au sein du Collège de Saint-Boniface", the Ad Hoc Committee drew the following general conclusion:

3. Notre comité propose que le Collège embauche le Principal du Collège pédagogique et le Bibliothécaire de ce même Collège le plus tôt possible; ...

At this time, the urgency of hiring the director was an important matter in view of the fact that most people anticipated the opening of the Institute for September of that year.

In a note written by S. Valiquette, s.j. (June 22, 1970), "Le directeur de l'école ou du collège pédagogique - les professeurs", the author referred to the interview with Father Martineau and a document written by the E.F.M. Valiquette stated:



Pour choisir le directeur, former un comité en collaboration avec le Secrétariat des relations culturelles fédérales-provinciales, le Directeurat de l'Education de la S.F.M., les E.F.M., l'Association des Commissaires.<sup>39</sup>

Further, the note contained the names of possible candidates for the position of director and the names of six people who should not be considered for the position. In addition, eight names were given as possible candidates for teaching positions.

The search for a director began in earnest in late 1971 and continued until May, 1972. The Provincial Council of the E.F.M. had submitted a number of recommendations (Document de travail; 22.XII.71) to the Administrative Council of St. Boniface College concerning a number of points dealing with the Institute. Of importance is the one dealing with "B - L'embauchement d'un Directeur du secteur pédagogique".

Recommandation - 1 -- "Les E.F.M. recommandent que le Collège annonce la mise en nomination des candidats possibles au poste du Directeur du Centre pédagogique." <sup>40</sup>

The Administrative Council of St. Boniface College (March 23, 1972) accepted this recommendation in its entirety.

Recommandation - 2 -- "Que le Conseil administratif établisse un comité de sélection des candidats possibles, composé de membres du Conseil administratif et des membres des divers organismes intéressés à l'éducation. On suggère la composition suivante:

- le Recteur du Collège
- le Président du Conseil administratif
- le Doyen (Arts et Sciences)
- le représentant du E.F.M.
- le représentant des commissaires de langue française
- le représentant du ministère de l'Education
- un membre de l'exécutif de la Faculté d'Education."<sup>41</sup>





The Administrative Council accepted this recommendation with the following modification:

"un représentant de la Faculté d'Education" au lieu du "Un membre de l'Executif de la Faculté d'Education".<sup>42</sup>

Recommendation - 3 -- "Les candidats à la Direction de l'Institut pédagogique devraient satisfaire aux exigences minimums suivantes:

- a) Etre reconnus comme excellents éducateurs dans le milieu franco-manitobain
- b) Avoir une expérience solide dans le domaine de l'enseignement aux niveaux élémentaire et/ou secondaire
- c) Etre en possession d'un Bacc. en Education ou d'une Maîtrise ou équivalent."<sup>43</sup>

The Administrative Council did not wish to be as restrictive especially in reference to (a) above where out-of-province candidates would be excluded. Further it was felt that a master's degree or equivalent was important. The Administrative Council stated:

Le Conseil d'administration a donc accepté que le poste soit annoncé comme suit:

FORMATION: Maîtrise en éducation ou l'équivalent

EXPERIENCE: - Expérience de l'enseignement  
- Expérience administrative.<sup>44</sup>

The composition of the selection committee was slightly altered by including a representative of the French super-intendents and a consultant from the French Consulate in Winnipeg working as a pedagogical consultant and by deleting the Rector and a representative from the Department of Education from the list. The selection committee reviewed five applications. On May 4, 1972, the Rector of St. Boniface College in a Press Release stated: The Rector of Collège de Saint-



Boniface is pleased to announce that Mr. Origène Fillion has been appointed Director of "L'Institut Pédagogique" (Teacher Training Institute).

With the opening of the Institute, the Faculty of Education saw the deletion of its programs in French. Thus, an agreement was reached between the College and the Faculty whereby three staff members from the Faculty would assume part-time work with the Institute. Dean Brown in a letter (August 29, 1972) to St-Denis stated:

1. That the following staff members provide instructional services to St. Boniface College as follows:

<u>Professor</u>	<u>Courses</u>	<u>% of Load</u>	<u>Salary</u>	<u>% of Salary</u>
A	Three half courses plus full-time supervision of student teaching	75	\$14,800	\$11,100
B	Two half courses plus half-time supervision of student teaching	50	\$ 9,700	\$ 4,850
C	One half course plus one-third time supervision of student teaching	25	\$11,800	\$ 2,950
TOTAL:				<u>\$18,900</u>

2. That the three staff members remain on the payroll of the University of Manitoba;
3. That St. Boniface College pay to the University of Manitoba an amount equal to the stated fractions of salaries and of staff benefits;
4. That the amount to be paid to the University of Manitoba be adjusted in accordance with



annual salary changes as determined from the annual budget of the University of Manitoba, and

5. That payments be made on the schedule previously established under an agreement between the Faculty of Arts and St. Boniface College.

In addition to these three part-time staff members, five other full-time staff were hired. The total staff therefore amounted to eight and one half full-time equivalent including the Director.

Affiliation. The desire to create the Institute at St. Boniface College raised the issue of affiliation with the University of Manitoba. On April 17, 1967, the Manitoba Council on Higher Learning had approved a proposal that an Ad Hoc Committee be established under the Chairmanship of Dean J.W. Neilson "to consider the role of St. Boniface College among the institutions of higher learning in the province". The committee held seven meetings which considered various aspects of the role of the College.

Of particular importance, the committee recommended:

1. That St. Boniface College continue to be a French-language institution autonomous in all matters pertaining to its administration, including staffing and its financing.
2. That St. Boniface College authorities deal directly with the University Grants Commission to which it will make its financial needs known and from which it hopes to obtain adequate financial assistance in support of its objectives.

In terms of academic matters, the programs would differ from the University courses only in that instruction would be in





the French language. The College would continue to be an affiliated college of the University of Manitoba, and degrees would be conferred by the University.

While preparations were being made to organize the Ad Hoc Committee set up for the Secretariat, G. Backeland, in a telephone conversation and subsequent interview with Laval Cloutier, who would be the Secretary of the committee, suggested that the final report ought to look at the following:

4. Statuts du Collège

- (a) affiliation à l'Université du Manitoba,
- (b) corporation, titres, etc...

At a meeting held October 2, 1969, the Ad Hoc Committee raised the following points:

6. Que deviendra le statut du Collège?

- Il deviendra la section française de l'université du Manitoba
- On ne parle pas de la confessionnalité sans nier la confessionnalité

7. Relations avec le Département

- On ne note pas de difficultés majeures pour l'instant.<sup>45</sup>

The notion of becoming the French section of the University of Manitoba was a continuation of the reference made by the B and B Report (Education II: no. 478: p. 185) to the effect that:

We have already emphasized the urgency of a French-language teacher-training centre for the Western provinces, and the general principle of developing a French-language college within an existing university; this would not exclude the possibility of a French-language university in Western Canada whenever the potential enrolment makes it feasible.



In its first report, the Ad Hoc Committee (Oct. 21, 1969) reiterated some of the recommendations that had been made to the Manitoba Council of Higher Learning in 1967. The Ad Hoc Committee (No. 15, p. 6) noted:

On peut dire qu'au moins le Sénat de l'Université du Manitoba avait permis au Collège de Saint-Boniface d'entretenir l'espoir de développer un jour une école normale...<sup>46</sup>

The report continued (No. 16, p. 6):

En somme, le Collège de Saint-Boniface par son école normale deviendrait la section française de la Faculté de pédagogie de l'Université du Manitoba, comme il l'est de fait pour la Faculté des Arts et des Sciences.<sup>47</sup>

The University's attitude relative to the establishment of an Institute was well expressed by its Vice-President, academic H.E. Duckworth (Jan. 6, 1970) when the latter stated:

The University of Manitoba has followed with interest the suggestion that St. Boniface College might become the training institution mentioned in Recommendation 19 and we should be happy to assist in any way to further the strong claim which the College has. ...We naturally wish to do nothing that might detract from the College's claim to the French Normal School.

In its final report (March 2, 1970), the Ad Hoc Committee brought some clarifications by stating:

Faudrait-il faire du département de pédagogie du Collège de Saint-Boniface la branche française de la "Faculty of Education" de l'Université du Manitoba? Nous n'inclinons pas en ce sens. D'abord, ce serait mettre le Collège en tutelle et risque de faire de son département de pédagogie un simple décalque de la "Faculty of Education". De plus, administrativement parlant, le département de pédagogie du Collège de Saint-Boniface sera financé



conjointement par les gouvernements fédéral et provincial, ce qui n'est pas le cas de la "Faculty of Education". Ce qui n'empêchera pas le Collège d'entretenir les meilleures relations avec la "Faculty" et même de profiter de son expérience...<sup>48</sup>

From this statement, the committee made explicit the fact that the Institute should not be a branch plant of the Faculty of Education. The relationship between the two organizations would be one of "entertaining good relations" and "profiting from the Faculty's experience." As expressed by the committee members, the fear was that becoming the French component of the Faculty would be detrimental to the College's autonomy and risk becoming a carbon copy of the Faculty.

In April, 1970, the Secretariat put out a draft document outlining three possible arrangements, namely, I - A Department of St. Boniface College, II - Under the direct jurisdiction of the Department of Education for the first year of operation, and III - A completely independent institution. While the document outlined the advantages and disadvantages of each arrangement, it does not appear that these suggestions received any serious considerations in subsequent discussions.

The "Contrat D'AFFILIATION entre l'Université du Manitoba et Le Collège de Saint-Boniface" was submitted by the College to the University April 23, 1971. It was approved by the Senate on June 6, 1972. It was approved by University Grants Commission on December, 1972 and received in its definitive form by the College January 18, 1973. Some of the





clauses are worth noting. In terms of Registration of students (b) (3) stated:

A student who registers at Le Collège de Saint-Boniface is eligible to take courses in his program on other campuses of the University, and vice versa. In Education, the maximum number of such courses shall be determined by agreement between the authorities of the College and of the Faculty of Education.

Note: include (b) (1) along with this.

Under Programs, item 5 stated:

With reference particularly to teacher education, it is understood that:

- a) The Faculty of Education has as its responsibility the training of teachers whose prime language of instruction is English; the responsibility extends to the training of teachers of second and third languages including French.
- b) Le Collège de Saint-Boniface shall assume responsibility for the entire program of teacher training offered in French, including the training of teachers of the English that forms an integral part of that program.

Various other areas where affiliation was of consequence were discussed but the major clauses were those given above. It is on these points that serious conflict has arisen in recent years and will be discussed later in

Summary. In this section six factors were identified as important elements in the shaping of the policy during the implementation process. Indeed, to these six factors were attached statements which became objectives sought by the people involved in the process of implementation. For example, in



terms of site, the objective was to locate the institute at St. Boniface College. This objective was far from being a fait accompli. The discussion on the question of site saw the involvement of the federal government and the governments of the three prairie provinces and the French associations of these three provinces. These discussions led to the establishment of the Raynauld Commission which sought resolution to the problem. Further, within the province of Manitoba, the discussion of site also involved many organizations and associations.

In terms of the other factors, objectives could not be specified too clearly because of the uncertainties characterizing these factors. For example, the cost associated with the establishment of the institute could only be determined by identifying key criteria such as number of students and the required facilities for such students and the programs which this implied. With no precedents to guide this process, establishing defensible figures was an onerous process. Thus the objective could only be stated initially in terms of percentages of a cost sharing agreement between the federal and provincial government. Precise figures were arrived at in the final stages of the process.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the objectives related to the six factors identified acquired specificity as the process of implementation evolved.

### Resources

This section will identify the policy resources made available to ensure that implementation would be carried out.



Van Meter and Van Horn (1975:465) suggest that

[Policies] also make available resources which facilitate their administration. These resources may include funds or other incentives in the program that might encourage or facilitate effective implementation.

While funds are certainly a crucial component to policy implementation, other resources such as human and political may well be of equal importance. This section therefore will be divided into three main components, namely, financial, human and political resources.

Financial Resources. Basic to the policy were the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Since the federal government could not become involved directly in the provincial educational jurisdictions, an area which the provinces guard with extreme jealousy, the alternative was to provide financial cost-sharing grants. Thus, Recommendation 29 stated, "... the federal government should cover 75 percent of the capital costs of the training institution." In addition, the recommendation provided for financial assistance on a per pupil basis, "we recommend that for students attending the French Teacher Training Institution for the western provinces... the federal grant to the province be 25 percent of the cost per student". These recommendations, and others, were endorsed by the federal government on November 6, 1969, in a policy document entitled "La politique du gouvernement fédéral en ce qui concerne les recommandations contenues dans le Volume II du rapport de la Commission Royale





d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme." The declaration stated in part

En principe, nous acceptons les recommandations adressées au gouvernement fédéral et nous sommes disposés à fournir un apport financier afin de les rendre effectives.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, on January 31, 1972, the Secretary of State outlined the specifics in a document: "Federal Contribution for the Establishment of a French-Language Training Institution at St. Boniface". The main elements of federal contributions were as follows:

#### Capital Costs

##### A. Academic Buildings:

Reimbursement at the rate of 75% of capital costs incurred, the ceiling of the federal contribution being \$1,000,000.

#### Operating Costs

Reimbursement at the rate of 25% of the operating expenditures of the institution... provision would be made for this reimbursement formula to apply to actual operating costs, up to a maximum of 25% more than those of similar anglophone institutions. The institution will of course be eligible for grants under the measure announced on January 20, 1972, concerning assistance for minority-language education at the university level in the amount of 10% of its provincial operating grant (cf. Recommendation 30, Book II, 195).

#### Library Acquisitions

- A. Purchase of books. A \$25,000 reimbursement for purchase of a basic collection of books in the French language.
- B. Other costs associated with library acquisitions (eg. ordering, cataloguing and shelving). These costs would be included in operating expenditures and, thus, be subject to the 25% federal share mentioned under the section "operating costs".



In addition to the above, research projects of various sorts were being conducted in Manitoba during the implementation process. Indeed, the Secretariat submitted a major report to Premier Schreyer entitled "The Implications of Bilingualism on the Educational Structure of the Province of Manitoba (December, 1971)." To conduct the studies which led to this report, Premier Schreyer, in a letter to Gérard Pelletier (January 6, 1970) requested federal funding:

Je crois savoir que vous recevrez sous peu une demande officielle... au sujet d'un accord financier entre nos gouvernements respectifs pour partager le coût des projets d'études que nous voulons entreprendre pour mieux réaliser les programmes de bilinguisme au Manitoba. J'espère que vous accueillerez favorablement notre demande, nous permettant ainsi d'entamer nos projets dans le plus bref délai de temps possible.<sup>50</sup>

On July 23, 1970, Pelletier in a letter to Desjardins stated:

J'ai fait tenir il y a quelques jours au Premier ministre de votre province, un chèque au montant de \$50,000 représentant une partie de l'octroi que vous a été consenti pour mener à bien des études préliminaires concernant le bilinguisme.<sup>51</sup>

The provincial financial participation, in terms of actual figures, was difficult to assess. All documents which were placed at this researcher's disposition did not include any reference to the provincial share in the implementation relative to studies, salaries and so on. It is relatively easy to deduce that in terms of capital costs and operating expenditures all additional percentages not covered by the federal government would be met by provincial funds.



La Liberté gave an indication of the provincial share in the construction of the Institute:

La construction du nouvel Institut Pédagogique a débuté, et devrait être terminée avant le 31 mars 1974. C'est un projet conjoint, fédéral (\$1,100,000) et provincial (\$366,000).<sup>52</sup>

The creation of the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations would also entail some provincial funding.

Human Resources. Under this heading will be included individuals, groups and institutions which were asked to contribute in some form or other through reports and for briefs. At the outset, it is important to state that the Secretariat, because of its limited staff (3 or 4 people at any one time), had to avail itself of the services of individuals, groups and organizations with an interest in the creation of the Institute. By using various groups and organizations, the Secretariat created a network of interrelationships while retaining the role of coordinator of activities through soliciting various inputs and being concerned with the political ramifications.

The request for aid came in early September, 1969, in a letter (September 3, 1969) from Desjardins to the rector of St. Boniface College:

Quand le moment sera propice, il faudra que le Collège puisse soumettre à la demande du secrétariat une étude au sujet de la mise sur pied d'une école normale française au collège.<sup>53</sup>

The rector, Stephane Valiquette, s.j., in a letter to Desjardins (September 25, 1969) accepted to set up an Ad Hoc Committee to work on the study. Working with individuals





representing various organizations (Faculty of Education, Department of Education, Education Franco-Manitobains, the Superintendent of the St. Boniface School Division, two high school principals, a retired school inspector) the Committee submitted six reports. These reports were an attempt to raise all significant issues relative to the establishment of an Institute at the College.

On February 12, 1970, Desjardins in a letter to S. Valiquette, s.j., wrote:

A cause de certaines conditions, il est important que le rapport du Comité Ad Hoc soit remis au Secrétariat le 23 février prochain.<sup>54</sup>

Desjardins added:

Le rapport final pourra traiter de la question du collège pédagogique sous trois aspects.

- a) Buts et Objectifs - (en termes généraux)
- b) Etapes à poursuivre - en tenant compte des priorités à court terme et à long terme et de leur ordre chronologique
- c) Commentaires - ajouter des remarques qui soient à propos, telles les problèmes à résoudre ou les difficultés à anticiper
- d) Conclusion - recommandations et suggestions<sup>55</sup>

The major problem of the Ad Hoc Committee had been:

pour étudier la possibilité d'établir un collège pédagogique au Collège de Saint-Boniface... à prendre conscience des difficultés et des issues possibles dans le domaine de la formation pédagogique des éducateurs franco-manitobain.<sup>56</sup>

To this end, the Committee had achieved the purposes for which it was organized. (cf. Appendix G)

In order to get some reactions to the Ad Hoc Committee's preliminary report, the Secretariat solicited the collaboration



of the "Directorat de l'Education - S.F.M.", "Société Franco-Manitobaine", "Commissaires de langue française", and "Fédération des Parents et Maîtres". Desjardins (October 23, 1970) in writing to these organizations stated:

Actuellement, le Secrétariat possède en main un rapport provisoire qui lui a été soumis par le Collège de Saint-Boniface. Dans un esprit de collaboration, nous vous soumettons ce document pour fins d'étude. Nous vous demandons de parcourir ce document et de nous soumettre dans un délai de sept à dix (7 à 10) jours un rapport analogue.<sup>57</sup>

The purpose of these reactions was essentially one of gaining some insights to the position of these organizations relative to the creation of the Institute.

In addition to these communications with Franco-manitoban organizations, the Secretariat was interested in gleanng all available information relative to the preparation and training of teachers in French. To this end, it solicited information from the Faculty of Education. In response to this request, the Dean of Education, J.M. Brown, would respond in a letter (October 1, 1969) outlining what the Faculty had endeavored to do since the passage of Bill 59.

Further, H.E. Duckworth, Vice-President (Academic) of the University of Manitoba, in an unsolicited letter to Desjardins (January 6, 1978) stated that it was the University's desire to expand its program in the area of teaching of second languages. As such therefore, he viewed St. Boniface College's claim for an Institute as complementary to these activities and, thus, indicated, "we should be happy to assist in any way to



further the strong claim which the College has". On January 23, 1970, Desjardins (Secretariat), Justice Monnin (College), and Duckworth (University) met and agreed that the University ought to submit a brief which could be used as a basis for discussion. In a note signed by the three principals, Duckworth noted:

University of Manitoba will prepare a brief

- 1) Describing our present activities in the area of teaching second languages.
- 2) How we would propose to develop these activities to meet needs of Prairie Provinces in connection with teaching of two official languages as second languages. This will include cost estimates.
- 3) How St. Boniface College might assist us in the activities described above.
- 4) How U. of M. might assist St. Boniface in "French Normal School".

The University's brief was submitted to Desjardins February 23, 1970. The brief, however, gave all indications that the University was more interested in making proposals and submitting cost-estimates to develop item (2), that is, second language teaching.

In addition to these, the Secretariat found it important to hire a consultant to conduct a study concerning the establishment of an Institute in Manitoba. To this end, Desjardins called upon Clement Cormier, who had previously been a commissioner with the B and B Commission. In his letter (February 13, 1970) to Cormier, Desjardins stated:

En tant que membres de la Commission Royale  
d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme,





vous pouvez être au courant de la complexité du travail que le gouvernement manitobain a confié au Secrétariat. Par conséquent, nous serions heureux de vous accueillir au Manitoba afin que vous puissiez travailler au service du Secrétariat pour mener les études dans le domaine du bilinguisme et de la mosaïque culturelle.<sup>58</sup>

Cormier's report was entitled, "Etude sur un projet d'établissement au Manitoba D'UN COLLEGE PEDAGOGIQUE FRANCOPHONE." The report reiterated much of what had been said previously concerning the more responsive climate now extant in Canada generally. Cormier's report quoted extensively from reports and communications between various organizations and government, all with the intention of developing a rationale for creating an Institute in St. Boniface, and more particularly, at St. Boniface College. As will be seen later, the purpose of Cormier's report was political, in the sense of giving further support in favor of St. Boniface College as the site for the Institute.

This short exposé completes the discussion on human resources. As seen, many organizations were asked to participate and offer input into the development of a rationale to establish the Institute at St. Boniface College. Most francophone groups were in agreement with the concept. The University of Manitoba also agreed but sought a trade-off in order to retain the training of teachers for second language education including French.

Political Resources. The notion of political resources refers to a group's access to proximate policy-makers and/or politicians



who by the nature of their positions can exercise their authority to make decisions which will satisfy the needs or aspirations of the group.

It has been argued elsewhere (LeTourneau 1977) that the French community, mediated through its representatives, enjoyed access to the ruling New Democratic Party. This access was made possible in a concrete manner when Desjardins accorded his support to Premier Schreyer in order to permit the latter to form a majority government.

The need for an institute for the training of teachers in the French language, was a major concern of the "Association d'Education des Canadiens Français du Manitoba". In 1966, in a brief presented to the Manitoba government (Premier rapport du Comité Ad Hoc, le 19 octobre 1969), the Association stated:

De récentes enquêtes sociologiques et une enquête linguistique sur l'état du français au Manitoba permettent de constater deux choses: 1. le groupe franco-manitobain veut garder sa langue et sa culture française; 2. la qualité de la langue française au Manitoba diminue dangereusement... L'Association représente le groupe français au Manitoba et demande en leur nom une école normale pour les Canadiens français".<sup>59</sup>

In a similar manner, the "Société Franco-Manitobaine" in its brief to Premier Schreyer (September 15, 1969) signaled the urgency for establishing an institute for the training of French teachers in Manitoba.

What these briefs indicate is the need of the French group to have services which it felt crucial to its linguistic



and cultural survival. As such, they represent an interest which was verbalized to various governments over a period of time. However, to get a positive response from the politicians there needs to be a responsive political ear or a situation or an event which will, as it were, make the demand important. The Schreyer-Desjardins agreement created such a situation. Desjardins had ready access to the Premier. And with the French representatives having equally ready access to Desjardins, the link in the chain was complete.

As described in chapter III the Rossillon incident, although fortuitous in nature, brought the French leaders in a face-to-face contact with Prime Minister Trudeau and Secretary of State Pelletier. What this points to is that the French leaders, by virtue of circumstance, had accessibility to the politicians. However, it may be argued as Anderson (1975) and others have done, that political accessibility might not be a sufficient condition to resolve problems. Indeed, the bureaucracy in the form of a government agency assuming responsibility to deal with the problem may not be responsive, for various reasons, to deal with the problem. Schreyer, Desjardins and the French leaders appeared to be cognizant of this when the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations was created. Four of the interviewees involved in the implementation process (Justice A. Monnin, March 4, 1978; O. Fillion, March 8, 1978; M. Gauthier, March 8, 1978; Fernand Marion, March 9, 1978) agreed that the Secretariat was created to circumvent the Department of Education because as Monnin





(March 4, 1978) indicated, "Nous étions tous soupçonneux du ministère. Le Secrétariat nous a permis de contourner les anglophones du ministères". Gisiger (March 3, 1978) noted that the creation of the Secretariat was, "une façon pour Schreyer de permettre à un ministre francophone de s'ingérer à l'éducation et la culture française - une façon... pour apporter des changements."<sup>60</sup>

While the Institute was a provincial concern, it was also a concern of the federal government due to the funding of the project. The documents record twenty-seven (27) written pieces of correspondence between Schreyer and Desjardins and Pelletier, in addition to three meetings relating specifically to the creation of the Institute. These communications suggest the extent to which the issue and its resolution was of some importance to Schreyer and Desjardins. The message directed at Pelletier was in essence the need to have the Institute located at St. Boniface College. Pelletier's response, in light of the jurisdictional implications of the issue, was that all four western provinces would have to be involved in the negotiations, and further, that some form of consensus be achieved before a decision be made. Thus, while Manitoba officials persisted in pressing its case, the federal officials insisted on mutual agreement. The result of this was an entanglement which accelerated toward an impasse where no government was prepared to assume leadership. In the final analysis an arbitration committee was set up to objectively analyze the situation and recommend a course of action.



From the French leaders' perspective the fact that provincial politicians were prepared to engage the federal government directly proved highly effective. Indeed, with Schreyer and Desjardins exercising direct pressure on the Secretary of State, chances of gaining federal involvement was greatly increased rather than the French leaders having to deal with the Secretary of State or the federal bureaucracy.

This section has dealt with the various resources -- financial, material and human and political -- which can be utilized in the process of policy implementation. All these resources are important if used simultaneously. The lack of any of these might well preclude successful implementation. For descriptive purposes, these resources were subdivided. The reality of the situation, however, is that these resources constitute the total network of resources used during the implementation process.

In the following section attention will be paid to interorganizational communications and enforcement activities.

#### Interorganizational Communication and Enforcement Activities

In this section interorganizational communication will be described by examining the linkages between the Secretariat as implementing agency and various other organization and associations. These linkages may be viewed as a network which constitutes the policy delivery system. Within this system, it is important that communications be consistent and accurate



so that there will be a collective understanding of the objectives being pursued. Enforcement activities on the other hand are those actions undertaken to increase the likelihood that people will perform in a manner consistent with the intent of the policy. To ensure such performance, we need to identify the action-forcing mechanisms instituted for this purpose.

The Secretariat, the Department of Education, and the S.F.M. Since the establishment of a teacher training institute was an education issue, it seems reasonable to assume that implementation responsibility ought to have been with the Department of Education. That it was not raises questions as to the rationale of having the Secretariat assume such a responsibility especially when the agency itself was just being organized. The major reason advanced by most interviewees was that the Secretariat was used to circumvent the Department of Education. Perhaps Justice Monnin's (Int. March 4, 1978) summarizes better the prevailing attitude among French leaders:

We were suspicious of the Department [of Education].  
The Secretariat permitted us to bypass the anglophones  
at the Department. (Translated from French)

But to say that the Department of Education was bypassed is not to say that it did not remain well informed of the activities of the Secretariat. Indeed, one individual played an important role in the process of informing the Deputy and Assistant-Deputy Ministers of Education. Arthur Corriveau since 1964 had been with the Department of Education as Director of





Romance Languages. He was considered a knowledgeable and influential educator in Manitoba by many French educators. As Gisiger (Int. March 3, 1978) said, it would have been difficult to explain his non-involvement in the process. Corriveau's own interpretation however, varies from this. He stated (Int. March 6, 1978) that he was asked to attend a meeting at the Legislative Buildings in the presence of the Minister of Education, his Deputy Minister and Assistant-Deputy Minister and Laurent Desjardins. The gist of this meeting was that he (Corriveau) was told of his secondment to the Secretariat. Corriveau intimated during the interview that someone from the Department of Education had "forced the issue". A third interpretation of Corriveau's secondment came from Marion (Int. March 9, 1978). Marion stated that Corriveau was seconded because he had easy access to Department of Education files and information. However, retrospectively his role was of a dual nature: securing pertinent information for the Secretariat and briefing top officials of the Department of Education. Corriveau during the interview stated (Int. March 6, 1978), "I played the role of double agent. I had access to the Department but from time to time Lorimer (Deputy Minister) and Davies (Assistant-Deputy Minister) would ask me 'What's happening?'"

Fernand Marion was also acutely involved during the implementation process. Initially as Director of the "Directorat de l'Education de la S.F.M." he worked extensively with the Ad Hoc Committee. In January of 1971, he was employed full-




time by the Secretariat. It should be noted that at this time a conflict had surfaced between the S.F.M. and Desjardins (Marion, Int. March 9, 1978). The conflict revolved around the issue of who could best represent the interests of the French community vis-à-vis the government. Clearly Desjardins' prestige had increased tremendously with his new political allegiance. On the other hand, the S.F.M. was a duly elected body whose constituency presumably was the entire French community of Manitoba. The conflict resulted in strained relationships between Desjardins and the S.F.M. representatives. However, S.F.M. officials also sought information from the Secretariat as to its activities, operations and strategies. Marion thus became the link between the two organizations.

As mentioned above, the Secretariat's organization was indeed quite modest: Desjardins was Director, Backeland was his executive assistant, and Corriveau and Marion joined the Secretariat at a later date as research assistants. All occupied an office on the third floor of the Legislative Building. The situation, however, became untenable because of the number of people in the same area, and Marion was asked to find an office in the building housing the S.F.M. Marion's relationship with Maurice Gauthier, President of the S.F.M. and Roland Marcoux, a social animator, was of a friendly nature and facilitated the exchange of information between the Secretariat and the S.F.M. Marion indicated (Int. March 9, 1978) that his role was similar to that of Corriveau between the Department of Education and the Secretariat. "Je passais de l'information à la S.F.M.



J'inspirais Gauthier et Marcoux." Thus, in both cases, Corriveau and Marion maintained informal links with organizations which were not recognized officially (see figure 4).



These therefore represent the linkages between three important organizations and the manner in which channels of communication were kept open between the three. In the next chapter, reasons will be given to explain these relationships.

Relations with the University of Manitoba and the Faculty of Education. The relation between officials of the Secretariat and the University of Manitoba appear to have been cordial. Part of the reason for this was the fact that the dealings between St. Boniface College and the University had always been based on a good "entente". On August 14, 1967, a report by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Role of St. Boniface College in Higher Education in Manitoba -- a committee of the Manitoba Council on Higher Learning -- stated as part of its recommendations that St. Boniface College would be allowed to offer academic courses to students in Education I B and II B. The report further stated:

In respect of professional courses in methodology of French and Social Studies, the College expressed the hope that arrangements might be made to offer





those courses at St. Boniface, with instruction in the French language.

Thus, it would appear that while there were no explicit commitment the door had been opened for the eventual extension of teacher training courses from the academic to the professional at St. Boniface College.

A further allusion to this possibility can be noted in H.E. Duckworth's (vice-president academic at the University) letter (January 6, 1970) to Desjardins stating that, "We do not wish to do anything that might detract from the College's claim to the French Normal School."

Although the above statements might have appeared reassuring to officials at St. Boniface College, the reality seemed somewhat different. The University was not necessarily committed to this orientation. In a press release (July 17, 1967) the president of the University of Manitoba, H.H. Saunderson, stated:

To provide the appropriate training for those teachers who wish to teach some classes in French under the provision of the new legislation... the Faculty of Education of The University of Manitoba will offer professional course in the French language. These courses will commence in September 1967 in the regular certification programmes of the Faculty of Education... there are now five bilingual members on the staff of the Faculty of Education, and... two additional bilingual members will join the staff for the next session.

Hence, beginning in September of 1967, the Faculty of Education would ease itself into the training of teachers in the French language. While Duckworth and Desjardins appeared to meet on good terms, the fact remains that relations between the



Faculty of Education and St. Boniface College were strained if not in outright conflict. This point was made quite explicit in a letter (February 5, 1971) from R. St-Denis, Rector of St. Boniface College to Desjardins. St-Denis was quick to point out his unease vis-à-vis the Faculty since the latter had developed courses which normally should have been the responsibility of the proposed Institute. St-Denis added:

A la dernière réunion de Conseil de la Faculté de l'Education, M. Bonneau et Soeur Chaput se basant maintenant sur l'adoption du "Bill 113" ont présenté une résolution qui prévoit une extension des programmes actuels de la Faculté."<sup>61</sup>

Bonneau and Chaput were both extensively involved in French teacher training at the Faculty. Bill 113 having brought amendments to the Public School Act permitting a greater spectrum of courses to be taught in French in the public schools of the province. Bonneau and Chaput were thus interested in extending the Faculty's offerings in the French language. For his part, St-Denis was upset because French teacher training was supposed to be conducted at the College, if and when the Institute was approved. This problem was also part of the urgency of getting a decision about the establishment of the Institute. St-Denis added:

Encore quelques cours et il n'y aura pas lieu de créer une Ecole Normale à Saint-Boniface; elle existera au sein de la Faculté d'Education sur le campus universitaire.<sup>62</sup>

To remove or delete established courses from the Faculty's curriculum would indeed prove most difficult.



In an article in La Liberté (March 3, 1971) Bonneau and Chaput expressed their concern of being totally ignored in the establishment of the Institute. Bonneau remarked, "J'ai l'impression qu'on nous considère plutôt comme l'opposition que comme collègues. On ne semble pas avoir confiance en nous."<sup>63</sup> Bonneau, it will be recalled, had previously expressed his disapproval of situating the Institute at the College. No doubt, despite being a francophone, his disapproval would be viewed as an unwarranted opposition by College officials. Bonneau's main concern was the question of removing French students from the mainstream of Manitoba life and creating, as it were, a sort of linguistic, cultural and social ghetto.

The Faculty of Education position on the establishment of the Institute was never expressed formally. Indeed, while there were strong reactions against the College, it would have been difficult to express a view contrary to Duckworth's statement of helping the College. However, as R. Hedley, Associate Dean of the Faculty of Education noted (Int. March 1, 1978) his reaction to the establishment of a teacher training institute at the College was one of opposition. The Faculty, he felt, had both French and Français courses, the facilities, and the personnel. To Hedley's way of thinking, O. Fillion (who became the Institute's first director) was the only one qualified at the College. Hedley, during the interview, agreed that his position and opposition was one of institutional protectionism.





Dean Brown (now retired) was more careful to deemphasize the misunderstandings. He noted (Int. March 3, 1978)

There were strong feelings to move St. Boniface College on campus. It would have been a good thing for the English and good for the French also. It was political.

Dean Brown allowed that Hedley was resistant. Justice Monnin (Int. March 4, 1978) indicated that "Brown était correct. Hedley nous a donné de la misère."<sup>64</sup> Laval Cloutier (March 7, 1978) concurred saying that Hedley was not positive. O. Fillion (March 8, 1978) stated that the negative reaction of officials at the Faculty resulted from their perception that their hegemony in matters of teacher education was being destroyed.

Despite the fact that the Institute was established at St. Boniface College, the conflict between the two institutions remains. The basic point of contention now appears to evolve from the Agreement outlining the affiliation between the College and the University of Manitoba. According to Hedley (Int. March 1, 1978) the wording of the Agreement is such as to be left open to interpretations thus permitting the College to do practically anything it wishes. The intent of the Agreement would have required Institute officials to have everything they wish to undertake be approved by the Faculty of Education. A major problem now exists in the training of French immersion teachers. Faculty officials feel that the teacher training for French immersion is their responsibility; College officials on the other hand are attempting to develop a rationale for assuming responsibility for every facet of



French teacher training irrespective of whether programs are directed to French or French immersion.

E.F.M.; F.P.M.; and, A.C.E.L.F.M. All three associations: the "Educateurs Franco-Manitobains", "Fédération des Parents et Maitres", and "l'Association des Commissaires d'Ecoles de Langue Française du Manitoba", assumed peripheral roles in the establishment of the Institute.

The E.F.M (an organization representing French teachers in the province) was in 1969 a special area group within the Manitoba Teachers' Society. Its terms of affiliation with the M.T.S. were identical to other special area groups such as the Teachers of English, Teachers of Mathematics and others. When the "Association d'Educateurs des Canadiens Français du Manitoba" was replaced in 1967 by the S.F.M. (Société Franco-Manitobaine) French teachers were left without an organization whose purpose was to concern itself with education per se. The creation of the E.F.M. was in fact to fill this void left when the A.E.C.F.M. was dismantled. The E.F.M. however, was a relatively new association and as such did not have a high profile on matters relating to French education in the province. Nevertheless, as other organizations were asked to reflect on the question of a French teacher training institute, so too was the E.F.M. asked by Desjardins (October 24, 1969) to submit its reactions to the first report of the Ad Hoc Committee. The E.F.M.'s reaction was submitted on November 25, 1969, but dealt, in the main part, with the structure and phraseology of the report instead of its content.



S. Valiquette, chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, noted (Ad Hoc Committee minutes, December 15, 1969) that the members of the E.F.M. executives were questioning the Committee's representativity. Indeed, no member of the executive of the E.F.M. had been asked to participate. Valiquette remarked, "Le Frère Marion demandera à l'E.F.M. si elle estime déjà suffisamment représenté sur notre comité par M. Gaborieau, le Frère Marion, l'abbé Cloutier, le Père Valiquette." Presumably, the names mentioned were members of the E.F.M. but not of its executive. The question of representativity was solved!

On February 16, 1970, L. Courcelles, President of the E.F.M., received a letter from Desjardins requesting that a report be submitted to the Secretariat. The report was to deal with the following:

- A. Le besoin d'un collège pédagogique de langue française (son rôle principal et la formation qu'il doit offrir aux enseignants franco-manitobains).
- B. L'emplacement du dit collège.
- C. Les conséquences du dit collège du point de vue des enseignants.<sup>65</sup>

The report was tabled on March 18, 1970, and dealt with the need, role, problems and location of the Institute. The information serving as basis for the report had been acquired by questionnaires sent to members (the report did not indicate the numbers). The only conclusion drawn was that there was a need for the Institute. However, as to the other questions, teachers were divided with no proportions or percentages presented.





A final presentation was made by the E.F.M. by submitting a number of recommendations to the Administrative Council of St. Boniface College. The recommendations dealt with the administrative structure of the Institute, hiring of the Director, elaboration of programs, librarian and the teaching certificate. The recommendations were accepted with few modifications. The Rector of St. Boniface College, Roger St-Denis, in a letter to the President of the E.F.M. (March 23, 1972) noted:

Il me fait plaisir de vous dire que la plupart de ces recommandations ont été acceptées, parfois avec certaines modifications plutôt mineur.<sup>66</sup>

From the available information, it appears that the E.F.M. was not extensively involved in a process which ought to have been critical to French teachers.

Two other organizations need to be discussed briefly; namely, the "Fédération des Parents et Maîtres" and "l'Association des Commissaires de Langue Française". Both Associations were asked to react to the Ad Hoc Committee's first report (letter from Desjardins, October 23, 1969). The president of the A.C.L.F.M. responded by stating that the association fully endorsed the report. Fernand Paquin, President of the A.C.L.F.M. (Int. March 7, 1978) remarked that the association was not too aware of what was taking place. Indeed, the association was dormant most of the time but was revived on occasion in response to situations requiring support. In a similar way, Hubert Philippot, President of the F.P.M. was clearly unable to converse in an interview



(Int. March 5, 1978) on the creation of the Institute. Thus, it appears that A.C.L.F.M. and F.P.M. were approached for the sole purpose of extricating support. Indeed, Philippot (Int. March 5, 1978) indicated that a wide based support gave a better impression on provincial government officials. Marion (Int. March 9, 1978) stated that it was important that a sense of solidarity be projected.

Enforcement Activities. Enforcement Activities usually refer to institutional mechanisms which will increase the likelihood that a policy will be implemented in a manner consistent with its intent. Neustadt (1960:18) refers to these as "action-forcing mechanisms". The available documents do not explicitly refer to such mechanisms. However, it would appear that a number of action-forcing mechanisms were in existence.

The establishment of the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations stands out as the most obvious means employed by the Schreyer government to increase the likelihood of implementation. Although the purpose of the Secretariat was not restricted to the establishment of the Institute it was part of its mandate. As noted before, the Secretariat was used to circumvent the Department of Education because it was felt that officials there might not possess the willingness nor the commitment to carry out the policy. According to Anderson (1975) and Bardach (1977), the creation of a new agency is considered an effective mechanism used by the governments to ensure the likelihood that a new and/or controversial policy will be carried out.



Another means employed by agencies to increase the success of policy implementation is the choice of personnel brought in or assigned to the process. Clearly, the use of committed Francophones within the Secretariat and the setting up of an Ad Hoc Committee made up of people with highly favorable disposition toward the establishment of an Institute at St. Boniface College were means by which the probability of implementation was increased.

Desjardins' objective was to have the Institute located at St. Boniface College. Any person(s) and/or group(s) suggesting any modification to that objective was (were) not recognized as having a legitimate argument to support their position. Corriveau submitted a dissenting report; he also raised other questions. In both cases, according to Corriveau (Int. March 6, 1978), his opinions were dismissed. In a similar manner, the divided opinions among teachers was played down. Indeed, the role of the E.F.M. throughout the process appears to have been one of minimal involvement. Clearly these and other incidents would suggest that the Secretariat sought support motivated by a desire to present an image of wide support to the federal government and to resolve the issue in the shortest time span. Certainly, the insistence and persistence of Manitoba officials vis-à-vis their federal counterparts that St. Boniface College was the only possible and logical site suggests a desire to eliminate consideration of other locations both within or outside Manitoba.





A final mechanism employed was the hiring of a consultant -- an outsider, Clément Cormier, whose objectivity, because of his involvement with the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism would be difficult to question -- to help buttress Desjardins' choice of site. Cormier's report was favorable to locating the Institute at the College. Desjardins (Int. March 15, 1978) remarked, "la venue de Cormier au Manitoba fut pour des raisons politiques - un 'put-up job'." Other people (Paquin, Int. March 7, 1978; Corriveau, Int. March 6, 1978; Marion, Int. March 9, 1978) agreed that Cormier's report was to offer support for the College's bid for the institute.

In conclusion, the Secretariat could indeed point to a considerable number of reports and pieces of correspondence from various people and representatives of organizations and associations which supported the establishment of the institute at the College. The Secretariat officials used a good number of mechanisms to ensure successful attainment of the policy objective.

In the next section, social, political and economic conditions will be presented in order to give a wider perspective of the context in which the implementation process evolved.

#### Social, Political and Economic Factors

Policies are expressions and articulations of the needs and aspirations of various publics in a society. Clearly,



policies evolve within particular environments. This environment may be construed as consisting of particular social, political and economic elements whose mixture permits certain policies to be brought to the forefront of public attention. This section will identify some environmental factors which may have played an important role in the implementation of the policy. These factors are viewed as providing the impetus for the implementation of the policy. Factors of particular importance for this discussion include: the re-evaluation of the Canadian federation, the ascent of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Edward Schreyer's rise to political prominence in Manitoba, and the economic bouyancy in both Manitoba and Canada as a whole.

A New Federalism. A re-evaluation of Canadian Federalism took place during Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson's years in office. Because of the rise of a separatist movement in Quebec, the Prime Minister felt that the survival of Canada as a nation was seriously jeopardized. To determine the extent of this perceived crisis, Prime Minister Pearson commissioned a Royal Inquiry. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism confirmed the Prime Minister's fear that Canada was going through its greatest crisis. According to the commissioners, part of the crisis was the failure to recognize the linguistic and cultural duality of the two founding people, the English and the French. From a Franco-Manitoban perspective, the Commission was able to



articulate the extent of the problem they faced in their quest for survival as a minority. The Commission therefore brought a resurgence of hope based on the fact that the Federal Government was showing signs of being concerned.

As part of his federalist project, Prime Minister Pearson called a constitutional conference in February of 1968. The major thrust of the conference was on language rights and their entrenchment within the constitution. The conference did not result in any new constitutional formulations. Two western premiers, Strom of Alberta and Weir of Manitoba were critical of entrenching language rights in the constitution. Indeed, the constitutionality of this procedure ought to be brought before the Supreme Court of Canada. For Premier Weir of Manitoba, language rights for the French in his province would be approached through a policy of gradualism. Needless to say such an incremental policy was not well received by the leaders of the French community. To these leaders Premier Weir's policy was viewed as retrogressive in light of the Federal Government's desire to accelerate the recognition of language rights.

Trudeau and Trudeaumania. There appears to be some general consensus of opinion as to Pierre Elliot Trudeau's impact on the Canadian people. Reporting on the June 25, 1968, federal election, Schindeler (1968:74) noted:

The mystique that surrounded Trudeau at the Liberal Leadership Convention in April became the magic of Trudeaumania and the key to the Liberal party's success at the polls on June 25.





In many ways, Trudeau was seen as the politician who possessed the wherewithal to save Canada, preserve its unity and put Quebec in its place. Lapointe (Le Magazine Maclean, March 1968:3) stated:

M. Pierre-Elriot Trudeau est d'ores et déjà considéré, au Canada anglais comme le Messie énergique qui sauvera la Confédération.<sup>67</sup>

For Trudeau (1967), the solution to the separatist threat was through a strong centralized Canada. This was to be done through a nationwide acceptance of bilingualism and a rejection of any special status for Quebec. As Stewart (1971:13) remarked, Trudeau was "making all the put-downs English Canada was longing for." Cook (1971:12) noted

Many Canadians, French and English, probably hoped that the federal election in June 1968 settled the Canadian constitutional question. Those people believed that Mr. Trudeau's views on the constitution were clear and acceptable. By voting for him they were expressing their support for a united Canada in which French and English Canadians would be recognized as equal powers, but in which no province would exercise special powers.

Thus, Trudeau was seen as best suited to deal with unity and its related problems.

In terms of style, Trudeau became the symbol of the unconventional politician of the "with-it" generation. As Stewart (1971:13) explained, the "media build up awestruck stories of his judo prowess, his work travels...(a) reputation as a ladies' man, his unconventional dress. Trudeaumania fanned by the press, inflamed by the famous kissing episode... spread across the land." There was a feeling that Trudeau had



revitalized politics and perhaps in some important way as La Pierre (1969:15) noted that Canadians were given the impression that they were involved in the process of change.

Thus, it was that Trudeau struck the proper strings to dismiss the discordance of the unity debate. His apparent grasp of the problem cast in a strong federalist state would eradicate the separatist tendencies of the Quebecois. Additionally, the new style of politics reflected a desire to leave the past and move forward as a nation. Under Trudeau's leadership, at least in its incipient stage, a different set of social enthusiasms came into fashion.

Schreyer's rise to power. In many ways, Schreyer's style of politics also represented a break with the past. During the Manitoba election of June, 1969, the N.D.P. under the leadership of Edward Schreyer presented a wide array of proposals to the electorate while the Conservatives and Liberals preached fiscal restraints. In campaign style, Schreyer had the advantage of careful preparation, was self-assured and energetic. Further, as an N.D.P. Schreyer was viewed as a moderate. It was on the basis of these factors according to Peterson and Barber (1970) that the N.D.P. were brought to power.

From a Franco-Manitoban standpoint, subsequent events developed fortuitously. The N.D.P. were one seat short of absolute majority. Since Schreyer had expressed himself favorably toward French language rights during the campaign,



and since Laurent Desjardins, Liberal M.L.A. for St. Boniface, had been seeking French language recognition, an agreement was struck between these two politicians. Part of the agreement was the creation of a teacher training institute.

Thus, the B and B Commission, the constitutional conference, the rise to prominence of Trudeau federally and Schreyer provincially created a social and political context in which policies related to linguistic and cultural issues were given currency. The Official Languages Act of the Federal government arose in this context. Bill 113 in Manitoba, giving added language rights to Franco-Manitobans was also formulated in this context. The establishment of a French teacher training institute was a joint federal-provincial project and a means of preserving the French language in Manitoba. To support these policies was to be Canadian.

The Economic Link. Open systems theorists would argue that societal subsystems, namely, the economic, political, educational, social and such, do not function independently of one another. Indeed, issues and events marking one subsystem may well impact upon the others. Boundaries of subsystems are permeable and thus, subsystems become inter-dependent.

The respective economies of Canada and Manitoba during the late sixties were bouyant. Their impact on the social and political fabric have been important.





As to the Canadian economy Laxer and Laxer (1977:15) propose the following:

The hour of Trudeau's accession was appropriate. It came at the end of a long economic upsurge and had given the country a flavour very different from that John Diefenbaker had found in 1957, even quite different from the country whose government Pearson took over in 1963. Trudeau seemed the logical culmination to a decade in which the nation had become urban, sophisticated and fully integrated into the world of instant communication. Trudeau's style seemed the appropriate adornment to the nation's substance.

The Manitoba economy during the sixties was to experience an upward swing. Earl (1967:22) writing in the Western Business and Industry, stated:

Manitoba has not enjoyed the advantage of money producing resources which are bulging the treasuries of its adjoining neighbours. Nonetheless, its log of economic development in 1966 was one of the most favorable in the history of the province.

This growth based on various indicators would continue. The Financial Post (1967:17) reported on an investment survey by the Wood Gundy Securities Ltd., saying:

Investment survey sees a rosy future for Manitoba Economy... still strongly agricultural. The province is developing an industrial structure attuned to technological trends and export markets.

It would appear that economic growth would spread into the seventies. Tyre (1969:101) noted:

While Manitoba's gross provincial product continues to increase at a slower rate than Canada's gross nationale product, much growth potential for Manitoba is diligently developing behind the scenes, its full energy to be released in 1970 for a decade of increasingly rapid expansion.



From the above economic growth and bouyancy appeared to be a characteristic of the Canadian and Manitoban economics. Hoselitz (1964:152) suggests that "economic development may be considered as associated with a transformation of social behavior." Lewis (1955:143) indicates that as economic circumstances change, social institutions may well go through a period of adjustment, "once economic growth begins it will... erode the old institutions and create new ones more compatible with further growth."

With respect to the social dimension, Lewis (1955:143) adds:

...change begins at some spot in the web of belief and relationships and spreads outward from there... (T)here has to be also a new sense of values.

Almond and Powell (1966:94) appear to concur with the effects of economic growth on social beliefs and attitudes:

socio-economic change have also been associated... with a breakdown in traditional patterns of belief and in traditional forms... of social life.

From a policy point of view, Dye (1966:293) in a study of state politics in the United States, concluded:

Economic development shapes both political systems and policy outcomes and most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic development.

Clearly, economic growth will increase man's receptivity to new orientations and thereby allow the filtering through to government agendas policies which in times of restraint might never see the light of day. The apprehension of an impending crisis of the Canadian federation was made



clear by the B and B Commission. The greatest threat posed to the union was the separatist movement in Quebec. To counter that threat two things were needed: (1) the education of Canadians to the extent of the crisis and the promotion of the dual linguistic character of Canada, and (2) making the Quebecois feel "at home" in Canada. This meant extending the availability of French services across the country as it related to federal government institutions and agencies. It meant also extending services to those groupings of francophones outside Quebec. The Franco-Manitobans were a case in point. In doing this, the federal government was attempting to crush Quebec nationalism and develop a Canadian nationalism based on the recognition of two founding groups, the French and the English.

The argument put forth above is that if the economy had been faltering creating unemployment and associated problems, cultural and linguistic policies would not have been elevated to the prominence they acquired. Economic growth ushered in a period of optimism, affluence, and perhaps increased tolerance.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter a description of the policy implementation process has been presented by using most of the main categories of the Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) model. An important functional feature of this model is its categorizing capacity. That is, the model made possible the categorization





of the data in such a way as to remove some of the complexity and diffuseness inherent in policy implementation. The categories have allowed a presentation of a descriptive picture of the implementing agency including its structure, functions and personnel. Further, this part of the analysis has presented an account of the objectives pursued with respect to the implementation of the policy and the resources made available in seeking to attain these objectives. In addition, the model allowed for the examination of the interorganizational network which developed during the implementation process and the activities undertaken to ensure implementation. Finally, the implementation process was viewed as evolving within a larger societal context. Thus, the component concerned with the description of the social, political and economic conditions gives us a wider perspective in which to locate the implementation process. The model therefore made possible a comprehensive description by focusing on both the micro- and macro-levels of policy implementation.

In the following chapter, the focus will be on providing an explanation of the policy implementation by discussing those factors critical to the process.



## AUTHOR'S TRANSLATIONS

1. While the organization of our secretariat is not yet complete, it is essential that St. Boniface College prepares itself to play an important role in this period of change. The setting up of a French Normal School will necessitate on your part a rather exhaustive period of study. It is therefore important... that St. Boniface College begins to think in terms of becoming a normal school in the not too distant future.
2. This school ought to be a branch of St. Boniface College.
3. The Committee retains as important for all future deliberation the positive disposition of the vice-president in supporting St. Boniface College in its legitimate demand for a pedagogical college distinct from the Faculty of Education by its language of instruction.
4. (2) The Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations, through its director, Mr. Laurent Desjardins, expresses its conviction
  - (a) that the French language pedagogical college must be situated in Manitoba;
  - (b) that it must be situated in the City of St. Boniface;
  - (c) that it be under the aegis of St. Boniface College.

(3) The Premier of Manitoba, the Honorable Edward Schreyer, at the congrès-rallye of the S.F.M., on December 6, 1969, announced that the province would create a French language pedagogical college in 1970 if possible. He did not specify the site nor the administrative responsibility of the college but, through Mr. Desjardins, we are aware of his thoughts on these points.
5. I was suspected. I was not of the group (French). I was from the Department (Education).
6. (1) All agree that there exists a pressing need to better prepare and train those destined to teach in French;



- (2) All agree that there is an urgent need to have a site in Manitoba where French teacher training courses be available in all subject area;
  - (3) Few would be disposed to favor the idea of a pedagogical college within St. Boniface College.  
(emphasis added)
7. (1) Even if all those of French expression who aspire to teach enrolled at St. Boniface College in Program B, there would not be a sufficient number of students (approximately 25) to fill two classrooms. (This number is based on projection made by the Faculty of Education for 1970-71). Such a situation would quickly become untenable unless, obviously, that an important recruitment be done in the neighboring provinces -- which is unlikely.
- (2) This small number of students would preclude the hiring of more than two or three professors. Those professors would have to be sufficiently well versed in pedagogy and quite flexible to satisfy the requirements of all subject areas. This would seem to be a demanding and quasi-impossible task.
- (3) To supplement this shortage of professors, one would have to have access to the most modern technical aids on site, and all kinds of facilities and diversifications. These aids and workshops would be most expensive and difficult to install at the College.
- (4) The advantage of a French ambiance would probably be cancelled by the disadvantage of a milieu with few modern pedagogic facilities and isolated from the main current of innovations, experiences, research, etc. which are found elsewhere.
8. I wanted them to answer the questions. The document was not well received. They were forcing the issue. It's understandable.
9. (1) The need for a French normal school,
- (2) The site of the school,
- (3) The ramifications of the school from the teachers' point of view.
10. Because of the diversity of choice, it is practically impossible to rally the whole group to one specific choice. While a good number see St. Boniface College as the ideal site, others... favor the Faculty of Education.





11. The importance of a French teacher training center is also a preoccupation of our government. To achieve the changes we propose in the area of education, it is important that a French normal school be established as soon as possible in St. Boniface.
12. We fully meet the intentions of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in suggesting that the institute be established in St. Boniface and more specifically at St. Boniface College.
13. As suggested by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the question of a French normal school for the Western provinces would seem to warrant further consideration. Obviously, this would necessitate consultation and agreement among interested provinces.
14. Nevertheless, permit me, sir, to again reiterate the importance of this new institute in our recent provincial policy relating to Canadians of French expression.
15. Unfortunately, we have pressed on too rapidly. We wanted to study the problem of creating a pedagogical college for the Western provinces with Saskatchewan and Alberta. We have just heard that this was also the intention of these provinces but that poor communication would have precipitated Premier Schreyer's declaration before the francophone associations of the three provinces could come to an agreement on the site of the college.

If another Western province were to demand financial assistance from Ottawa to establish a pedagogical college, Ottawa would probably have to divide the monies allocated for one pedagogical college for Western Canada.

Can we now rally the francophones of Saskatchewan and Alberta to our decision?

16. The key to our reform in Manitoba is to create a French teacher training institute. In order to accelerate the implementation of a fair system for franco-Manitobans, it is important that this question, along with financial participation of the parties involved, be discussed as soon as possible. At this time of year, if decisions are not taken soon, it would be impossible to organize such an institute for 1970.
17. At the meeting of the ministerial committee on Official Languages, the Manitoba delegation discussed this question with the other Western provinces and those provinces had no objection as to Manitoba being chosen as site for the pedagogical college.



18. I do not believe, sir, that this solution would be efficacious. It would only serve to bring the question in an area where a futile discussion would ensue for an indefinite period of time. Besides, the question cannot be resolved at that level at this time.
19. I am submitting to you all correspondance on the subject and in addition copies of all important reports... I hope that these documents will attest the interest which exists vis-à-vis the establishment of a French pedagogical college and will serve to re-open this question which, following our recent school legislation, is of crucial importance.
20. The meetings were abusive -- very parochial. Alberta possibly had a point. Our position was of an insuperable arrogance -- we were the only ones capable... an impasse.
21. We did not agree -- total impasse.
22. We do not believe it to be possible to establish the total costs of the undertaking before we begin operation because of the original circumstances and conditions.
23. Experience has demonstrated that the Federal government can at times be extremely slow and the members of the Board of Governors are anxious to know whether word will arrive when we expect it. If not, what would happen?
24. I would like to assure you that our government is as conscious as the College's Board of Governors of the urgency to open the pedagogical Institute in the near future.  
  
However, for the moment, we are confident that the Federal government will make its decision known shortly. If a delay was to occur, we would do everything in our power to get a final decision from the Secretary of State.
25. We are confident that the Secretary of State will communicate with us within the stipulated time, but we would like to bring to your attention that the interested organizations, and specifically St. Boniface College, are keeping a close eye on the calendar, are questioning us on the situation, and are anxiously awaiting a decision expected for so long.
26. May I have your recommendations and opinions as to the amount that Ottawa will be granting for this project...
27. (2) Amount of \$1,200,000 and ceiling of \$1,000,000.  
All right! Agreed!





(3) "Understandings" on page 2 of the brief. The Institute must open its doors on the 1st of September, 1972. This is urgent. Therefore, we must not delay the opening by waiting for an agreement with people in the West, which would probably take years. Therefore, begin in September, 1972 and then as soon as possible enter into negotiations to satisfy the "undertakings" of the Secretary of State.

28. The provincial government had assured us that the Federal government would respond before the end of January.

This delay seriously compromises the creation of the Institute for next September particularly the organization of in-service courses for the summer.

Could you please indicate the latest date at which we can receive a response.

29. As to the telegrams you have recently received from the "Conseil d'Administration du Collège"... and the St. Boniface School Division, I wish to state that we from the government had no idea that these organizations would be sending telegrams so soon after the end of January. I am disappointed at their too impatient attitude before the normal course of events...

30. 4. The report must include an exhaustive documentation with regard to:

(a) Actual manpower: (to be developed)

1. external to the College

- professors from the university
- professors from Quebec, etc.
- French-Canadian students from the province
- French-Canadian students from the university
- students from the Faculty of Education

31. We must first conduct a study of the francophone student population in Manitoba and in the other Western provinces so as to determine enrolment projections for the French language normal school in light of the positions available after graduation.

32. Admission: The first year of education (IB) will be offered:

1. to all French students having completed grade 12 with Français 300 or the equivalent in addition to four other courses, two of which must be at the 300 level (300 level courses constituted the academic stream).





2. to anglophone students or others who desire a bilingual education and who wish to teach in French language institutions.

### Recruitment

The following figures were supplied by the principals of various schools of the province and thus, give us an opportunity to establish the possible number of students enrolling at the Institute in September 1970.

School Divisions	Total number of students enrolled in grade 12	Number of students enrolled in Français 300
Seine River S.D.	198	106
Red River S.D.	111	80
Mountain S.D.	115	27
White Horse Plains S.D.	55	10
Turtle Mountain S.D.	139	3
Saint Boniface S.D.	429	113
Norwood S.D.	150	19
TOTAL	<u>1,397</u>	<u>358</u>

A liberal estimate would situate the number of students in Education IB for September 1970 to be between  $1/10$  and  $1/5$  of the actual number of students enrolled in Français 300, that is between 35 and 65.

33. We anticipated approximately thirty registrations: there were sixty-three.
34. It's difficult to say; I believe that it will depend on whether our graduates can find a teaching position.
35. 2. At the College  
 Our first year of the B.A. program is accepted as the academic year required for the two-year program with the second year of professional training being offered at the university. There is also a good number of students who complete a bachelor of education by taking special courses.
3. Shortage of French science teachers. The major-minor programs at the College are preponderately Arts rather than Science.



5. Would the school offer all methodology courses?  
Yes, because we are training a total teacher.

36. The French language "collège pédagogique" would pursue the same objectives as the Faculty of Education through the medium of the French language, and the Franco-Manitoban culture and milieu. Specifically, we must prepare teachers qualified to teach all subjects in the French language (English being the exception) at all levels of the public school system, that is, at the kindergarten, primary, elementary, and secondary levels.

37. Education IB:

Already the College offers the first year of a two-year program in education: the Faculty of Education of the University of Manitoba allows French language students to enrol in five (5) Arts courses for IB at the College; the students must then enrol in five (5) courses in pedagogy at the Faculty of Education for Education IIB.

Thus, the first step for September, 1970 for a school of pedagogy at the College would be to complete IB by offering two courses in pedagogy required by the Faculty of Education.

Education IIB:

Education IIB now given at the Faculty of Education is offered to those students who have completed four Arts or Science courses and two half-courses in pedagogy. It is comprised of a series of courses in Arts or Sciences, in addition to student teaching experience.

Education IIB presents a number of problems which precludes its introduction before the 1971-72 academic year... We cannot therefore recommend its introduction for 1970-71.

Education I

This year consists of one full year of teacher training leading to a Certificate of Education.

The admission requirements are two completed years in Arts or Science or their equivalent given by another faculty with a major in a teaching subject...

38. 3. It seems preferable that the director or principal of the normal school be a man because of the continual dealings with the Department of Education and further, because of male presence within the student body.



4. The Director must be acceptable to the Department of Education and the Franco-Manitoban community.
5. The professors for the Normal school must be recruited within the school system. School inspectors will be helpful in this choice. We must not neglect women who are numerous and succeed quite well at the primary level.
6. The director must hold at least a Master of Education or Pedagogy and have experience at the primary and secondary levels. His salary could reach \$19,000 for a small normal school to \$21,000 for a larger school (150 students plus).
7. Professors must hold a permanent teacher's certificate, a Bachelor of Arts and at least seven years of experience at the primary level. In Ontario, the minimum salary is \$12,000 and a maximum of \$16,500 with annual increases of \$500.
- 13 The first step: hire the director and the librarian as soon as possible.
39. To choose the director set up a committee in collaboration with the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations, the Directorate of Education of the S.F.M., the E.F.M., and the Trustees Association.
40. Recommendation - 1 -- The E.F.M. recommends that the College announce the names of those candidates for the position of Director for the Institute.
41. Recommendation - 2 -- That the administrative council set up a committee for the selection of possible candidates whose composition would include members of the administrative council and members of various organizations with a special interest in education. We suggest the following composition:
  - the Rector of the College
  - the President of the Administrative council
  - the Dean (Arts and Science)
  - a representative of the E.F.M.
  - a representative of the French Trustees Association
  - a representative of the Department of Education
  - a member of the executive of the Faculty of Education
42. One representative of the Faculty of Education rather than a member of the executive of the Faculty of Education.
43. Recommendation - 3 -- The candidates should meet the following minimum requirements:







- (a) be known as an excellent educator with the Franco-Manitoban milieu
- (b) have a wide teaching experience at the elementary and/or secondary levels
- (c) hold a Bachelor of Education or a Master or its equivalent

44. The Administrative council has therefore accepted that the position be posted as follows:

TRAINING: Master of Education or its equivalent

EXPERIENCE: Teaching experience;  
Administrative experience

45. 6. What is to become of the College's status?

- It will become the French section of the University of Manitoba
- We do not speak of a confessional character but we do not deny it.

7. Relations with the Department (of Education)

- We note no major difficulties at present.

46. We can at least say that the Senate of the University of Manitoba had allowed St. Boniface College to entertain the hope that one day it would have a normal school.

47. In short, a normal school at St. Boniface College would become the French section of the Faculty of Education of the University of Manitoba as it is for the Arts and Science faculties.

48. Should the Department of Pedagogy of St. Boniface College become the French section of the Faculty of Education of the University of Manitoba? We think not! First, there is the danger of placing the College under the tutelage of the Faculty and risk having the Department of Pedagogy becoming a carbon copy of the Faculty of Education. Further, from an administrative point of view, the Department of pedagogy of St. Boniface College will be financed jointly by the federal and provincial governments this last point not being the case for the Faculty of Education. However, nothing would prevent the College from developing better relations with the Faculty and benefit from its experience.

49. In principle, we accept the recommendations submitted to the federal government and we are prepared to provide financial assistances for their implementation.



50. I believe you will shortly receive an official request... related to a mutual financial agreement between our government to share in the costs of a study undertaken to better carry out our bilingual programs in Manitoba. I hope that this request will receive your favor so that we can begin our project as soon as possible.
51. I have sent to the Premier of your province a cheque in the amount of \$50,000 which represents a part of the grant agreed upon so as to conduct the preliminary studies concerning bilingualism.
52. Construction of the new pedagogical Institute has started and should be completed before March 31, 1974. It is a joint federal (\$1,100,000) and provincial (\$366,000) project.
53. At such future date and upon request from the Secretariat the College ought to be able to submit a report concerning a study for the establishment of a French normal school at the College.
54. Because of certain conditions, it is important that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee be submitted to the Secretariat by February 23.
55. The final report could approach the subject of a normal school from three aspects:
  - a) Goals and Objectives - (in general terms)
  - b) States to consider - should consider short and long term priorities and their chronological order.
  - c) Comments - add comments such as problems to solve and anticipated difficulties.
  - d) Conclusion - recommendations and suggestions.
56. To study the possibility of establishing a normal school at St. Boniface College... to be aware of the difficulties and issues in the area of training Franco-manitoban teachers.
57. St. Boniface College has submitted its preliminary report to the Secretariat. We are providing you with a copy of the report so that you can study it. We would appreciate your scanning the document and submit a similar report in the period not exceeding seven to ten (7 to 10) days.
58. As member of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on bilingualism and biculturalism you are probably aware of the complexity of the task that the Manitoba government has entrusted to the Secretariat. Accordingly, we would be



happy to have you assume the responsibility of conducting a study in the areas of bilingualism and the cultural mosaic.

59. Recent sociological and linguistic investigations on the state of French in Manitoba allow to ascertain two things: 1. The Franco-manitoban group wants to maintain its French language and culture; 2. The quality of the French language is seriously threatened... L'Association represents the French group in Manitoba and demands, in its name, a normal school for the French Canadians.
60. We were all suspicious of the Department.  
  
A way for Schreyer to allow a French Minister to get involved in French education and culture - a way... to bring about some changes.
61. At the last meeting of the Faculty Council M. Bonneau and Soeur Chaput presented a proposition, based on the adoption of "Bill 113" which provides for an extension of the existing programs at the Faculty.
62. A few more courses and there will be no need to create a Normal School in Saint-Boniface; it will exist at the Faculty of Education on campus of the University.
63. I'm under the impression that we are considered the opposition as opposed to colleagues. They do not seem to have any confidence in us.
64. Brown was fine. Hedley gave us some problems.
65. A. The need for a french language normal school (its principal role and the training it must offer to Franco-manitoban teachers).  
  
B. The location of the school.  
  
C. The implications of the school from the teachers' point of view.
66. I have the pleasure to inform you that most recommendations have been accepted with few minor modifications.
67. M. Pierre-Elliot Trudeau is already being considered in English Canada as the energetic Messiah who will save the Canadian Confederation.







## CHAPTER V

### POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: AN EXPLANATION OF THE PROCESS

The preceding chapter offered a description of the implementation process. This was the first phase of the analysis. The second phase of the analysis, which is the purpose of this chapter, is to provide an explanation of why the process evolved the way it did. The discussion is divided into four sections:

1. The form and type of policy implemented.
2. The support, demand, and scope of the policy implemented.
3. The identification of the factors critical for achieving the policy objective.
4. The forces shaping the policy as the process evolved over time.

Taken together these four sections constitute the explanatory framework for the policy implementation process.

#### THE FORM AND TYPE OF POLICY

The policy to establish a teacher training institute may be described as a decisional statement. This contrasts with a law which must receive legislative assent and which usually contains specific regulations. Teacher education per se is usually regulated by some lawlike structure but the creation of an institutional framework to operationalize teacher education programs depends solely on the discretionary



powers of a provincial government. As such, Premier Schreyer's decision to create a French teacher training institute was well within the prerogative of this government. However, it is important to recognize that the government's desire to offer such a service to the French community was set down in a decisional statement. Thus, apart from the statement itself there was virtually nothing in terms of rules and regulations which could form a basis for the implementation of the policy. Rules and regulations which accompany policies usually give greater specificity to policies. Indeed, they provide a basis for moving from the general to the operational. The policy of creating a teacher training institute was a general statement. This approach is in keeping with what Anderson (1975), Bardach (1977) and others have suggested that giving specificity to policies is usually left to administrators. And so it is that administrators must develop an implementation program which must answer to the policy objective and be acceptable to those whom the policy affects. The initial phase of policy implementation is characterized by a certain degree of nebulousness in trying to specify what the important elements of the process might be. It should be noted, however, that such nebulousness may be advantageous. As Elmore (1978) has remarked, such a process places emphasis on individual motivation and commitment creating a sense of involvement and ownership in the project. Further, it highlights the centrality of strong face-to-face work groups thus enhancing



cooperation. Finally, it explicitly criticizes the conventional notion of organizational efficiency on the assumption that there is a usefulness in reinventing the wheel. Citing a Rand Corporation report on implementation successes, Elmore (1978:214) states that "the only way an innovation can become established . . . is for implementors to learn it, shape it, and claim it for their own." This is the view of implementation from the organizational development model. Indeed, from the description provided it appears that the implementation of the policy was characterized by creativity and much discretion in a broad field of action. The implementors were engaged in discussions with a large number of individuals who represented groups and organizations in and outside Manitoba in addition to a good number of officials of the provincial and federal governments. These discussions were instrumental in securing the agreements and resources which were required to establish the institute in Manitoba.

The type of policy is also important. Smith's (1973) three categories are of particular significance. First, Smith (1973) distinguishes between a complex and a simple policy: the former is broad and non-incremental, the latter small scale and incremental. Initially, we might conclude that creating the institute would be a relatively simple undertaking, and this suggests an incremental change. On incremental and non-incremental change Lindblom and Braybrook (1970:69) are quite definitive:





We consider the introduction through public policy of what is considered to be a new and important element... to be a large non-incremental change. On the other hand, a somewhat greater or reduced use of an existing social technique or a somewhat higher or lower level of attainment of some existing values is a small or incremental change.

This definition would therefore appear to suggest a non-incremental change. The events surrounding the implementation process under consideration here suggest a broad policy since it had important ramifications at the provincial level, inter-provincial level and at the federal level.

A second category presented by Smith (1973) relates to the fact that the policy may be organizational or non-organizational. A policy is considered organizational if it requires modifications to or the establishment of a formal organization. Within this perspective, the creation of the institute ought to be regarded as an organizational policy. All activities related to its implementation were initiated and/or dealt with by the Secretariat of Dominion - Provincial Cultural Relations. Although the Secretariat was not established for the sole purpose of implementing this policy, because its scope of activity was much wider, it nevertheless assumed this responsibility.

Creating the Secretariat to deal with French language issues in Manitoba may have proven important. As Anderson (1975) notes, an administrative organization may be used to emphasize the need for and facilitate action on particular policy problems. The effect of creating the Secretariat may have given a sharper focus to the administra-



tion of language legislation specifically and issues concerning the French minority in general. Perhaps too, it was thought that an existing agency such as the Department of Education would not be sufficiently sympathetic and vigorous. President Johnson (cited in Anderson: 1975:106) was noted to have remarked, "The best way to kill a new idea is to put it in an old line agency". Further, it can be said that administering educational innovations falls within the mandate of Departments of Education. In a sense departments monopolize administration; creating the Secretariat may have been designed to deal with this monopoly. The strategy, according to Bardach (1977:104) is "to create a substitute monopoly you can control" by creating new bureaus to undertake new programs rather than assigning them to existing ones. In the view of a number of interviewees this appeared to be the case.

A final category referred to by Smith (1973) is the classification of policies according to Lowi's (1964) typology. Lowi, it will be recalled, classified policies as distributive, redistributive and regulatory. In the words of Doern and Aucoin (1971) a distributive policy is one which distributes resources to particular groups in a political system. In such instances, a group receives an output from the government without competing actively with other groups. The group desiring a government output deals directly with the policy-makers. Redistributive policies contain elements of the regulatory type. Decisions are made to support the demands of some while depriving others as in the regulatory type. The groups involved in the redistribution are not as numerous as for the



other two policy type. These groups are seen as broad categories of individuals and can be treated as social classes, that is, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie or, more simply, the haves and have nots. (Doern and Aucoin, 1971:19-20). Regulatory policies involve a more overt decision to meet some demands and not to meet others. The main characteristic of such policies, therefore, is that options are considered limited and thus cannot be distributed to all individuals or groups desiring them.

The policy to establish the institute appears to be a specific example of the distributive policy. The group desiring a government output was the Francophone group in Manitoba. There appears to have been no active competition with other groups. Further, the French leaders could deal directly with Desjardins, Schreyer's legislative assistant, or Schreyer himself on occasion.

Thus, the policy might be better described as a decisional statement, broad and non-incremental, distributive and requiring, along with other policies relating to French instruction, the establishment of a formal organization to deal more effectively with its implementation.

#### SUPPORT, DEMAND AND SCOPE OF THE POLICY

Other concepts that provide useful analytical tools are the notions of intensity of support, demand, and scope of the policy. First, it should be noted that the intensity of support, from the perspective of the French





leaders, was extremely pronounced. This, in tandem with governmental commitment, helped to bring the project to fruition. Second, the demand and support for the policy by the French elite was at its apogee. This strong positive disposition vis-à-vis the policy is most fully understood from the historic point of view. Historically, the French felt they had been dealt a severe blow by the abrogation of language rights in 1916. That abrogation in effect legally removed French language instruction and prevented the training of teachers in the French language. Subsequent Manitoba governments were somewhat less than sympathetic to the restoration of those rights which the French firmly believed to be theirs. However, Roblin's partial restoration of these rights, the federal government's minority language policy, and Premier Schreyer's language policy vis-à-vis the French all served to establish a more favorable context for reconsidering and indeed restoring language rights. The fortuitous election of the N.D.P. government triggered the development of policies to ensure linguistic recognition.

An other important element is the fact that the French group in Manitoba had always maintained a relatively strong organization despite its waning tendencies during the fifties. Furthermore, the sixties saw a resurgence of group solidarity following closely the Quiet Revolution in Quebec, and the French became a pressure group. As Pross (1975:2) remarks, "Pressure groups are organizations



whose members act together to influence public policy in order to promote their common interest". Associating together within the framework of a formal structure, the French shared and promoted the common interest of language recognition. However, their numbers precluded sufficient legislative representation to exercise political power. Nevertheless, and this appears to be a characteristic of pressure groups (Pross, 1975), they attempted to influence the political power of the day. With the Roblin government, the French were accepted as a legitimate interest group with legitimate demands. Kwarnick (cited in Pross 1975:8) states

One of the major prizes in the struggle between competing interest groups . . . is tangible recognition by government of the status and representative capacity claimed by interest group leaders for their respective organizations. Such recognition is conferred . . . when government calls a group's leaders in consultation on legislative or administrative matters which fall within the class of matters on which the group's leaders claim to speak in a representative capacity.

This appears to have been the relationship between Premier Schreyer and the French leaders. The French leaders had access to the Premier and availed themselves of the opportunity offered (LeTourneau, 1978).

Finally, the scope of the policy is an important dimension. A wide-ranging policy usually attracts much public attention through the media and generates public debates among the various groups affected by the policy. Such public attention will at times modify the original intent of the policy and may in fact help give it greater precision. In the case



of the institute media coverage and public attention were negligible. The policy was narrowly focused on a relatively small subject area although it did provoke interest in second language teacher training at the Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba. Even the financing of the project did not appear to provoke much interest. This may be due to the fact that the financing of the institute was partially assumed by the federal government (75% of capital costs, 25% of operational costs). If costs had been borne in toto by Manitoba taxpayers reactions might have been of a more active nature. Coming from the federal government, funds were less identifiable and indeed, appeared more distant to the Manitoba situation.

#### FACTORS CRITICAL TO THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The purpose of this section is to identify those factors which are viewed as critical to the process described in the preceding chapter. In keeping with the analytical framework that was adopted to describe the implementation process, the analysis that follows recognizes six types of factors; to recapitulate, the six categories focus on: (1) standards and objectives, (2) resources, (3) interorganizational communication and enforcement activities, (4) characteristics of the implementing agency, (5) social, political and economic conditions, and (6) disposition of implementors. These six categories will form the basis of the general discussion which follows.

One of the most critical features of policy implemen-





tation is the choice of the implementing agency. Anderson (1975), Bardach (1977) and others have made explicit the importance of choosing or creating an administrative structure responsible for the implementation of a policy(ies). Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980:547) recognized this when they stated:

. . . the responsibility for implementation can be assigned to agencies whose policy orientation is consistent with the statute and which will accord the new program high priority. This is most likely when a new agency is created specifically to administer the statute, as the program will necessarily be its highest priority and the creation of new positions opens the door to a vast infusion of statutory supporters.

Two factors appear important in the above: (1) the creation of an agency to administer the policy, and, (2) the hiring of supporters. Both of these were operationalized in the establishment of the institute. The pivotal organization in the policy implementation process was the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations. While the mandate of the Secretariat was language and culture, its major responsibility was in the area of minority language. For some interviewees (Monnin, Gauthier, Marion, Desjardins, and Gisiger) there is no question that the Secretariat was created for the purpose of developing service in the French language in Manitoba. More specifically, the interviewees stated that the Secretariat was a means of by-passing officials of the Department of Education who were perceived as not supportive of French language policies. Bardach (1977:103) states:



Up to a point, the problems of obstruction by individuals or organizations possessed of monopoly power may be foreseen in the design phase of policy and program development. Although the character and extent of their resistance may not become apparent until the implementation state, the potential for and likelihood of significant obstruction may be anticipated early. Antimonopoly preventive measures may therefore be incorporated in the program design.

Thus, according to Gisiger (Int. March 2, 1978), creating the Secretariat and naming Desjardins as its Director permitted a francophone to deal directly with French education and culture.

In keeping with the creation of a parallel monopoly (Bardach, 1977), the hiring of personnel whose disposition is favorable to the policy is also important. It is generally accepted throughout the literature on policy implementation (Anderson, 1975; Bardach 1977; Elmore, 1978; Williams, 1975, and others) that commitment to the policy is a crucial element to implementation. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980:547) state that it is this commitment, ". . . which probably lies behind many cases of suboptimal accomplishments of policy objectives." Desjardins, a strong defender of the French language and an advocate of restoring the rights of the French minority, was named Director of the Secretariat. Indeed, the gentlemen's agreement between Schreyer and Desjardins had been predicated on the restoration of language rights, part of which involved the establishment of the institute. Backeland, close associate of Desjardins, became the executive secretary of the Secretariat.



Marion, director of the Education Directorate of the S.F.M. and assistant-superintendent of the Seine River School Division was seconded to the Secretariat as consultant; finally, Corriveau, was also seconded to the Secretariat.

The Secretariat consisted of a small staff and thus had to rely upon other work groups, organizations, and associations for information relating to the establishment of the institute. The following list identifies those external sources:

1. Ad-Hoc Committee
2. St. Boniface College
3. University of Manitoba
4. Faculty of Education (U. of M.)
5. Société Franco-Manitobaine (S.F.M.)
6. Educateurs Franco-Manitobains (E.F.M.)
7. University Grants Commission (U.G.C.)
8. Association des Parents et Maîtres (A.P.M.)
9. Association des Commissaires de Langue Française du Manitoba (ACLFM).

As a first step, the Secretariat sought to consult various organizations in Manitoba. A major element in this process of consultation was the setting up of a work group, the Comité Ad-Hoc. The committee's mandate was to study the ramifications of establishing the institute at St. Boniface College. While the committee touched upon such considerations as clientele, costs, staff, programs, and affiliation, its major efforts and preoccupation appears to have been the site. In all its reports the committee was adamant in stating





time and again that the only possible location for the institute was St. Boniface College. The arguments raised in favor of this were historical, cultural, and linguistic. The reasons for the reiteration of these arguments were twofold: (1) that Manitoba be chosen over Alberta as the provincial site, and (2) that St. Boniface College be chosen over the University of Manitoba. In Manitoba, an alternative to locating the institute at St. Boniface College was presented. The alternative meant situating the institute on the campus of the University of Manitoba. Both the Faculty of Education and some members of the E.F.M. had argued for this alternative. Indeed, the Faculty of Education developed a rationale for this option. As it turned out the alternative was never given serious consideration. That such an alternative was not considered may in part be a reflection of the Ad-Hoc Committee's homogeneous composition. It was comprised in the main of people supporting the College location. This homogeneity may not be dysfunctional. However, as Murphy (1971:52) remarks, "it may tend ... to establish an inbred, insular attitude and approach which probably are resistant to new ideas . . ." Further, as stated above, the Secretariat officials were certainly disposed in favor of seeing the institute at the College. The setting up of an Ad-Hoc Committee was entrusted by Laurent Desjardins to Stephane Valiquette, Rector of St. Boniface College, Valiquette also chaired the meetings and drafted the committee's reports. In this connection Cortner's (1976:326) remarks are significant, he suggests that the process enabled

the decision makers to search for information which [was] consistent with their perceptions, attitudes,



beliefs, and goals, and to filter out information which [was] not . . . It narrow[ed] the kinds and numbers of alternatives considered, and the permissible range of choice.

Thus, everything was done to deflect the Faculty of Education option. First, the composition of the Ad-Hoc Committee ensured a majority opinion in favor of St. Boniface College. Second, the report by M. Bonneau, professor at the Faculty of Education, was not given serious consideration. Third, when Corriveau, one of the implementors, submitted a critical analysis of the Ad-Hoc committee's reports, the analysis was not well received. Finally, when the E.F.M. appeared divided on the question of site for the institute, no follow-up study was conducted. Thus, in most cases, dissention and disagreements appear to have been disregarded.

Even as conflicting opinions were disregarded the Secretariat was, however, seeking support from various groups and organizations. St. Boniface College viewed the institute as a means of increasing its offerings, hence support from its administrative council was unconditional. The University of Manitoba, through its Vice-President, had agreed to do nothing that would hinder the college's claim for the institute as long as it could retain responsibility for second language teacher training. The Vice-President, A. Duckworth, was implicitly bargaining to retain some responsibility in an area that the Faculty of Education was slowly developing. Further, organizations such as the French Trustees' Association of Manitoba and the French Parent - Teacher Association, while dormant as associations, were revived for the occasion to lend support to the college option. The S.F.M. and its Education Directorate were



also supportive of this option. Finally, Father Cormier's consultation and report on the issue served to nail the decision in favor of St. Boniface College.

This process of seeking support in favor of a specific position can but be described as a "massing of assent" or getting as many organizations (or individuals) as possible to come out in favor of an option which supports the implementor's position (Bardach, 1977; Bunker, 1973). The process also reflects what Dror (1968:169) calls coalition building:

gaining the necessary support for a policy involves building a coalition of power centers that together control most of the power that is concerned with the problem the policy is about.

Dror (1968:189) notes also that, "the need to form a coalition usually excludes some alternatives." Dror's comments certainly reflects in large measure what happened in Manitoba. A crucial factor in the implementation of this policy was the fact that while officials of the Secretariat were disposed favorably toward the College option they were less open to consider alternative options. As Anderson (1975) noted, making top level appointments may be used as a lever to influence the implementation process. Further, the relation of the interest group to the Secretariat was so close that, as Anderson (1975) remarks, in such situations the group "captured" the agency. Rourke (1969:1) alludes to this when he states:

Agencies provide channels of "access" through which segments of the public can advance or protect their interests in the executive branch in much the same way as they pursue their goals through other governmental institutions.





Thus, the Secretariat offered the French group in Manitoba a prime opportunity to advance their interests. Indeed, the Secretariat's personnel were not only sympathetic to the French but were representatives of the group.

There is however another element which presents an important dimension to the implementation process. The question of site was decided by Desjardins when the process began. The question then became one of ensuring that the decision be maintained by enlisting the support of what Clark (1965:233) calls a "confederative organizational alliance which converge and become somewhat a part of political influence." This the Secretariat did and in its negotiations with the Federal government it could declare that its support was wide ranging. The process is synonymous with what Bardach (1977) calls "fixing the game." In other words, the game was fixed in favor of the College option. As Bardach (1977:274) notes:

. . . the fixer attempts to rig the game to increase his own winning . . . winning here must be interpreted to mean policy outcomes in accord with the spirit of the original mandate . . .

In our case, the Secretariat officials became the "fixers" ensuring that what Desjardins had stipulated in his first letter to Valiquette, Rector of St. Boniface College, ". . . que le Collège de St-Boniface commence déjà à entrevoir le jour qu'il devienne une école normale . . .," be maintained to the end.

Another dimension in the implementation process from



a Manitoba perspective was the fact that federal acceptance of the project was crucial. It was crucial from a financial perspective because the federal government would be assuming responsibility for 75 percent of capital costs and 25 percent of operational costs. Manitoba's policy to create a French teacher training institute was a direct response to the federal government's policy to create one in Western Canada. There is ample evidence to suggest that for the officials of the Secretariat, St. Boniface College and the S.F.M., Western Canada meant Manitoba. To these officials Manitoba was best suited since it had a law recognizing French as an official language of instruction in schools, an identifiable French community with a long established organization, a university milieu, a French radio and television station. The only problem was ensuring federal participation in the allocation of financial resources for the undertaking. Perhaps as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) have noted, the Manitoba officials were aware that until resources have been committed, implementation cannot take place and the desired outcome cannot be secured.

The federal government through the Secretary of State refused to submit to the pressures directed its way by the Secretariat. Indeed, the Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, was adamant that the Western Provinces ought to arrive at a decision concerning where the institute would be located. However, the negotiations broke down quickly because of lack of leadership. No one province seemed prepared to



take the initiative. No one seemed to know who was to convene whom, when and where. Eventually, the provinces agreed on a federally appointed arbitration committee to resolve the impasse. It took 18 months for the provinces to agree on this approach. This delay clearly indicates the federal government's desire not to be seen as interfering in an area of provincial jurisdiction. Further, Manitoba had a clear policy with regard to creating the institute while the provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan did not. As Simeon (1972) notes provinces are seldom agreed on their goals and hence are seldom able to articulate provincial positions. While delays seem to be counterproductive because interests may wane and social and political priorities may change, they appear to be characteristic of implementation. As Bardach (1977:180) remarks:

Implementation takes a long time, much longer than most of the program sponsors had hoped it would take and longer even than the law's hypothetical "reasonable man" might have expected. If there is one attribute of the implementation process that everyone would agree was symptomatic of "pathology", it would be delay.

Finally, after a two year delay, a solution was proposed by the Raynauld arbitration committee. Manitoba was to have an institute; Alberta was to be given assistance to set up a teacher training program at Collège St. Jean. However, it took another year before funds were appropriated from the federal government.

Resources in the form of committed individuals, access to political decision-makers, and financial assistance appear to be of critical importance to implementation.





Clearly, individuals supportive of the policy objective are more likely to act in a manner consistent with that objective. Thus, as we have seen the commitment of Secretariat officials was indeed consistent with the policy. This commitment can therefore be viewed as a resource which will affect the direction of the implementation process. Lack of commitment may well impede successful implementation; however, commitment in and of itself is not a sufficient condition to ensure implementation success. Having political resources and the willingness to use them appears to be a significant feature of the implementation process.

In the establishment of the institute political resources were available and were used effectively. Access to high government officials by the French group in Manitoba was secured when Desjardins was appointed Director of the Secretariat. Premier Schreyer was the minister responsible for the Secretariat and as such, Desjardins would consult frequently with the Premier. This direct link to the Premier also made possible direct contact with top politicians of the federal and provincial governments. This access to politicians was used extensively by Secretariat officials in their attempt to advance their cause with the federal government. Premier Schreyer would correspond directly with the Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier. In addition, three meetings were held between these two politicians. Further, the question of establishing the institute in Western Canada was the object of discussions between the Premiers of the Western Provinces.



Ministers of Education were also involved in such discussions along with top officials of their departments. In essence the issue was kept alive at this level by Desjardins' insistence that this was the level at which it ought to be resolved. Desjardins was adamantly opposed to having the question decided at the level of the Western French associations. The Secretariat possessed sufficient power to direct the negotiations at a level where a resolution would be expedited and where such decisions could be taken. In other words, the French associations were too dependent upon their respective governments to make decisions which would have been binding. Decisions by the French associations would have had to gain government approval. The problem would have remained. Desjardins thus called a meeting at Premier Schreyer's office (December 17, 1971). The officials of the Secretariat and Monnin proposed a federal arbitration committee. This proposal was then submitted by Premier Schreyer to the three other Premiers at their Prairie Economic Council meeting. The arbitration procedures were agreed upon and later led to the establishment of a federally appointed arbitration committee. This action illustrates the degree of power which the Secretariat could utilize to overcome some political blockages. This was possible to the extent that Premier Schreyer was accessible and to the extent that he was sufficiently supportive of the policy to bring it before the other premiers. Thus, there is reason to accept Rourke's (1969:1) comment that, "the power of government agencies can



be looked upon as resting essentially on political support." It would appear from the above discussion that the Secretariat enjoyed this support. It also gives credence to Anderson's (1975:108) statement that the, "effectiveness of an agency, what it does or accomplishes, will be affected by the . . . amount of political support it has - politics affects how an agency exercises discretion and carries out the programs."

Financial resources are also critical since without them implementation costs in terms of programs, buildings, and general expenses cannot be met. Without financial resources implementation cannot take place. The financing of the Secretariat and its various research projects (these were financed in part by federal grants) did not appear to pose any difficulty. Indeed, the creation of Secretariat and the hiring of staff to conduct its activities were part of the Manitoba government's commitment to the development of its minority language policy. Perhaps the most critical aspects of costs were those related to converting the federal government's stated responsibility of covering the 75 percent of capital costs and 25 percent of operational costs to actual figures. This process was tedious and lengthy due in part to the fact that there were few concrete examples to serve as guide posts. Thus, the speculative nature of establishing firm and defensible figures made for extended discussions between federal and provincial officials. In the final analysis it can be concluded that financial resources were available and were allocated according to proposed estimates.





A final factor, given only cursory attention in the literature, but which nonetheless is critical to implementation, is the context in which the process takes place. By context we mean the social, political and economic conditions which serve as background on the implementation canvas. Such a background is critical because it is from this macro-setting that problems arise and find their way to government agendas. With the proper mixture of these conditions certain problems are accepted by governments and become priorities upon which future actions will be taken. There is, however, no substantial empirical evidence to suggest what the mixture might be; there are only indicators which suggest possible explanations.

For instance, economic analysts could tell us that the economy in general was bouyant. It has been suggested that such conditions may lead to greater optimism and perhaps a greater degree of tolerance for problems which previously were ignored. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980:549) note that "variations in socio-economic conditions affect perceptions of the relative importance of the problem addressed by the statute." The N.D.P. government's policies relative to the French language in Manitoba were not the object of public criticism either positive or negative. There was little media coverage of activities related to these policies. It appears rather that indifference was the rule. But this indifference nevertheless allowed the government to develop the policies and proceed with implementation. Premier Schreyer had also argued that his government was only



complementing the federal government's policies relative to the Official Languages Act. The economic resources inherent in the implementation process were to a great extent allocated by the federal government. The Manitoba government may have been viewed as acting in a supportive role rather than as an initiator.

From a political point of view, the N.D.P. government saw fit to pursue its language policies to the extent of creating an agency to administer these policies. Further, the government gave the responsibility of administering the agency to representatives of the French community. The gentlemen's agreement between Schreyer and Desjardins may have accounted for much of this but not all. There was a desire on the part of the N.D.P. to pursue such policies because it had been part of its election platform. More specifically, members of Schreyer's cabinet appeared to be supportive. Schreyer (Int. August 9, 1976) remarked, "Out of 16 [cabinet ministers], two were not sure . . . sceptical." This degree of support from politicians may indicate to some extent the prevailing social and political conditions. The behavior and statement of politicians are usually a good measure of what is possible within the social and political environment.

In brief therefore, it can be concluded that the prevailing conditions for implementation were favorable throughout the process. Indeed as Mazamnian and Sabatier (1980:549) note, "successful implementation is rendered more difficult by local variation in socio-economic conditions



and . . . in the seriousness of the problem being addressed." This did not appear to be the case in Manitoba during the implementation of the policy.

#### THE SHAPING OF THE POLICY DURING IMPLEMENTATION

The starting point of implementation is the policy which defines in broad terms the intention of policymakers. The policy to establish a French teacher training institute in Manitoba represents such a general statement of intent. No further guidelines or policy objectives were provided. As Bardach (1977:90) comments on the generality of policy mandates:

. . . the mandate will have provided certain program elements, usually a piece of bureaucracy and a modest budget without clearly prescribing or even envisioning what other elements might be conjoined with them and to what exact purpose.

This statement in effect illustrates quite precisely the case of establishing the institute. The responsibility for policy implementation was given to the Secretariat without specifying what elements were to be considered. But the process of transforming the general statement to operational terms is in part what implementation is about. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973:XV) state that, "implementation may be viewed as a process of interaction between the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them." In other words, the policy is reinterpreted into operational terms as it is implemented. Anderson (1975:98) tells us:

it must be kept in mind, . . . that the content of policy, . . . , may be substantially modified, ela-





borated, or even negated during the implementation process.

In the case of establishing the institute implementation consisted in elaborating the elements which were viewed as important. To this end six major elements were given consideration and those were: (1) site (2) costs (3) clientel (4) staff (5) programs, and (6) affiliation. These six elements were transformed into program objectives and became the essential features which shaped the policy. In other words, these six elements gave precision and specificity to the policy.

It should be recalled that site was the only element given precision. Indeed, Desjardins had stipulated to the Rector of St. Boniface College that the institute should be located at the College. During the course of the implementation process a tremendous amount of time and effort was spent in gaining support for this option.

For the remaining five elements the situation was quite different. There were no precise directives attached to these elements; precision and specificity were obtained as the process developed. Costs for establishing the institute were very much linked to the potential clientel to be served. On the assumption that the institute would serve all of Western Canada a certain set of figures was put forward by S. Bateman, Chairman of the University Grants Commission. Further, on the assumption that the residential accommodations would be provided costs increased accordingly. But as we saw



these assumptions were dropped since College St. Jean of Edmonton developed training facilities and residential accommodations were though inappropriate. Finally, there was a clear sense in which much of the work done in preparing estimates amounted to predicting the most likely estimate. In this, speculation appears to have been the modus operandi.

Programs on the other hand were easier to establish. Because of the affiliation to the University of Manitoba, programs had to be comparable to the Faculty of Education. Thus, in most cases programs were the same with the exception that the language of instruction was to be French. In terms of affiliation, College officials did not wish the institute to be a "carbon copy" of the Faculty of Education. Despite this desire to create their "own" teaching institute, affiliation in many ways dictated what the programs ought to be. Further, there was to be a sharing of staff between the institute and the Faculty. How distinctive the institute could become from the Faculty is a moot point. While the desire was there to create a particular type of institute based on linguistic and cultural considerations, the fact remains that programming was controlled by the larger organization which was the Faculty of Education.

#### SUMMARY

In this chapter four categories were presented in an attempt to provide an explanation of the implementation process. The two first categories examined the nature of



the policy and an analysis was undertaken to determine the extent to which this may have had a bearing in structuring the implementation process. The third category discussed some of the critical factors which helped define the implementation process. Finally, the fourth category discussed the shaping of the policy. The major theme was that although no specific directives were presented with the policy statement, specific directives were developed and elaborated as the process evolved.





## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

This chapter summarizes the major elements of the implementation process and presents a number of conclusions related to policy implementations. In addition, a number of implications suggested by the study are identified and discussed.

#### SUMMARY

The purpose of this study was to analyze the policy implementation process as it related to the establishment of a French teacher training institute in Manitoba. The data sources included interviews with key actors involved in implementation and a search of the available documents. The analysis consisted of a description and an explanation of the process. Specifically, this case study addressed the following questions:

1. How was the policy shaped prior to and during the implementation process?
2. What resources were made available and what was the impact of these resources upon the implementation process?
3. What were the relevant characteristics of the agency which assumed responsibility for the implementation process?
4. What other organizations, associations, groups, and individuals were involved and what was their impact upon the implementation process?
5. How did the major contextual conditions (economic,



social, and political) influence the implementation process?

### The nature and shaping of the policy

The policy to create a French teacher training institute was defined as a decisional statement which left to administrators and others the task of defining the specific nature of the policy. As such, the policy implementation process required much personal commitment, much discretion, and a good measure of creativity on the part of implementors; in addition, it led to strong face-to-face group interactions.

The policy was defined as broad and non-incremental. It was broad in the sense that it involved a number of governments both provincial and federal. This involvement of governments provided insights into the negotiating process that goes on between provinces and between provincial and federal governments. Furthermore, the policy was defined as non-incremental because it reflected the Manitoba government's desire to develop services of a linguistic and cultural nature. Such a broad policy in this area had never been the object of previous governments in Manitoba.

Another element which aided in understanding the nature of the policy was that it was organizational: a new agency was created to deal with the implementation of the policy.

Finally, following Lowi's typology, the policy was said to be distributive in nature since it was aimed spe-



cifically at one group, the Francophones in Manitoba. In addition, the distributive nature of the policy suggests that it was not cast within a competitive framework. In other words, the French were not competing with other groups within the social and political environment.

The nature of the policy can thus be described as a decisional statement, broad and non-incremental, organizational and distributive. As such some degree of creativity was demanded on the part of implementors; the policy had no precedent to give a sense of direction for its implementation. The organizational feature suggests that it was a priority for the agency and its distributive feature suggests that competing interests were not in existence to hinder its implementation.

The shaping of the policy refers to giving detail and precision to the decision of creating an institute. To this end six important factors were identified: site, costs, clientele, programs, staff and affiliation. Site was seen to be a critical factor since it brought three provincial governments, the federal government and three French provincial associations in face-to-face negotiations. The intractability of this situation led to the establishment of a federally appointed arbitration committee for a resolution of the issue of site.

Clientele was also important. Initially, the objective pursued was that the pool of students to be considered would be from Western Canada. This was viewed as impractical





since the chosen province would not attract students from other provinces; consequently, student intake figures had to be adjusted in terms of provincial requirements.

The determination of costs proved difficult, and much of the discussion about costs was speculative in nature. However, final figures were arrived at and appeared to satisfy the requirements.

The institute could not operate independently because St. Boniface College was an affiliate of the University of Manitoba. Within this affiliation arrangement, the institute had to offer programs acceptable to and approved by the Faculty of Education. The administrators of St. Boniface College would have preferred a greater degree of discretion in determining programs. However, affiliation essentially defined that programs at the institute would be French equivalents of programs offered at the Faculty of Education.

In terms of staff, it turned out that three staff members from the Faculty of Education divided their workload between the institute and the Faculty. The link, therefore, with the Faculty of Education was indeed very close.

In conclusion, we saw how the policy was transformed from a general statement to more concrete terms as implementation evolved. Terms became clearer by redefining arrangements in light of circumstances. For example, the idea of a "Western Canadian" institute was viewed as impractical. Further, the notion of an institute for Franco-Manitobans had to be revised in terms of institutional affiliation.



Nature of resources and their impact

Three types of resources were identified: (1) financial resources, (2) human and material resources, and (3) political resources. Financial resources are no doubt critical to implementation; in this instance, however, they did not seem to pose serious problems. Both governments, federal and provincial, were committed to their respective policies of promulgating French language developments. Along with these policies there were financial allocations which made possible the funding of the implementation process. The critical question in this area was the determination of precise figures.

In terms of human and material resources the creation of an agency and the hiring of a highly committed personnel were identified. An important feature characterizing the personnel was that the staff was chosen from the target group -- Franco-Manitobans -- at which the policy was directed. This arrangement was most favorable for the target group since it could in many ways control the inputs and outputs of the agency.

Once financial resources are committed and human and material resources are in place, political resources become critical elements in bringing the process to fruition. In this case, implementors had easy access to top politicians who, through their power of office, exercised pressures to pursue their objectives. Thus,



Desjardins could rely on Premier Schreyer to communicate directly with Gerard Pelletier, Secretary of State. Also, Premier Schreyer could raise the issue directly with his provincial counterparts. The Minister of Education did the same. This access to top provincial and federal politicians and civil servants was seen as most advantageous in the establishment of the institute in Manitoba.

### The Agency and its Characteristics

The agency responsible for the implementation process was the Secretariat of Dominion - Provincial Cultural Relations. The Secretariat was a small organization with a small staff. This characteristic led it to rely upon and seek outside groups to aid in the implementation process. Thus, an ad-hoc committee was formed on the initiative of Desjardins. This committee established a rationale, based on linguistic cultural and historical reasons, for locating the institute at St. Boniface College. Other associations and organizations were approached with the view to gaining their support and building a coalition which would reflect wide acceptance of the project. A consultant was also hired and his report added further support to the direction of the implementation process.

The staff of the Secretariat, being small and having few directives to guide the direction of the implementation process, relied to a great extent upon creativity in order to move the process forward. In this the Secretariat was success-





ful largely because it utilized its resources to advantage. Furthermore, the Secretariat was not enmeshed in bureaucratic normalities and being "new" as an organization it could rely on many discretionary powers. It also involved its personnel in most aspects of the process. Finally, its staff was totally committed to the policy. All of those features (characteristics) contributed to bringing the process to fruition.

#### Involvement of individuals, groups, associations, and organizations

Because of the complex and multifaceted nature of the implementation process, a large number of people and organizations were involved. The involvement of the French associations created a coalition of support; dormant associations were asked to express formally their support for the College option. When total support was not forthcoming as in the case of the E.F.M., the dissenting voices went unheard. The University of Manitoba, on the other hand, sought support for the development of second language teacher training. On this the University, through its Vice-President, was trading for support. Thus, despite the beliefs of members of the Faculty of Education, second language teacher training could be developed and support for St. Boniface College could be offered.

With this support from various quarters, the Secretariat presented a united front and could argue more convincingly with politicians.



The result of inter-provincial negotiations and federal and provincial negotiations led to protracted discussions. It is in this arena that negotiations were most difficult and time consuming. The different provincial governments' policy positions with respect to the establishment were not congruent. Further, the commitment of these governments may not have been equal. This situation may have had the effect of causing certain governments to take time to study the ramifications of establishing such an institute and to develop a rationale for it.

The federal government, through the Secretary of State, would not unilaterally decide which province was to get the institute, and chose instead to wait until the provinces arrived at a decision. When this was not forthcoming, the Secretary of State established an arbitration committee to resolve the issue but only after he was requested to do so by the provinces.

The greatest impact upon the implementation process in Manitoba of these negotiations was the time delay and a prevailing sense of uncertainty in whether Manitoba would, in fact, be chosen.

### Contextual Conditions

It has been established that political, social and economic conditions must be favorable for a policy to be implemented. The correct mixture of these, however, may not be easily determined. Be that as it may, the economy



was bouyant; such a situation may bring about greater toleration from the electorate and allow politicians to explore other areas. This appears to have been the case in Manitoba. There were no reports of either support or interference from the general population in Manitoba or, indeed, from other ethnic groups.

Politically, conditions appear to have been favorable. In Canada as a whole the promulgation of French as an official language was beginning to expand. The recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism were gaining acceptance; passing of The Official Languages Act attests to this. Bilingualism in the federal civil service is yet another example. Provincially, the N.D.P. supported the federal government's language policy. Premier Schreyer indicated that his party's language policies in Manitoba would complement the federal position. Finally, Desjardins' support for Edward Schreyer gave the N.D.P. an absolute majority. This served to strengthen the Franco-phone group's position relative to the government. All of these factors, therefore, created an environment which proved favorable and advantageous for the implementation of the policy.

### CONCLUSIONS

Some general conclusions can be drawn from this investigation. These conclusions should be viewed as tentative and ought to be tested in other settings. The main conclusions are summarized below:





1. Implementation is a multifaceted and complex process. This is of fundamental importance in understanding the intricacies of policy implementation. There are a great number of issues which need to be considered simultaneously; Laswell's notion of the "black box" is indeed appropriate. The process therefore is not linear, but evolves from a center and moves in many directions.

In this case supporting coalition had to be formed. The general policy statement had to be given precision. Federal approval was required. An interprovincial consensus had to be achieved. French associations needed to be consulted. All of these needs and others had to be resolved. Further, committed individuals had to act as implementors and use the available resources in an effective manner. Political support had to be used effectively to exercise the needed pressure to push the process forward. To under-estimate or fail to recognize this complexity would be to jeopardize implementation.

2. Creating an agency or administrative unit which assumes responsibility for implementing a policy can facilitate the implementation process. Support for this conclusion is based on the notion that the creation of the Secretariat was to develop French language and culture in Manitoba. As such, therefore, it had no other major priorities. The creation of the agency reflected the government's commitment. The choice of personnel was also an indication of this commitment. Thus, Desjardins as spokesman of the French community, understood its desires and concerns. As a politician he had easy access



to the Premier. Using this strategic position he could link up the aspirations of the French with the existing political power.

Another feature of the agency was the fact that it was "new" and small. These characteristics allowed for more flexibility, greater discretion on the part of its personnel, little hierarchical structure and fewer bureaucratic formalities. The small size required its personnel to extend their involvement to most facets of the process. This feature further required the personnel to seek outside help in addressing the problem. The ad-hoc committee was such an outside source which helped define the direction of the process and aided in the elaboration of the policy. Finally, many interview respondents suggested that the Secretariat was created to circumvent the Department of Education; this attests to the fact that implementation was assured a greater chance of success. On this point, the results of this case study appears to support the literature.

3. Political resources are a critical factor in bringing about implementation success. Strategies and tactics developed to advance a cause or implement a policy are important. When these have the support of ruling politicians they take on added importance. Premier Schreyer used the power of his office at critical points in the implementation process with the Secretary of State and the Premiers of the other Western provinces. In a similar way, Desjardins used his position to push forward a policy which he considered



critical to the French of Manitoba. Without such direct and overt support implementation might not have achieved success.

4. Building a supportive coalition is viewed as important in ensuring that support for the policy will be sustained throughout the implementation process. Two factors were important if implementation was to be successful. First, the Secretariat had to ensure that there existed a consensus among the French population about the desirability of establishing such an institute. To do this it called upon the various associations to react to the proposal. Of significance was the fact that French educators were divided not only on the issue of site but in establishing such an institute; this division was not pursued but in fact underplayed. In Backeland's word there was a deliberate effort to present a united front. Second, the University of Manitoba's support was also important because establishing the institute meant that the Faculty of Education was relieved of the responsibility for this facet of teacher training. This support the Secretariat acquired by trading the responsibility for the training of teachers in second language (later defined as French immersion teacher training). With this wide support, or at least apparent support, the case for establishing the institute in Manitoba was given credence in the eyes of provincial and federal politicians. It may also have been helpful with respect to the arbitration committee. In the final analysis it helped secure the site of the institute in Manitoba.

Finally, two secondary conclusions, closely related to





the second conclusion above, which should be given attention are: (1) the hiring of a committed personnel, and (2) the allocation of financial resources. Both these conclusions serve to buttress the verbal and written intentions of policy-makers. In this report, the personnel hired by the Secretariat was shown to be highly favorable to the creation of the institute. Further, the allocation of funds was shown to be critical for pursuing the objectives of the policy.

### IMPLICATIONS

This study has important implications for administrators and for additional research. These can be stated as follows:

1. The study of policy implementation has important implications for administrators. This study has shown how administrators, utilizing the resources available, brought a policy to fruition. In particular, it would appear that a favorably disposed political power is critical to the implementation process especially when it can be called upon to help in moving the policy toward its objective. Additionally, the social context may play an important role to the extent that it must at least be non-interruptive. Finally, the process requires commitment and discretion on the part of administrators. Commitment facilitates the process by ensuring that the course followed is in keeping with the objective of the policy. Discretion permits administrators to use their expertise for creating the necessary conditions to attain the objective of the policy.



2. The establishment of a French teacher training institute in Manitoba was for the training of teachers of French as a language of instruction. With the increasing popularity of French immersion programs in the province, there is a need for teachers whose training would consist of teaching in French to a non-French clientele. What this will mean to St. Boniface College and the Faculty of Education is not clear. Which institution will assume the responsibility is also not clear. Further, the ramifications for graduate work in this area might well require the development of new courses and programs. To date St. Boniface College has been an undergraduate institution. It may wish to extend some programs at the graduate level. These questions might well serve as basis for future study in the development of French language services in the province.

3. Both Alberta and Manitoba have developed a capacity to train teachers in the French language. These programs in both provinces are expanding especially in French immersion. As these programs develop it might be of interest to determine their impact on the development of the second official language in Western Canada.

4. The study of policy implementation revealed how a policy to create a French teacher training institute in Manitoba was transformed into a reality. A study to compare what the institute is today to what it was when created in terms of goals, clientele, programs and so on, might provide insights as to how an organization evolves over time with changing social, political and economic conditions.



There are also some implications related to the analytical framework utilized and the fact that this is an ex-post facto case study which ought to be discussed.

(a) The analytic framework of description and explanation used for this study was developed for this particular case study. The Van Meter and Van Horn model while comprehensive was inadequate in some respects. The model does not pay sufficient attention to the nature of the policy to be implemented. As has been shown, the characteristics of the policy will have some important consequences for the implementation process. Further, and this may be due to the case investigated, the categories of the model generated redundant information. This was especially so when discussing the characteristics of the implementing agency and the disposition of implementors; for this reason the latter component was deleted. Finally, the categories of the model are not well developed. Taken together they provide a comprehensive picture of implementation; individually they lack definition and precision. They offer little in terms of analysis other than to suggest possible areas of research. In addition, the model disregards the shaping of a policy. There are no explicit statements in this regard. For policies which are stipulated in very explicit and concrete terms, the model might be helpful; for other policies, however, this is a deficiency.

One way to alleviate the inadequacies raised above was to include a section dealing with the nature of the policy and to look more closely at the shaping of the policy. In doing





so, the analytic framework led to a better analysis and provided information important to this analysis. The additions also aided in extending the comprehensiveness of the Van Meter and Van Horn model. It is more comprehensive but remains well within the concerns addressed by policy implementation.

(b) The case study method for research is no doubt an important research method. As Williams (1975) suggested it is especially so in a newly discovered area of research. This is the case for policy implementation where the conversion of policies to programs has proven to be a significant problem. However, ex-post facto case studies are not without problems.

In conducting this investigation two such problems had to be dealt with. The first problem has to do with access to individuals whose importance has been corroborated by a number of people. When these people refuse to participate, the research project is bound to suffer to some extent. For this investigation three such people were unavailable for interviews out of a total of seventeen. A second problem has to do with recall. The problem of recalling events, situations, and important factors affecting those events is one which must be dealt with. If primary source documentation is available the problem can be mitigated. On a number of occasions respondents had to be informed explicitly before progressing with the interview. The problem is one feature of this type of case study which must be given serious consideration.



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1967	March 30.	June 15.
1968	June 12. September 18 October 23, 30.	November 13. November 20.
1969	January 1. February 12. July 9.	September 17. October 15.

### Le Devoir

1967	March 30.
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### Winnipeg Free Press

1963	May 21.	
1967	December 6.	February 9.
1968	June 10. September 18.	October 26. November 13.
1969	February 10, 14. April 10. July 2, 9.	September 15. November 4. December 9, 10, 18.

### Winnipeg Tribune

1967	April 26. November 25.	December 5.
1968	February 5, 9. September 11, 17.	October 24, 26. December 18.

### Government Documents

Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

1968	<u>Book II - Education.</u> Ottawa: Queen's Printer.
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1962	<u>Debates.</u> Sessions 1962 - 1963. (3): 2723.
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APPENDIX A  
General Interview Guide





## GENERAL INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What objectives were you pursuing in the implementation of the policy?
2. How did you accomplish what you set out to do?
3. What kind of appointments did the government make for the task of implementing the policy?
4. (a) What was the nature and extent of involvement of consultants in the implementation process?  
(b) Who were the consultants? What specific purpose did they serve and what was the impact of the consultants?
5. What was the extent of federal/provincial involvement in the finding of the implementation process?
6. (a) Can you name other organizations (or groups) involved in the implementation process?  
(b) How did they become involved? At what point in time?  
(c) What was the extent of their involvement? What specific contribution(s) did they make?  
(d) What was the nature of the relationship among the various organizations?  
(e) What was the role of your organization in the implementation process?  
(f) Which organization played the key role throughout the implementation process?  
(g) What was the nature of this role?
7. (a) Describe the organizational structure of the Secre-



Secretariat of Dominion - Provincial Cultural Relations?

(b) How many staff members? What was the nature of their task?

(c) What were the strengths/limitations of the staff?

(d) What was the nature of the decision-making process?

Who made decisions?

(e) What was the nature of the political support?

(f) What was the nature of communication between the Secretariat and outside organizations?

(g) What were the formal/informal linkages between the Secretariat and the government?

(h) How was the Department of Education involved?

8. (a) What was the state of the economy in Manitoba during the period 1969-72?

(b) In what way did the economic conditions interfere or support the implementation process?

9. (a) What was the nature of public opinion to the policy as indicated by the news media, interest group reactions, etc.? Examples?

(b) What evidence do you have of the importance of the policy to Manitobans?

(c) What was the nature of the reaction of Francophones to the policy? Examples?

10. What was the impact of outside interest groups (other provincial governments, francophone organizations in the western provinces, on the Manitoba policy? Which of these groups exercised the greatest influence? What was



the nature of this influence?

11. What role did the federal government play in trying to resolve these contending interests?
12. (a) Who were the implementors of the policy?  
(b) How did the implementors understand the policy?  
(c) How consistent were the implementors in outlining the course to be pursued?  
(d) What evidence was there that the implementors demonstrated any bias with respect to the policy?  
(e) How did the implementors influence the direction of the implementation process?  
(f) How well did the implementors communicate the intent of the policy?





## APPENDIX B

Letter sent to aid in identification  
of principal actors and list of  
names identified in documents



236 Michener Park  
Edmonton, Alberta  
T6H 4M5

Cher monsieur,

Je suis dans la phase finale de mes études au doctorat en Administration Scolaire à l'Université de l'Alberta. Mon projet de recherche consiste à décrire et à analyser le processus de la mise en application de la politique du gouvernement Schreyer, à savoir l'établissement d'un Institut Pédagogique au Manitoba.

La recherche sera menée sur deux plans. En premier lieu, il s'agira d'analyser les documents disponibles et accessibles. En deuxième lieu, les personnes clefs qui ont influencé le processus seront interviewées.

Un sous-projet à la recherche est l'identification des personnes importantes ayant été impliquées au processus. J'ai donc dressé une liste non-exhaustive mettant à jour les représentants des principaux organismes concernés.

Je vous serais très reconnaissant si vous pourriez me prêter votre assistance pour identifier toutes les personnes ayant jouées un rôle très important à l'édification de cette politique. A ce sujet, il se pourrait que certaines personnalités, de par leur position, n'apparaissent pas dans les documents disponibles mais qui néanmoins sont des éléments fondamentaux à ma recherche. J'apprécierais grandement votre concours en vérifiant la liste annexée. Il va de soi que toutes additions ou éliminations de noms devront se faire d'après un critère d'objectivité.

Comptant sur votre collaboration, et vous remerciant à l'avance pour l'attention que vous porterez à ma requête, je vous prie d'agréer cher monsieur l'expression de mes sentiments distingués.



Léo A. LeTourneau

P.S. N'ajoutez pas les noms des personnes hors du Manitoba étant donné que l'analyse se fera d'après le point de vue manitobain.



# LISTE

M Edward Schreyer	gouvernement, Premier Ministre
M Laurent Desjardins	gouvernement, Assistant au Premier Ministre
M Saul Miller	gouvernement, Ministre de l'Education
M Gérald Backeland	gouvernement, Secrétariat
M Fernand Marion c.s.v.	gouvernement, Secrétariat
M Arthur Corriveau	gouvernement, Secrétariat
Stéphane Valiquette s.j.	Collège, Recteur
Ludger Guy s.j.	Collège, Doyen
M Alfred Monnin, juge	Collège, Président - Conseil des Aviseurs
M Maurice Gauthier	S.F.M., Président
M Louis Courcelles	E.F.M., Président
M Fernand Paquin	Commissaires d'école de langue française, Président
M Hubert Phillipot	Association des Parents et Maîtres, Président
M H.E. Duckworth	V.-P. Academic, University of Manitoba
Dr J.M. Brown	Faculty of Education, Dean
M Marcel Bonneau	Faculty of Education, Professor
M Jean Gisiger	Manitoba Teachers' Society
Dr Robert Roy	Winnipeg School Division No.1
M Scott Bateman	University Grants Commission
Clément Cormier o.m.i.	Conseiller





APPENDIX C

List of Interview Respondents



## LIST OF INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS

NAME	Position Held When Interviewed
Gerald Backeland	Executive Director - Administrative and Internal Services, Department of Economic Development, Government of Manitoba
Marcel Bonneau	Director Field Services, Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba
Dean J. Brown	Retired Dean of Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba
Laval Cloutier	Directeur du Collège Communautaire et l'Education des Adultes et des Programmes Spéciaux
Clément Cormier	Retired, Rector Université de Moncton, Moncton, Nouveau-Brunswick
Arthur Corriveau	Retired
Laurent Desjardins	M.L.A. St. Boniface
Origène Fillion	Doyen Arts et Science, Directeur de l'Institut Pédagogique, Collège de St-Boniface
Maurice Gauthier	Commissaire aux Langues Officielles, Région de l'Ouest
Jean Gisiger	Professional Development, Manitoba Teachers Society
Robert Hedley	Assistant-Dean, Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba
Fernand Marion	Professeur, Institut Pédagogique, Collège de St-Boniface
Alfred Monnin	Juge, Court de Conté St. Boniface



Fernand Paquin

Senior Livestock Economist,  
Department of Agriculture,  
Government of Manitoba

Hubert Philippot

Supervisor of Accounts  
Receivable, Manitoba Agri-  
cultural Credit Corporation





#### APPENDIX D

Letter of S. Valiquette, s.j. and  
First Report of Ad-Hoc Committee



LE RECTEUR  
COLLÈGE DE ST-BONIFACE  
ST-BONIFACE, MANITOBA

Le 21 octobre 1969.

L'honorable Laurent Desjardins,  
Assistant parlementaire du Premier  
Ministre du Manitoba.

Cher Monsieur,

Pour faire suite à votre lettre du 3 septembre dernier nous vous présentons le rapport ci-joint intitulé "Pour la création d'une école normale de langue française au Collège de Saint-Boniface, Manitoba".


Ce rapport constitue une déclaration de principe qui, d'un côté, s'inspire de la volonté clairement manifestée par la communauté franco-manitobaine, de l'autre, rencontre les recommandations de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme. Nous croyons savoir que votre gouvernement entend bien respecter ces deux expressions de vouloir-vivre culturel.

Nous demeurons à votre entière disposition pour poursuivre l'étude prérequise à la réalisation du projet que nous vous présentons.

Nous savons qu'en certains milieux même politiques ce projet a déjà soulevé et soulèvera des oppositions. Nous osons espérer que votre gouvernement fera preuve de fermeté et même d'audace afin de permettre à la raison de triompher du sentiment ou des préjugés. C'est ainsi, croyons-nous, qu'il servira mieux les intérêts de la province et du pays tout entier.

Veuillez agréer l'expression de nos respectueuses salutations.

Bien vôtre



Stéphane Valiquette, S.J.

Copie à M. le Juge Alfred Monnin,  
président du Conseil des Auteurs.



POUR LA CREATION D'UNE ECOLE NORMALE DE LANGUE FRANCAISE

AU COLLEGE DE SAINT-BONIFACE, MANITOBA

I - La nécessité d'une école normale de langue française

1 - L'Association d'Education des Canadiens Français du Manitoba, dans un mémoire de 1966, écrivait:

"De récentes enquêtes sociologiques et une enquête linguistique sur l'état du français au Manitoba permettent de constater deux choses: 1. le groupe franco-manitobain veut garder sa langue et sa culture française; 2. la qualité de la langue française au Manitoba diminue dangereusement."

.....

"L'Association représente le groupe français au Manitoba et demande en leur nom une école normale pour les Canadiens français."

2 - Cette volonté des Franco-Manitobains de rester fidèles à leur langue et à leur culture s'est affirmée très nettement par les "rallies" de juin et décembre 1968 qui couronnaient des consultations à l'échelle provinciale.

3 - Il y a un lien organique et vital entre langue, culture, et école, comme le rappelle le Livre II du Rapport de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme. Après avoir noté que "la langue est l'assise de la culture", le rapport ajoute que "le milieu est un facteur capital pour la conservation de la langue maternelle". D'où "si l'anglais prédomine dans le milieu environnant, le français devra prédominer dans l'enseignement." (Nos 800 et 801, pp. 303-304. Nous nous référerons dorénavant à ce Rapport par le signe B.B. II.)





- 4 - Les chefs franco-manitobains ont depuis longtemps compris ce lien organique entre langue, culture et école. D'où leurs démarches constantes pour obtenir un système scolaire qui respectât leurs traditions linguistiques et culturelles.
- Dans leur plus récente démarche, en date du 15 septembre 1969, le président de la Société Franco-Manitobaine, M. Maurice Gauthier, remettait à l'Honorable Edward Schreyer, Premier Ministre du Manitoba, un document qui réclamait des écoles de langue française mais qui rappelait l'urgence de la création d'une école normale de langue française pour préparer des maîtres pour ces écoles.
- 5 - Une école normale d'expression française peut seule constituer le milieu naturel requis pour préparer des maîtres destinés à des écoles d'expression française, comme le note judicieusement le Rapport B.B. II: "Plus encore que les autres écoles, les centres de formation des enseignants doivent constituer un milieu linguistique et culturel favorable. On les préparera de façon toute spéciale à l'enseignement de la langue maternelle et de l'autre langue officielle, mais en veillant également à ce que les futurs maîtres acquièrent le vocabulaire propre aux autres matières. Il est illogique de former dans un établissement où l'on parle la langue de la majorité des maîtres qui iront enseigner dans les écoles de la minorité linguistique."
- (No 446, pp. 179-180)
- 6 - Le Rapport du comité sur les écoles de langue française de l'Ontario, déposé en Chambre le 28 novembre 1968, affirme de même que le succès des écoles françaises dépendra de l'aptitude des enseignants à créer une atmosphère et un milieu culturel français d'où la nécessité de former ces maîtres dans des institutions de langue française. (p. 58)



## II - Une école normale: une branche du Collège de Saint-Boniface.

7 - Dans sa démarche du 15 septembre dernier, la Société Franco-Manitobaine réclamait de l'Honorable Premier Ministre une école normale et ajoutait:

"Cette école devrait être une branche du Collège de Saint-Boniface car il se trouve dans un milieu naturel français et de plus, cela permettrait au Collège de Saint-Boniface non seulement de continuer le rôle qu'il joue au Manitoba depuis sa fondation, mais également d'enrichir ce rôle et sauvegarder son avenir."

8 - L'idée de la Société Franco-Manitobaine de rattacher l'école normale de langue française au Collège de Saint-Boniface qui "se trouve dans un milieu culturel français" rejoint une préoccupation exprimée dans une recommandation du Comité sur les écoles de langue française de l'Ontario que nous citons plus haut:

"Nous recommandons de former les maîtres destinés aux écoles de langue française dans un milieu francophone."

Recommandation no 24, p. 78.

9 - C'est sans doute le même souci d'assurer aux futurs maîtres des écoles de langue française une formation en milieu culturel français qui a conduit les membres de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme à formuler



la recommandation suivante:

" Nous recommandons que les enseignants soient formés dans des établissements distincts, selon qu'ils se destinent aux écoles de la majorité ou à celles de la minorité de langue officielle. "

Recommandation 18, no 446, p. 180.

- 10 - Quand la Société Franco-Manitobaine souligne le rôle joué par le Collège de Saint-Boniface depuis sa fondation, elle rappelle que dès son origine, en 1818, sous Mgr Provencher, l'institution voulait servir les enfants de la colonie d'expression française. Incorporé en 1871 comme collège classique, le Collège de Saint-Boniface s'unissait à deux collèges de Winnipeg en 1877 pour fonder l'Université de Manitoba. Mais dans cette fondation le Collège conservait l'autonomie requise pour continuer à desservir la population francophone du Manitoba. Il est toujours affilié comme Collège à l'Université de Manitoba dont il peut être regardé comme la branche française de la Faculté des Arts et des Sciences, au niveau du premier cycle d'études universitaires.
- 11 - En ouvrant une école normale de langue française rattachée au Collège de Saint-Boniface, la Province de Manitoba se trouverait à exaucer un vœu pressant de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme. La Commission voit bien cette école normale dans l'orbite d'"un collège francophone au sein d'une université existante", ce qui est exactement le statut du Collège de Saint-Boniface. (No 478, p. 192).





12 - Du même coup, la Province de Manitoba se trouverait à donner suite à une autre recommandation de la Commission royale.

En effet, au Collège de Saint-Boniface, les maîtres qui se destinent aux écoles de la minorité francophone pourraient prolonger leurs cours en vue d'accroître leur maîtrise du français, puisque déjà le Collège offre des cours de langue et de littérature françaises conduisant à un baccalauréat avec concentration majeure en français.

(Recommandation 20, no 452; p. 182).

13 - Cette recommandation rejoint une constatation du Comité d'enquête sur la formation des maîtres, institué<sup>2</sup> par le gouvernement ontarien (1966) qui notait la nécessité d'une formation universitaire pour les maîtres "qui sont au service d'un groupe minoritaire, surtout si la communauté en cause offre des possibilités restreintes de développement culturel pour le groupe."

(Cité par le Comité des écoles de langue française de l'Ontario, p. 57).

14 - Pour le Collège de Saint-Boniface, développer une école normale est tout simplement donner suite à une pratique déjà établie en pleine collaboration avec l'Université de Manitoba et sa Faculté de pédagogie. En effet, à la demande expresse de l'Université, le Collège a créé des cours académiques qui permettent à ses étudiants de s'inscrire dans la deuxième année de la Faculté de pédagogie de l'Université pour y suivre des cours professionnels qui conduisent en fin d'année au diplôme d'enseignement élémentaire. A la demande de la même Université, le Collège a, durant deux étés, offert des cours professionnels de pédagogie en méthodologie du français.



De plus, les cours académiques du Collège conduisent à un baccalauréat ès Arts avec concentration majeure et mineure, décerné par l'Université de Manitoba. Muni de ce diplôme, les étudiants du Collège peuvent entrer à la Faculté de Pédagogie de l'Université en vue d'y obtenir un baccalauréat ou une maîtrise en Education.

15 - On peut dire qu'au moins le Sénat de l'Université de Manitoba avait permis au Collège de Saint-Boniface d'entretenir l'espoir de développer un jour une école normale en accueillant favorablement le "Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Role of St. Boniface College in Higher Education in Manitoba submitted to the Manitoba Council on Higher Learning" (14 août 1967). Dans ce rapport, il est expressément fait mention du désir du Collège d'en arriver à une entente avec l'Université pour offrir en français les cours professionnels de pédagogie. C'est d'ailleurs dans la même optique de collaboration avec la Faculté de pédagogie de l'Université que le même rapport recommande qu'un représentant qualifié du Collège de Saint-Boniface siège sur le Conseil de la dite Faculté.

16 - En somme, le Collège de Saint-Boniface par son école normale deviendrait la section française de la Faculté de pédagogie de l'Université de Manitoba, comme il l'est de fait pour la Faculté des Arts et des Sciences.

17 - Ajoutons qu'une dernière raison milite en faveur du choix du Collège de Saint-Boniface pour devenir le siège d'une école normale de langue française: il se trouve bien situé pour permettre un accès facile aux écoles requises pour l'enseignement pratique, soit en milieu urbain, soit en milieu rural



### III - Les étapes à parcourir pour réaliser le projet

- 18 - Il faut d'abord faire une étude de la population étudiante francophone du Manitoba et des autres provinces de l'Ouest canadien, afin d'établir des projections d'inscriptions possibles à une école normale de langue française, compte tenu évidemment des débouchés prévus pour ces nouveaux maîtres.
- 19 - A la lumière de cette étude, situer les locaux de cette nouvelle école normale dans la Ville de Saint-Boniface. Le nombre d'étudiants déterminera s'il sera possible d'installer l'école normale à l'intérieur des murs de l'actuel Collège de Saint-Boniface.
- 20 - Avec l'aide du Ministère de l'Education, en particulier des inspecteurs d'écoles, déceler les candidats aptes à prendre la direction de l'école normale ou à y donner des cours. La première année, les étudiants de l'école normale pourraient suivre leurs quatre cours académiques avec les autres étudiants du Collège de Saint-Boniface. A ces cours, il faudra "jouter deux demi-cours professionnels, l'un en psychologie de l'éducation, l'autre en méthodologie du français. L'année suivante, le Collège de Saint-Boniface devra pouvoir offrir au moins quatre cours professionnels.
- 21 - Le Ministère de l'Education devra prêter son concours pour établir le coût de la fondation et du fonctionnement de cette école normale et en assurer le financement. Il voudra sans doute se prévaloir des recommandations de B.B. II qui invitent le gouvernement fédéral à assumer 25% du coût d'instruction des maîtres et 75% des coûts d'immobilisation d'une école normale. (Recommandation 29, no 509, p. 203)





22- Une élaboration plus détaillée de ce projet d'école normale de langue française demandera des recherches qui devraient occuper une personne à plein temps, si l'on pense en termes de brève échéance. Nous formulons la recommandation que le Gouvernement du Manitoba applique un homme au projet ou accorde au Collège de Saint-Boniface un octroi lui permettant de s'assurer les services d'une personne compétente en la matière.

Texte préparé par le Père Stéphane Valiquette, S.J., recteur du Collège de Saint-Boniface, sous la direction et avec l'approbation des membres du Comité Ad Hoc dont les noms suivent :

Soeur Antoinette Bergeron, S.d.S. 210 rue Kenny Saint-Boniface, Man.	professeur à la Faculté de pédagogie de l'Université de Manitoba.
Abbé Laval Cloutier, 200 avenue de la Cathédrale Saint-Boniface, Man.	directeur du cours secondaire, Collège de Saint-Boniface,
M. Origène Fillion 60 rue Taché, Saint-Boniface, Man.	surintendant-adjoint de la Division Scolaire de S.-Boniface.
M. Antoine Gaborieau 405-415 rue St-Jean-Baptiste Saint-Boniface, Man.	professeur à la Faculté de pédagogie de l'Université de Manitoba.
M. Laurent Gagné 162 rue Monck Saint-Boniface, Man.	directeur de l'École du Précieux- Sang, à Norwood.
Soeur Edmée Labossière, S.N.J.M. 321 avenue de la Cathédrale Saint-Boniface, Man.	candidate au doctorat en pédagogie.
Père Arthur Lacerte, O.M.I. 89 Eastgate Winnipeg, Man.	supérieur provincial des Pères Oblats
Frère Fernand Marion, C.S.V. Case postale 160 Sainte-Anne, Man.	surintendant de la Division Scolaire de la Seine.
M. Céleste Muller 146 rue Masson Saint-Boniface, Man.	inspecteur d'écoles (retraité).



Père Stéphane Valiquette, S.J.  
200 avenue de la Cathédrale  
Saint-Boniface, Man.

recteur du Collège de Saint-Boniface

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Le Conseil des Aviseurs du Collège de Saint-Boniface, dont les noms suivent dans sa réunion du 14 octobre 1969 a approuvé le rapport du Comité Ad Hoc et l'endosse totalement.

Juge Alfred A. Monnin, président

S.E. Mgr Maurice Baudoux

Stéphane Valiquette, secrétaire

S.E. Mgr Antoine Hacault

M. Marcel Barnabé

M. Clément Benjamin

Dr Claude Bernier

M. Robert Bockstael

M. Arthur Corriveau

M. Roland Couture

Abbé Georges Damphousse

M. David Dandeneau

Dr F.P. Doyle

M. André Fréchette

M. Laurent Gagné

M. C.E. Huot

Père Arthur Lacerte, O.M.I.

Dr C. Lavoie

Frère Fernand Marion, C.S.V.

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Le rapport a été remis à l'honorable Laurent Desjardins, Assistant parlementaire du Premier Ministre du Manitoba, l'honorable Edward Schreyer, le vingt-deuxième jour du mois d'octobre, mil neuf cent soixante-neuf.

Le 19 octobre 1969.



APPENDIX E

Report by Scott Bateman,  
University Grants Commission  
Possible costs of Institute  
and Critique of Estimates  
by A. Corriveau





INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MEMORANDUM

DATE March 9, 1970

FROM B. Scott Bateman, Chairman,  
Universities Grants Commission

TO The Honourable Saul A.  
Miller, Minister of Youth  
and Education

SUBJECT Estimate of Costs French Teacher-training Institution for Western  
Canada

We have found it rather difficult to produce defensible figures on the estimated cost of establishing and operating a French language teacher-training institution in Manitoba. We believe it can be done only by making certain assumptions and then showing the basis on which these assumptions result in estimates of cost. If the assumptions are then changed, it is possible to modify the costs in accordance with the new assumptions. The assumptions we have made are the following:

1. that the annual intake of students will be 100;
2. that the course will be a three-year course, partly because this is the length of the most recently established teacher-training course in Manitoba (Brandon's Bachelor of Teaching course); and partly because a three-year teacher-training period is probably the shortest period which would satisfy the demands of all four western provinces;
3. that the enrolment pattern in the first four years would be as follows:

	<u>1970-71</u>	<u>1971-72</u>	<u>1972-73</u>	<u>1973-74</u>
1st year	100	100	100	100
2nd year		80	80	80
3rd year	—	—	<u>70</u>	<u>70</u>
	100	180	250	250



4. that the teacher-training program would become an integral part of the operation of St. Boniface College because it now offers a French program in Arts and Science, is located in Manitoba's largest French-speaking community, and is affiliated with the University of Manitoba and therefore confers University of Manitoba degrees and standing;
5. that there will be immediate cost for the expansion of library space apart from the space required for the normal academic activities of this program, and provision for this is included in the cost of the academic building;
6. that there will be no additional cost for such ancillary activities as student union, etc. at the present time, but that undoubtedly a need for such space will develop in the future;
7. that the operating cost per student will be about midway between that for Brandon University and that for St. Boniface College as projected for 1970-71 exclusive of the costs of self-supporting ancillary activities and mortgage payments. The probable figure for Brandon is about \$2,000 per student and for St. Boniface about \$1,600 per student, so a figure of \$1,800 per student has been taken as a projected operating cost for the teacher-training



program for 1970-71;

8. that a library will have to be accumulated over a relatively short period of time and that this might be accomplished by acquiring 20 volumes per student at an average cost of \$8.00 per volume during each of the years 1970-71 to 1973-74 inclusive. The rate of acquisition might taper off after that date;
9. that no costs will be incurred for land acquisition in connection with expansion of the College;
10. that the following buildings will be required:
  - (a) an academic building costing approximately \$1,100,000. Planning would begin in September 1970 but to accept an intake of 100 students at that time and carry through an increasing enrolment until September 1973 when the academic building would be completed would probably require 3 trailers plus whatever existing space could be utilized. The trailers are estimated at \$10,000 each;
  - (b) a residence for 90% of the enrolment, based on 80% of the enrolment coming from Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia and half of the remaining 20% being beyond commuting distance in Manitoba. Where residences are financed through C.M.H.C. the maximum C.M.H.C. loan is





90% of the cost up to a loan of \$7,000 per bed. This would provide a maximum total cost of \$7,777 per bed and the cost of a residence for 225 students would therefore be a maximum of \$1,750,000;

- (c) a food services area including dining facilities for all resident students for three meals a day and for non-resident students at noon, kitchen facilities to provide the meals, and areas for food storage. It is estimated that these areas in total would cost about \$200,000 equipped and furnished;

11. that the annual rate of escalation of all costs except capital will be 7% per year, exclusive of cost increases attributable to increasing enrolments; and that the escalation of building costs has been and will be 4.5% per year.
12. that the residence and food services areas will be self-supporting, i.e. that charges for board and room will cover all the costs of operation plus any mortgage payments which may result from the financing of residence or food service areas;
13. that tuition fees will be at the rate of about \$425.00 per student per year;
14. that summer programs will be self-supporting;



15. that bursaries will be the responsibility of individual provinces and that bursaries for Manitoba students will come from Education estimates and are therefore not included in any of the figures in this document.

### Operating Costs

The following costs are estimated on a basis of \$1,800 per student per year gross:

1970-71	100 x \$1,800	=	\$180,000
1971-72	180 x \$1,800 x 1.07	=	346,680
1972-73	250 x \$1,800 x (1.07) <sup>2</sup>	=	515,205
1973-74	250 x \$1,800 x (1.07) <sup>3</sup>	=	551,270

### Library Acquisitions

1970-71	20 books x 100 students x \$8.00	=	\$ 16,000
1971-72	20 books x 180 students x \$8.00 x 1.07	=	30,800
1972-73	20 books x 250 students x \$8.00 x (1.07) <sup>2</sup>	=	45,800
1973-74	20 books x 250 students x \$8.00 x (1.07) <sup>3</sup>	=	49,000

### Estimated Fee Income

1970-71	100 x \$425	=	\$ 42,500
1971-72	180 x \$425	=	76,500
1972-73	250 x \$425	=	106,250
1973-74	250 x \$425	=	106,250



Summary of Operating Costs

<u>Year</u>	<u>Operating Cost</u>	<u>Library Acquisitions</u>	<u>Total Costs</u>
(Figures Rounded)			
1970-71	\$180,000	\$16,000	\$196,000
1971-72	347,000	31,000	378,000
1972-73	515,000	46,000	561,000
1973-74	551,000	49,000	600,000

Net operating costs after post-secondary recoveries under current arrangements, and exclusive of any sharing arrangements with other western provinces: see Table I on the next page.

Capital Costs

The following figures assume that none of the cost of the residence and food services will be amortized by C.M.H.C. because:

- (a) C.M.H.C. money is now earmarked for 1970;
- (b) it is not very practical to plan on a federal 75% sharing on mortgage repayments over the next 30 to 50 years.

Therefore if the residence, the food services, the academic building, and miscellaneous capital costs are estimated on a cash basis, the cash flow would be:





(Rate of recovery estimated at 50% on 85% of total costs  
not including ancillary costs)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total Costs</u>	<u>Shareable Costs</u>	<u>Net Rate of Post-secondary Recovery</u>	<u>Amount of Recovery</u>	<u>Amount of Fee Income</u>	<u>Net Provincial Cost</u>
1970-71	\$196,000	\$166,000	42.5%	\$ 83,000	\$ 43,000	\$ 70,000
1971-72	378,000	321,300	42.5	160,650	77,000	140,350
1972-73	561,000	476,850	42.5	238,425	106,000	216,575
1973-74	600,000	510,000	42.5	255,000	106,000	239,000

Table I



<u>Year</u>	<u>Residence</u>	<u>Food Services</u>	<u>Academic Bldg.</u>	<u>Misc. Capital</u>	<u>Total</u>
1970-71	\$ 35,000	\$ 4,000	\$ 52,000*	\$ 75,000	\$ 166,000
1971-72	560,000	64,000	352,000	25,000	1,001,000
1972-73	<u>1,155,000</u>	<u>132,000</u>	<u>726,000</u>	<u>25,000</u>	<u>2,038,000</u>
Total	<u>\$1,750,000</u>	<u>\$200,000</u>	<u>\$1,130,000</u>	<u>\$125,000</u>	<u>\$3,205,000</u>

\*Includes \$30,000 for temporary accommodation (three trailers - furnished). If the Federal Government pays 75% of capital costs, then recoveries and net costs on the above program would be as follows:

<u>Year</u>	<u>Capital Expenditure</u>	<u>Recovery</u>	<u>Net Provincial Cost</u>
1970-71	\$ 166,000	\$ 105,750*	\$ 60,250
1971-72	1,001,000	750,750	250,250
1972-73	<u>2,038,000</u>	<u>1,528,500</u>	<u>509,500</u>
Total	<u>\$3,205,000</u>	<u>\$2,385,000</u>	<u>\$820,000</u>

\*no recovery estimated for \$25,000 functional planning in miscellaneous capital.

#### Further Comments.

1. Every undergraduate teacher-training program must include a practical element requiring students to observe first-rate teaching in classrooms of a suitable type, and then to practise teaching themselves in the same or similar classrooms. This part of the work is known as the practicum. One of the problems of operating a French language



teacher-training institution in Manitoba would probably be the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of classrooms where teaching in the French language was done at a high level of quality and within a reasonable distance of the College. This problem would be accentuated to the extent that enrolment in teacher-training was a reflection of the needs of the four western provinces but practise facilities were proportional only to the facilities of one province. The same difficulty would undoubtedly exist if the western institution were established in any other western province.

2. One other province - Alberta - has already indicated an interest in having one of its institutions established as the western French language teacher-training institution. It would probably not give way to Manitoba's wishes to be the centre unless Manitoba could assure an Alberta level of accommodation and instruction. For this reason we have estimated the capital cost of a residence at the figure which represents the maximum C.M.H.C. contribution plus a provincial contribution on the same quality of accommodation. The capital cost of the academic building has been calculated by taking  $\frac{5}{6}$  of the cost of the Brandon Education Building (for 250 students instead of 300), and updating the figure for increased building costs since it was constructed.





3. No calculation has been made for a recovery on either operating or capital costs from other provinces, on the grounds that Manitoba has rejected past requests from other provinces to share in some of their capital projects which would provide an interprovincial service. Unless the three Prairie Provinces or the four western provinces can evolve and agree upon a fair formula for sharing both capital and operating costs in each case where one province provides a service for all, then there will probably be little chance of evolving a completely satisfactory arrangement for the rationalization of university services in the West.



CRITIQUE OF ESTIMATE OF COSTS re  
FRENCH TEACHER TRAINING INSTITUTION

Your memo dated April 23 last, has just come to hand. I am taking it for granted that the request it contains for remarks on the costs of French Teacher-training Institution really makes reference to a previous suggestion from you to the effect that comments be made on the submission prepared by B. Scott Bateman in this regard.

- I. In my view the following assumptions advanced by Mr. Bateman are somewhat questionable:
1. That the intake of students be 100, etc., (a figure of 30 the first year, increasing possibly to 80 the following year, would be much more realistic).
  2. That the course will be a three year course, etc. (A two-year program is the best that can be offered at this juncture).
  3. That the teacher-training program would become an integral part of St. Boniface College, etc. (This is of course the key question which has yet to be answered).
  4. That there will be no additional cost for such ancillary activities as student union at the



present time, etc. (The need for such activities is psychologically important at the very outset in order to promote a feeling of belonging, of togetherness).

5. That ... while awaiting the completion of an academic building by September 1973, students be housed in trailers. (Rented space in the College itself would be much more suitable and probably no more expensive during the interim.)
6. That there should be residential accomodation for some 90% of the enrolment. (This does not seem like sound speculation.)
7. That bursaries be not included because they will come from Education estimates. (There is danger of becoming lost in the crowd if this system is adopted. Special incentive bursaries clearly earmarked for this particular institution ought to be included in the estimates.)
8. That summer programs will be self-supporting. (Summer programs of the in-service variety are never self-supporting.)
9. That the capital cost be \$1,750.00. (This strikes me as too high. Furthermore, I am not convinced that residential facilities should be provided.)





II. It is my opinion that Mr. Bateman's report fails either to include or identify sufficiently two very important items, namely, the kind of "teaching hardware" so much as integral part of modern teacher training institution, and the matter of staff.

Much as it is of prime importance to provide for a suitable library, the need for "Hardware" is almost as equally important. It is essential to include such equipment as a language laboratory, science laboratory, closed circuit TV and simulation facilities, projections and other electronic devices, including materials required for Art, Music and kindergarten work.

It must be assumed that the operating cost quoted by Mr. Bateman includes salaries for the staff. Since this is an item of major expense it ought to be given a special mention in the estimates.

The following are some of the changes I would like to suggest in the estimate:

1) Fee Income

1970-71 - 30 x \$425	\$ 12,750.
1971-72 - 80 x \$425	34,000.
1972-73 - 100 x \$425	<u>42,500.</u>
	\$ 89,250.



2) Operating costs (excluding staff)

1970-71 - 30 x \$800	\$ 24,000.
1971-72 - 80 x 900	72,000.
1972-73 - 100 x 100	<u>100,000.</u>
	\$196,000.

3) Salaries

1970-71 -

A principal and 3 professors

\$ 50,000.

A bursar and one typist

11,000.

A caretaker

3,000.

Total \$ 64,000.

1971-72 -

A principal and 3 professors \$ 60,000.

1 busar, 1 secretary, 1 typist 16,000.

2 caretakers 7,000.

\$83,000.

1972-73 -

A principal and 5 professors \$ 75,000.

1 bursar, 1 secretary, 2 typists 16,800.

2 caretakers 7,500.

\$ 99,300.



4) Library & Equipment

1970-71 - 30 x \$900	\$ 27,000.
1971-72 x 80 x 400	32,000.
1972-73 x 100 x 300	<u>30,000.</u>
	\$ 89,000.

5) Capital cost\*

1970-71	\$ 45,000.
1971-72	200,000.
1972-73	<u>300,000.</u>
	\$545,000.

\*This includes \$15,000 for the rental of 2 classrooms for 1 year in the College.

6) Bursaries

1970-71 - 30 x \$250	\$ 7,500.
1971-72 - 80 x 200	16,000.
1972-73 - 100 x 100	<u>10,000.</u>
	\$ 33,500.

7) In-service & practice teaching

1970-71	\$ 10,000.
1971-72	8,000.
1972-73	<u>5,000.</u>
	\$ 23,000.





SUMMARY

	<u>1970-71</u>	<u>1971-72</u>	<u>1972-73</u>
Operating costs	\$ 24,000	72,000	100,000
Salaries	64,000	83,000	99,300
Library & Equipment	27,000	32,000	30,000
Capital costs	45,000	200,000	300,000
Bursaries	7,500	16,000	10,000
In-services & practice	<u>10,000</u>	<u>8,000</u>	<u>5,000</u>
 TOTALS	 \$177,500	 411,000	 544,300
Less fee income	<u>12,750</u>	<u>34,000</u>	<u>42,500</u>
	\$164,750	377,000	501,800
 TOTAL for three years		\$ 164,750	
		377,000	
		<u>501,800</u>	
		\$1043,550	

Mr. Bateman has both considerable experience and a great deal of knowledge in determining budgets of this kind. Nevertheless, I do believe that he has over-estimated the probable enrolment and the cost of the building. I am personally more interested in a less expensive building but one that would be functional, providing the type of space and facili-



ties required for effective work, research, study and recreation. I am also interested in making available the best and most modern equipment possible.

---

Arthur Corriveau.



#### APPENDIX F

Lettre de G. Pelletier au  
Premier Ministre M. Schreyer  
Accord et modalités de la  
participation financière  
du gouvernement fédérale






The Secretary of State



Le Secrétaire d'Etat



Canada

OTTAWA K1A 0M5

January 31, 1972

Dear Premier Schreyer:



I am writing to you concerning the proposal to establish a French language teacher training institution at St. Boniface, Manitoba.

As I mentioned during our meeting in Winnipeg in December, I hoped that I would be in a position at this time to respond to the request submitted on behalf of your Government by the Honourable Saul A. Miller.

This question has been examined in the light of the estimates provided by your officials and of the funds allocated for the period ending March 1974 for the programme of cooperation for bilingualism in education. Consideration has also been given to the results of discussions held with your officials and with other interested federal departments.

I am now in a position, subject to your agreement, to recommend to my Cabinet colleagues the arrangements outlined in the annex to this letter relating to the establishment and operation of a French language teacher training institution over the next two fiscal years. While the exact amount of the federal contribution will naturally depend upon enrolment and operating cost figures, present estimates would place it at \$1,200,000.

The Honourable Edward Schreyer  
Prime Minister of Manitoba  
Legislative Building  
Winnipeg, Manitoba






I have asked my officials to contact your Associate Deputy Minister of Education, Mr. G. M. Davies, to provide such additional information as may be required, and to arrange, in due course, for a simultaneous public announcement.

In closing, may I indicate how sincerely I appreciate your cooperation in seeking, through this project and many others, to improve the educational opportunities available in your province to citizens of both official languages.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Gérard Pelletier". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "G" and a distinct "P" at the end.

Gérard Pelletier



Federal Contribution for the Establishment  
of a French-Language Training Institution  
at St. Boniface

---

N.B. These arrangements would be valid over the fiscal years 1972-73 and 1973-74.

Capital Costs

A. Academic Buildings:

Reimbursement at the rate of 75% of capital costs incurred, the ceiling of the federal contribution being \$1,000,000.

B. Cafeteria and Residence:

A federal contribution additional to the normal mortgage facilities offered by the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation for these types of buildings is not contemplated under this arrangement.

Operating Costs

Reimbursement at the rate of 25% of the operating expenditures of the institution. To take into account the possibility that the operating expenditures of this institution might exceed those of similar anglophone institutions in Manitoba, provision would be made for this reimbursement formula to apply to actual operating costs, up to a maximum of 25% more than those of similar anglophone institutions. The institution will of course be eligible for grants under the measure announced on January 20, 1972, concerning assistance for minority-language education at the university level in the amount of 10% of its provincial





operating grant. The remaining portion of the operating costs would also be subject to the sharing provisions of Part II of the Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements Act, 1967.

#### Library Acquisitions

- A. Purchase of books. A \$25,000 reimbursement for the purchase of a basic collection of books in the French language.
- B. Other costs associated with library acquisitions (e.g. ordering, cataloguing and shelving). These costs would be included in operating expenditures, and thus be subject to the 25% federal share mentioned under the section "operating costs".

#### Understandings

A contract would be signed between the Secretary of State and the Manitoba Universities Grants Commission and would include the usual provisions in such contracts. It would also include the following undertakings on the part of the UGC:

- a) that it agree to make arrangements for the institution to accept candidates from the other Western Provinces and that such candidates not be required to pay tuition or other fees in excess of those paid by students from Manitoba;



- b) that it agree to negotiate satisfactory arrangements with the other Western Provinces concerning admission standards, equivalent certification and other such matters affecting students from those provinces wishing to study at the institution.

Ottawa, January 31, 1972.



APPENDIX G

Final Report of Ad-Hoc Committee





M E M O I R E

du

COMITE AD HOC

sur

L'OPPORTUNITE DE CONFIER AU COLLEGE DE SAINT-BONIFACE

LA FORMATION PEDAGOGIQUE DE MAITRES FRANCO-MANITOBAINS

présenté

au

SECRETARIAT DES RELATIONS FEDERALES-PROVINCIALES-CULTURELLES

du

MANITOBA

Le deuxième jour de mars 1970.



## Table des matières

Note liminaire	299
<u>I - Ce que présuppose le mémoire</u>	
1- Amendement de la loi scolaire du Manitoba	300
2- Réseau d'éccles franco-manitobaines	300
3- Le besoin de maîtres francophones au Manitoba	302
4- Agents de culture française au Manitoba	303
<u>II - Buts et objectifs de cette formation pédagogique</u>	306
<u>III - Etapes à parcourir</u>	
1- Situer le lieu de cette formation pédagogique	307
2- Désigner l'institution qui offrira la formation pédagogique	311
3- Etablir les programmes de formation pédagogique	312
4- Etablir le coût de l'entreprise totale	313
5- Une ébauche de cheminement critique	314
6- Recrutement des étudiants	315
7- Cours en administration scolaire	315
<u>IV - Commentaires</u>	
1- Le vouloir-vivre-français des Franco-Manitobains	317
2- La peur d'être trop français au Manitoba	318
3- Qui doit prendre la décision et comment ?	319
4- Les imprévus de la politique	320
5- Concurrence ou collaboration avec la Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba ?	321
6- Equivalence de diplômes	322
<u>V - Recommandations</u>	324



Le 25 septembre 1969 douze personnes venant de milieux ou d'institutions aussi variés que la Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba, le Ministère de l'Education du Manitoba, le District scolaire de Saint-Boniface, la Société Franco-Manitobaine, le Collège de Saint-Boniface, les Enseignants Franco-Manitobains, les Ecoles privées et les Inspecteurs franco-manitobains acceptaient de se constituer en comité ad hoc pour répondre aux trois questions suivantes:

- 1- le temps est-il venu d'avoir une école normale française au Manitoba?
- 2- si oui, où devrait-elle se situer?
- 3- si oui, comment faudrait-il en préparer la création?

Un membre du comité original n'a pu participer à la réflexion du comité, deux autres personnes se sont jointes au comité à un stade fort avancé de sa recherche. Si bien qu'il ne faudrait voir dans les pages qui suivent que les opinions de ceux qui, avec ou sans réserve, ont accepté de signer le présent mémoire.

Nous voulons remercier tous ceux qui ont participé au travail du comité, consacrant de nombreuses heures à l'étude d'un projet de grande conséquence pour la communauté franco-manitobaine. Nous osons espérer que leur réflexion a fait avancer le problème.

Le secrétaire du comité ad hoc

Le 2 mars 1970.





## I - Ce que présuppose le Mémoire

Avant qu'on nous reproche de mettre la charrue devant les boeufs en nous prononçant sur la formation pédagogique de maîtres destinés à enseigner dans des écoles qui n'existent pas encore, nous croyons opportun d'aligner l'ensemble des facteurs ou des présupposés dont le comité a tenu compte dans sa réflexion.

### 1- Amendement de la loi scolaire du Manitoba

Le gouvernement fédéral, faisant écho au Rapport de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme, presse les provinces canadiennes d'assurer l'épanouissement linguistique et culturel de leur minorité de langue officielle et leur offre de l'assistance financière à cette fin.

Le Nouveau Parti Démocratique, porté au pouvoir en juin 1969, semble décidé à favoriser le plein épanouissement linguistique et culturel de la minorité francophone du Manitoba. A cette fin il a créé le Secrétariat des relations fédérales-provinciales-culturelles. Le 6 décembre 1969, au congrès-rallye de la Société Franco-Manitobaine, l'honorable Edward Schreyer, Premier Ministre du Manitoba, annonçait la ferme intention de son gouvernement d'amender la loi scolaire de la province, dès la prochaine session, en vue de permettre "l'enseignement en français de la maternelle à la douzième année, dépassant de beaucoup le 50% déjà prévu dès les années primaires".

### 2- Réseau d'écoles franco-manitobaines

Les Franco-Manitobains ont depuis toujours exprimé leur volonté de rester fidèles à leur langue et à leur culture. Ils l'ont fait en paroles par les nombreux mémoires présentés à diverses commissions gouvernementales, par les retentissants "rallyes" de juin et décembre



1968 qui couronnaient des consultations à l'échelle provinciale. Ils l'ont fait en actes en créant et en développant, à leurs propres frais, des programmes de français dans tout un réseau d'écoles primaires et même secondaires, avec inspection, concours de français, bourses d'études aux professeurs, etc. Ils l'ont fait en actes en se groupant dans des associations francophones comme l'Association d'Education canadienne-française du Manitoba devenue la Société Franco-Manitobaine, les Enseignants Franco-Manitobains, l'Association des Commissaires d'écoles de langue française du Manitoba, les Associations de Parents et Instituteurs, les Caisses Populaires, l'Union des Cultivateurs Catholiques, etc.

Conscients du lien organique et vital qui existe entre langue, culture et école, les Franco-Manitobains n'ont jamais cessé de réclamer un système scolaire qui satisfasse leurs légitimes aspirations culturelles. Le 15 septembre 1969, la Société Franco-Manitobaine s'est faite leur porte-parole auprès du nouveau gouvernement de la province, réclamant de ce dernier, non comme une faveur mais en justice, la création d'écoles franco-manitobaines. Nous savons que cette demande a été favorablement accueillie et l'honorable Premier Ministre l'a publiquement confirmée dans son discours du 6 décembre 1969.

Pour préparer la mise en place de ce réseau d'écoles franco-manitobaines on est à étudier un projet d'école-pilote, depuis la maternelle jusqu'à la douzième année, où seraient mis à l'essai des programmes et des manuels scolaires nouveaux. Il semble bien que le gouvernement fédéral collaborerait financièrement à un tel projet-pilote. On peut même légitimement espérer pour un avenir prochain la réalisation de ce projet.



### 3- Le besoin de maîtres francophones au Manitoba

Parler d'un réseau d'écoles franco-manitobaines, c'est immédiatement faire surgir le besoin de maîtres dûment préparés pour ces écoles. Aussi, dans sa démarche du 15 septembre dernier auprès du Premier Ministre du Manitoba, la Société Franco-Manitobaine disait:

"Il est évident que l'école normale est une priorité si l'on veut apporter quelque changement que ce soit dans le système d'éducation actuel.

S'il n'y a pas de formation pédagogique de professeurs, aucun programme en français ne pourra être mis en application."

L'honorable Edward Schreyer l'a bien compris et dans son discours du 6 décembre dernier annonçait:

"Un tel programme exigera évidemment un grand nombre de professeurs qualifiés et dont la formation académique tiendra compte des aspirations et de l'évolution linguistique. Pour cela nous espérons établir dès l'an prochain un collège pédagogique pour la formation de ces professeurs."

Par sa promesse le gouvernement du Manitoba exauçait un vœu de la Commission Laurendeau - Dunton:

"Il est certainement nécessaire d'établir un programme spécial de formation du personnel enseignant pour les écoles de la minorité de langue officielle. Un collège francophone affilié à une université provinciale serait tout indiqué pour accueillir un établissement nouveau au service d'écoles minoritaires des quatre provinces de l'Ouest." (B.B. II, n° 449, p. 180-1)

Comme nous savons maintenant que le gouvernement fédéral est résolu à mettre en pratique les recommandations de l'Enquête royale sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme et à prendre sa large part des frais qu'entraîneront ces recommandations, nous pouvons conclure que le Manitoba devrait s'engager bientôt dans la formation pédagogique de maîtres francophones.





#### 4- Agents de culture française au Manitoba

L'existence au Manitoba d'un ensemble d'institutions et d'organisations qui sont agents de culture française et leur concentration dans la Ville de Saint-Boniface sont deux facteurs à considérer dans la recherche que nous faisons.

##### a- Le Collège de Saint-Boniface

Incorporé civilement en 1871, le Collège a toujours été un foyer de culture française intégrale, refusant d'adulterer son cours pour se mettre à la mode du temps. Son cours universitaire offrira en septembre prochain un éventail de 35 cours permettant des concentrations en une dizaine de disciplines intellectuelles. Son cours secondaire reçoit dorénavant garçons et filles et offre les programmes de la section pré-universitaire du Manitoba mais entièrement en français, sauf pour les cours d'anglais. Par ses cours du soir et ses cours d'été il rejoint un nombre sans cesse croissant d'adultes. Par ses anciens élèves il rayonne dans toutes les sphères de la vie manitobaine.

##### b- La Liberté et le Patriote

Fondé en 1913, cet hebdomadaire dispense de l'information et en même temps exprime les aspirations et les revendications de la communauté francophone de l'Ouest canadien. Cette dernière vient tout justement d'assumer la responsabilité du journal avec son fardeau financier qu'ont jusqu'ici héroïquement portés les Oblats de Marie-Immaculée.



c- L'Association d'Education canadienne-française du Manitoba

Fondée en 1916, cette Association a été comme la conscience de la population franco-manitobaine, l'exhortant sans cesse à la fidélité à son héritage culturel. C'est elle qui a veillé à maintenir du français dans les écoles envers et contre toutes les lois.

d- Le Cercle Molière

Cercle dramatique fondé en 1925 il a développé des talents qui ont connu des succès à l'échelle nationale en même temps qu'il maintenait la présence d'un théâtre d'expression française dans les prairies canadiennes.

e- Le poste de radio C K S B

En 1944 les Franco-Manitobains se dotaient eux-mêmes d'un poste de radio de langue française, l'unique de toute la province. Affilié à Radio-Canada le poste relie la province à la francophonie canadienne et internationale.

f- La télévision française C B W F T

Cette station, située à Winnipeg, présente surtout des programmes en différé mais parfois aussi des programmes directs de la chaîne française de Radio-Canada. Elle fonctionne depuis 1954.

g- Le Centre Culturel de Saint-Boniface

Sous l'oeil paternel de la Société Franco-Manitobaine dont il abrite d'ailleurs les bureaux, le Centre Culturel agrandit sans cesse son rayonnement dans la région de Saint-Boniface et semble promis à un bel avenir. Grâce à la générosité des gouvernements fédéral et provincial



il s'installera dans un avenir pas trop lointain dans un édifice neuf d'un million. Le Centre a une populaire "boîte à chansons", Les Cent-Nons, qui d'ailleurs trouve déjà des imitateurs en d'autres centres francophones du Manitoba.

## 5- Conclusion de la première partie

Notre comité est conscient que le sens de certains présupposés ou de certains facteurs peut être ambigu. Cependant, pour raison de clarté et pour ne pas retarder trop l'approche du coeur de notre recherche, nous avons renvoyé l'analyse de certaines de ces ambiguïtés à notre quatrième partie.

Pour l'instant, nous résumons notre pensée ainsi:

- a- Les Franco-Manitobains nous paraissent avoir opté pour la fidélité à leur héritage culturel français.
- b- Le gouvernement provincial respecte cette option et, avec l'aide du gouvernement fédéral, s'apprête à prendre les mesures et à créer les institutions qui favoriseront sa réalisation.
- c- Dans cette optique l'école franco-manitobaine nous paraît appelée à devenir le centre vital de l'épanouissement culturel des Franco-Manitobains.
- d- Pour jouer ce rôle primordial l'école doit pouvoir compter sur des maîtres préparés à épouser les besoins et les aspirations culturels des Franco-Manitobains.

Essayons maintenant de cerner ce que devrait être cette préparation des maîtres pour les écoles franco-manitobaines.





## II - Buts et objectifs de cette formation pédagogique

1- Schématiquement nous dirons que cette formation pédagogique doit former ou re-former (recycler) des enseignants de langue et de culture françaises:

- a- aptes à enseigner le français et non pas seulement le "French";
- b- aptes à enseigner en français les diverses matières du cours primaire;
- c- aptes à enseigner en français les matières spécialisées du cours secondaire;
- d- capables de favoriser à l'école une atmosphère et un milieu culturel français;
- e- susceptibles de comprendre et de partager les sentiments et les aspirations de la communauté francophone en matière d'enseignement;
- f- capables de transformer progressivement l'école en centre culturel français vivant et vigoureux;
- g- aptes à enseigner l'anglais comme langue seconde à la majorité des élèves sans pour autant priver les jeunes plus doués linguistiquement de la chance de pousser davantage leur connaissance de l'anglais.

Comme ce mémoire s'adresse à des personnes averties, nous ne croyons pas nécessaire de détailler davantage les objectifs énumérés ici.

2- Nous croyons utile d'ajouter qu'on devra se soucier de former des administrateurs scolaires:

- a- susceptibles de comprendre les besoins scolaires spécifiques de la communauté franco-manitobaine;
- b- habilités à instaurer et régir un réseau d'écoles qui répondent aux aspirations des Franco-Manitobains.



### III - Etapas à parcourir

Une fois tombés d'accord sur les objectifs à atteindre par cette formation pédagogique, reste à établir le cheminement critique pour y arriver. Voici les étapes entrevues par notre comité.

#### 1- Situer le lieu de cette formation pédagogique

Nous avons opté pour le Collège de Saint-Boniface pour les raisons suivantes:

- a- La Commission Laurendeau-Dunton recommande "que les enseignants soient formés dans des établissements distincts, selon qu'ils destinent aux écoles de la majorité ou à celles de la minorité de langue officielle". (B.B. II, n° 446)
- b- La même Commission ajoute: "Plus encore que les autres écoles, les centres de formation des enseignants doivent constituer un milieu linguistique et culturel favorable." Plus loin la Commission ajoute encore: "Il est illogique de former dans un établissement où l'on parle la langue de la majorité des maîtres qui iront enseigner dans les écoles de la minorité linguistique." (B.B. II, n° 446) Le Rapport sur les écoles de langue française de l'Ontario était arrivé à la même conclusion: "Nous recommandons de former les maîtres destinés aux écoles de langue française dans un milieu francophone." Ce sont ces considérations qui ont sans doute poussé la Société Franco-Manitobaine à dire au Premier Ministre du Manitoba le 15 septembre 1969: "Cette école (normale) devrait être une branche du Collège de Saint-Boniface car il se trouve dans un milieu naturel français..."
- c- La tendance actuelle au Canada et ailleurs est de confier la formation pédagogique des futurs maîtres à des collèges universitaires.



Cette intégration permet aux aspirants-maîtres de partager avec les autres étudiants les cours académiques et les activités et services parascolaires. Financièrement et psychologiquement cet arrangement nous paraît heureux. Cette intégration poussera un certain nombre de futurs maîtres à poursuivre leurs études académiques, ce qui ne peut qu'être bénéfique aux écoles et à la profession enseignante. Déjà, le Collège de Saint-Boniface compte parmi ses étudiants des aspirants-maîtres à qui il offre les cours académiques requis pour le programme pédagogique I-B et II-B et pour le programme Education I et Education II, grâce à une entente avec la Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba.

- d- "Il faut prendre des mesures pour remédier à cette situation précaire du français parmi les minorités francophones du Canada. En conséquence, nous recommandons que soient prolongés les cours de formation des maîtres qui se destinent aux écoles de la minorité francophone, pour leur permettre d'accroître leur maîtrise du français." (B.B. II, n° 452) Le Collège de Saint-Boniface s'est toujours donné comme objectif l'amélioration de la langue parlée et écrite de ses étudiants en leur offrant un solide cours de grammaire, de stylistique et de littérature françaises, en enseignant toutes ses matières en français, en maintenant au sein du Collège une atmosphère de culture française.
- e- La section universitaire du Collège de Saint-Boniface est en pleine expansion, élargissant rapidement son éventail de cours qui touchent maintenant à des domaines aussi variés que les littératures française et anglaise, l'histoire, la géographie, la philosophie, la psychologie, la sociologie, les sciences biologiques, chimiques et





physiques, les mathématiques, l'économie et la science politiques, la religion, l'anthropologie. Il faut savoir que, depuis deux ans, par la Commission des octrois universitaires, le cours universitaire du Collège est subventionné par le gouvernement manitobain sur le même pied que les Universités de Manitoba, de Winnipeg et de Brandon. Grâce à ces subventions le Collège peut désormais engager des professeurs dûment qualifiés et améliorer ses services aux étudiants.

- f- Déjà le Collège de Saint-Boniface peut mettre à la disposition de ses étudiants une bibliothèque de 28,800 volumes dont environ 70% sont français, un étalage de 250 revues dont environ 165 sont françaises. Il leur offre un gymnase spacieux pour l'enseignement et la pratique de la culture physique. Une salle académique avec scène favorise la culture de l'art dramatique et musical. Il possède l'équipement pour le cinéma et le cinémascope ainsi que les autres instruments audio-visuels requis pour l'enseignement. Il a même un poste de radio interne où se forment nos futurs annonceurs. Ses laboratoires sont équipés pour l'enseignement de la biologie, de la chimie et de la physique. Dans un avenir très prochain il devrait acquérir un laboratoire de langues et un atelier d'art et d'artisanat. Enfin le Collège possède déjà une intéressante discothèque où abondent la chansonnette et le poème français.
- g- Le Collège de Saint-Boniface nous paraît donc l'endroit le plus logique où situer la formation pédagogique de maîtres francophones. Le Collège se trouverait compléter un service qu'il a déjà commencé et pour lequel il nous semble préparé. C'est d'ailleurs ce que vient de reconnaître le vice-président académique de l'Université



de Manitoba, M. H. E. Duckworth, dans une lettre du 6 janvier 1970 à M. Laurent Desjardins, directeur du Secrétariat des relations fédérales-provinciales-culturelles:

"The University of Manitoba has followed with interest the suggestion that St. Boniface College might become the training institution mentioned in Recommendation 19 (il a cité plus haut B.B. II, n° 449) and we should be happy to assist in any way to further the strong claim which the College has."

Déjà en novembre 1964, l'Association des Commissaires de langue française du Manitoba, dans un mémoire au gouvernement du Manitoba, écrivait:

"This move (déménagement de l'Ecole Normale de Tuxedo au campus universitaire) may make it easier to recognize courses organized at the University-affiliated St. Boniface College in summer or in evening sessions and to accord substantial co-operation with regard to recognition for credit purposes and financial subsidy. It may even be possible to establish a bilingual branch of the teacher training institution at that college." (p. 7)

L'Association d'Education canadienne-française du Manitoba écrivait dans le même sens à l'honorable Roblin, Premier Ministre, le 22 juin 1967. Le Rapport de la Commission Laurendeau-Dunton fait état de ces demandes (B.B. II, n° 449) qui trouveront même des échos au Parlement du Manitoba. Le choix du Collège de Saint-Boniface comme siège de formation pédagogique s'inscrit donc dans un courant de pensée qui remonte au moins à six ans et qui est de notoriété publique. Ceci nous incline à penser que le gouvernement fédéral, qui connaît le Collège de Saint-Boniface comme centre traditionnel de culture française, hésiterait à coopérer avec un gouvernement provincial qui songerait à confier la formation de ses maîtres francophones à une autre institution, surtout, si contrairement à toutes les recommandations de la Commission Laurendeau-



Dunton, elle était située en milieu anglophone et ne constituait pas un milieu culturel naturel pour des étudiants francophones.

2- Désigner l'institution qui offrira la formation pédagogique

Actuellement c'est le Ministère de l'Education du Manitoba qui décerne les brevets d'enseignement aux candidats présentés par la Faculté d'Education d'une université. Cette dernière institution se porte garante des succès académiques et professionnels des candidats.

Il appartient donc au Ministère de l'Education, sans doute sur la recommandation du Secrétariat des relations fédérales-provinciales-culturelles, de désigner l'institution qui offrira la formation pédagogique préparant des maîtres pour les écoles franco-manitobaines.

Notre comité recommande au Ministère de l'Education de reconnaître la compétence du Collège de Saint-Boniface pour assumer ce nouveau service pédagogique.

Nous ne recommandons pas au Collège de Saint-Boniface de parquer les futurs maîtres dans une école normale ou un collège pédagogique autonome. Cette mesure irait contre la tendance actuelle d'intégrer les futurs maîtres dans un milieu universitaire, comme nous l'avons dit plus haut. Nous préférierions voir le Collège de Saint-Boniface développer une section ou un département de pédagogie dont le chef jouerait le rôle autrefois assumé par le principal d'une école normale.

Faudrait-il faire du département de pédagogie du Collège de Saint-Boniface la branche française de la "Faculty of Education" de l'Université de Manitoba? Nous n'inclinons pas en ce sens. D'abord ce serait mettre le Collège en tutelle et risquer de faire de son département de pédagogie un simple décalque de la "Faculty of Education". De plus, administrativement parlant, le département de pédagogie du Collège de Saint-Boniface sera financé conjointement par les gouver-







nements fédéral et provincial, ce qui n'est pas le cas de la "Faculty of Education". Ce qui n'empêchera pas le Collège d'entretenir les meilleures relations avec la "Faculty" et même de profiter de son expérience, comme l'y invite M. H. E. Duckworth dans sa lettre du 6 janvier dernier et où il ajoute: "We naturally wish to do nothing that might detract from the College's claim to the French Normal School."

### 3- Etablir les programmes de formation pédagogique

Une fois choisie l'institution qui dispensera la formation pédagogique aux futurs maîtres des écoles franco-manitobaines, il reviendra à celle-ci de préparer avec la collaboration du Ministère de l'Education, du Secrétariat des relations fédérales-provinciales-culturelles et de la "Faculty of Education" de l'Université de Manitoba des programmes qui varieront selon le niveau d'enseignement auquel le maître est destiné et selon le diplôme professionnel auquel il aspire. Nous croyons que l'expérience des écoles normales de langue française du Nouveau-Brunswick et de l'Ontario pourra être utile dans la préparation de programmes.

Si, comme nous l'espérons, on confiait cette formation pédagogique au Collège de Saint-Boniface, celui-ci devrait immédiatement engager le chef de son département de pédagogie. Nous estimons qu'il revient à ce chef avec l'aide d'un comité de définir les programmes de formation pédagogique à offrir, l'ordre et le temps où ils seront établis. En même temps, le chef du département de pédagogie devra recruter avec l'aide des inspecteurs ses professeurs de méthodologie. En plus, il devra durant quelques mois s'adjoindre de l'aide secrétariale pour repérer et acheter des ouvrages de pédagogie. Enfin,



avec l'aide des inspecteurs et des directeurs d'écoles il devra trouver des maîtres-critiques qui présideront aux stages d'enseignement pratique des étudiants en pédagogie.

#### 4- Etablir le coût de l'entreprise totale

Nous ne croyons pas qu'il sera facile d'établir avant de commencer le coût total de l'entreprise parce qu'elle se fera dans des circonstances ou des conditions plutôt nouvelles. Si on confie les futurs maîtres au Collège de Saint-Boniface, par exemple, ceux-ci partageront les locaux de classe et les professeurs de cours académiques avec les autres étudiants. Ils partageront les activités et les services parascolaires des autres étudiants comme bibliothèque, cafeteria, gymnase, etc. De plus le coût de l'entreprise dépendra de l'éventail des cours académiques et professionnels qu'on veut offrir aux futurs maîtres et cet éventail sera lui-même conditionné par les diplômes vers lesquels on veut conduire les étudiants. Il est certain que dès qu'on poussera la formation pédagogique jusqu'au baccalauréat ou la maîtrise en éducation, le coût de l'entreprise va substantiellement être changé.

Pour être pratiques nous faisons la suggestion suivante. En supposant qu'on ait décidé de confier cette formation pédagogique au Collège de Saint-Boniface, les gouvernements fédéral et provincial devront se mettre d'accord pour assurer au Collège un premier budget permettant d'engager immédiatement le chef d'un département de pédagogie, de lui assurer de l'aide secrétariale, de procéder immédiatement à l'achat de volumes de pédagogie pour la bibliothèque. Le chef du département de pédagogie s'entendra avec les personnes intéressées et autorisées pour déterminer la nature de la formation pédagogique



qu'on veut offrir, pour établir le cheminement critique de la mise en place de cette section pédagogique du Collège et pour préparer des prévisions budgétaires en conséquence.

L'arrivée d'étudiants en pédagogie au Collège de Saint-Boniface accélérerait la réalisation de la planification actuelle dans laquelle on prépare de nouvelles classes et on envisage la possibilité d'une résidence d'étudiants. Une partie du coût de cette expansion de services devra sans doute être portée au budget de la section pédagogique, qui, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, sera financée conjointement par les gouvernements fédéral et provincial. Comme par ailleurs le Collège de Saint-Boniface reçoit des subventions de la Commission des octrois universitaires, il s'estime, et à bon droit, croyons-nous, capable dorénavant d'assumer la responsabilité d'une section pédagogique.

##### 5- Une ébauche de cheminement critique

Nous avons dit qu'il reviendra au chef du département de pédagogie d'établir le cheminement critique selon lequel sera mise en place la formation pédagogique offerte aux futurs maîtres des écoles franco-manitobaines. Cependant, nous avons pris contact avec les autorités du Collège de Saint-Boniface pour savoir s'il serait au moins possible, à ce stade du projet, de faire une première ébauche de cheminement critique. C'est cette ébauche que nous soumettons ici sous toute réserve.

1970 : septembre : entrée de la première classe d'étudiants I-B.

1971 : septembre : entrée de la première classe d'étudiants II-B.

Aussitôt que possible : commencement des cours en vue du B. Ed.





## 6- Recrutement des étudiants

Nous inspirant du cheminement critique ébauché plus haut, nous pressentons que le recrutement s'élargira progressivement à mesure que la formation pédagogique elle-même s'étendra, ce qui nous paraît excellent pour le département pédagogique et pour les étudiants.

Nous ne possédons pas suffisamment de données pour projeter les inscriptions possibles à ce département de pédagogie mais nous souhaitons qu'il commence modestement. Nous savons que l'Université de Brandon a ouvert son collège pédagogique avec 14 étudiants au niveau Education I.

En parlant de recrutement il ne faut pas oublier les enseignants actuels qui demanderont à se recycler en vue des écoles franco-manitobaines. Il faudra une planification spécialement pour eux. Des cours d'été, des cours de fin d'après-midi ou du soir ou du samedi en intéresseraient sans doute plusieurs, à moins que les commissions scolaires trouvent des fonds pour les envoyer étudier à plein temps durant un ou deux ans.

## 7- Cours en administration scolaire

On nous dit que les Franco-Manitobains manquent d'administrateurs scolaires ou qu'il manque de la qualité à leurs administrateurs.

Nous rapportons le problème pour signifier notre désir d'être complet dans notre recherche mais nous n'avons pas de solution concrète à proposer. Tout au plus affirmerons-nous que les responsables de la formation pédagogique devront se pencher sur la question. Et même s'ils ne développaient pas de département d'administration scolaire, peut-être pourraient-ils par des cours du soir ou d'été offrir aux administrateurs actuels des cours de perfectionnement.



Résumé des étapes à parcourir

- 1- Confier la formation pédagogique à une institution déterminée.
- 2- Cette dernière engage immédiatement le chef du département de pédagogie et procède à l'achat des volumes de pédagogie.
- 3- Aussitôt déterminées la nature et la date du premier cours, commencer le recrutement.

N.B. Nous présumons que le financement a été prévu et approuvé, à chaque étape de la mise en place de la formation pédagogique.



#### IV - Commentaires

Nous avons mentionné dans notre première partie que certains pré-supposés ou facteurs présents à la pensée du comité durant sa réflexion pouvaient être ambigus. Nous en reprendrons quelques-uns dans cette quatrième partie, y ajoutant certaines pistes de recherche à explorer pour faire face aux difficultés que nous pressentons.

##### 1- Le vouloir-vivre-français des Franco-Manitobains

Nous avons présumé que les Franco-Manitobains ont opté pour la fidélité à leur héritage culturel français. Cependant, nous sommes conscients que ce vouloir-vivre-français est déjà entamé dans la masse des 83,000 francophones du Manitoba. Aussi sommes-nous en accord avec le P. Richard Arès, S.J., qui, dans sa magistrale conférence du 6 juin 1964 à Saint-Claude, disait que l'image qu'il se faisait à travers une multitude de témoignages:

"C'est celle d'un peuple qui a magnifiquement porté jusqu'ici la langue et la culture françaises, mais qui donne présentement des signes évidents de fatigue et d'inquiétude."

Le système scolaire du Manitoba a placé les francophones à cheval sur deux langues et deux cultures. Il n'en fallait pas davantage pour leur créer un complexe d'infériorité, souvent aggravé par leur infériorité économique. A ce complexe nous rattachons la peur du risque, le manque d'ambition, voire l'indifférence trop souvent constatés chez les Franco-Manitobains. Leur scolarisation moins prolongée comparativement au reste de la population expliquera peut-être qu'ils soient plus sujets à l'ignorance et aux préjugés. Ruraux, ils gardent l'esprit de clocher du paysan. Noyés dans l'anglophonie et l'anonymat de la grande ville, ils perdent facilement le sens de leur identité culturelle.





Par ailleurs d'aucuns constatent, depuis quelques années, un prometteur sursaut de vouloir-vivre chez les Franco-Manitobains qui se traduit dans une certaine fierté d'être de culture française, par l'affirmation d'être des citoyens à part entière et par la volonté de régler le sort de la minorité francophone du Manitoba sans s'accrocher au Québec. Nous croyons que le gouvernement manitobain aurait tout avantage à soutenir ce sursaut par un vaste programme d'éducation populaire.

## 2- La peur d'être trop français au Manitoba

Certains parents sont arrivés au Manitoba avec un pauvre bagage d'anglais et ont eu de la difficulté à se faire une place au soleil dans la majorité anglophone de la province. Ils sont bien décidés à éviter ces angoisses à leur progéniture et s'opposeront à tout changement dans le système scolaire actuel. Nous les invitons à réfléchir sur cette observation soumise au gouvernement du Manitoba par les Commissaires d'écoles de langue française, en novembre 1964, à propos de la demande de commencer l'enseignement en français dès la première année de classe:

"To those who might object that such freedom, if exercised extensively, will handicap our children in their future role as residents of this Province, we answer emphatically that the contrary will be true. The problem of French-speaking parents is not that their children will not be fluent in English, it is that their children will not be fluent in their own language. Environment, public news and entertainment media, everything guarantees that in Manitoba, every child will be quite conversant with the language of the majority."

Il ne faudra pas se surprendre de voir certains enseignants faire cause commune avec les parents mentionnés plus haut. Ils sont les produits d'un système scolaire hybride qui ne leur a pas appris à bien s'identifier culturellement. Ils ont été formés en vue d'un



système d'enseignement dit bilingue dans lequel ils sont installés: tout changement dans le système devient une menace pour leur sécurité ou une pression pour se définir culturellement, deux situations devant lesquelles leur première réaction peut facilement être purement négative.

Une des objections des parents et des enseignants ci-haut mentionnés est que la fidélité à leur héritage culturel peut développer chez les Franco-Manitobains une mentalité de ghetto qui n'est avantageuse ni pour eux ni pour les autres groupes ethniques. Nous croyons au contraire que l'originalité et la valeur de la contribution de la communauté franco-manitobaine à la société canadienne s'établira d'après son degré de fidélité à son héritage culturel.

### 3- Qui doit prendre la décision et comment?

Certains individus sont frustrés de n'avoir pas été consultés sur la création possible d'une école normale ou d'un collège pédagogique de langue française.

En saine démocratie, le peuple élit ses députés à qui il fait confiance pour prendre des décisions en son nom. Il est rare qu'un gouvernement se sente obligé de recourir à un referendum avant de prendre une décision.

Il ne s'ensuit pas que les élus du peuple peuvent prendre les décisions sans consulter. Au contraire, ils savent très bien qu'ils ont tout avantage à s'entourer d'experts pour ensuite pouvoir justifier leurs décisions devant le public.

Dans le cas qui nous occupe nous savons que le gouvernement de la province a consulté le Directeurat de l'Éducation de la Société Franco-Manitobaine, les Enseignants Franco-Manitobains, l'Association



des Commissaires d'écoles de langue française du Manitoba, la Manitoba Teachers Society, la Faculté d'Éducation de l'Université de Manitoba, le Collège de Saint-Boniface, le Ministère de l'Éducation du Manitoba. Autant dire que le projet n'est plus un secret et que ceux qui s'intéressent à l'éducation et qui se donnent la peine d'en étudier tous les aspects ont eu le temps et l'occasion d'exprimer leurs opinions.

#### 4- Les imprévus de la politique

Certains se demandent comment la majorité anglophone de la population manitobaine recevra les projets du Nouveau Parti Démocratique visant à favoriser le plein épanouissement de la minorité francophone de la province, d'autant que la majorité parlementaire du gouvernement se trouve dans un état plutôt précaire. C'est une question qu'on peut se poser et qui souligne l'urgence pour les Franco-Manitobains de faire l'unité entre eux et de saisir une occasion qui ne se représenterait peut-être jamais de devenir des citoyens à part entière.

Notre comité sait que la Commission Laurendeau-Dunton recommande une école normale de langue française pour les quatre provinces de l'Ouest canadien. Il sait également que le Collège Saint-Jean d'Edmonton a commencé, comme le Collège de Saint-Boniface, à offrir des cours à de futurs maîtres qui vont terminer leur formation professionnelle dans une faculté d'éducation d'université. Le gouvernement fédéral voudra-t-il appuyer financièrement les deux entreprises de formation pédagogique de maîtres francophones ou optera-t-il pour l'une des deux? S'il décidait d'appuyer les deux, cela entraînerait-il un partage des fonds que le gouvernement Fédéral destine à la formation pédagogique des maîtres francophones de l'Ouest canadien?







Voilà des questions que nous nous sommes posées. Une chose cependant est certaine, c'est que le gouvernement du Manitoba a déjà annoncé publiquement qu'il s'engagera dans un avenir très prochain dans la formation pédagogique de maîtres francophones, quitte ensuite à négocier l'entente financière la plus favorable avec le gouvernement fédéral.

5- Concurrence ou collaboration avec la Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba?

Notre comité ad hoc comportait des membres de la Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba qui nous ont informé de l'excellente organisation de ce centre de formation pédagogique où l'on offre déjà certains cours en français. Notre comité sait également que certaines personnes voudraient qu'on confie la formation des futurs maîtres francophones à cette faculté d'éducation, à Fort Garry. Dans notre troisième partie, nous croyons avoir clairement démontré que seule une institution comme le Collège de Saint-Boniface rencontre les recommandations de la Commission Laurendeau-Dunton, recommandations que nous avons fait nôtres totalement.

La Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba n'est pas actuellement organisée en vue de former des maîtres francophones destinés à des écoles franco-manitobaines. Advenant la création d'un département de pédagogie au Collège de Saint-Boniface, nous prévoyons la possibilité d'une entente entre les deux institutions pour que chacune œuvre dans son secteur propre. La lettre du vice-président académique de l'Université, M. H. E. Duckworth, à M. Laurent Desjardins, que nous avons déjà citée, nous laisse clairement espérer cette collaboration en vue d'une répartition des tâches:



"Since the College's interests and our own are complementary rather than competitive, and since they together represent the total teaching training program envisaged by the Commission, it might prove advantageous to both of us to correlate our plans in a manner that would be discernible to the Federal Government."

Déjà le Collège de Saint-Boniface collabore harmonieusement avec la Faculté des Arts et Sciences et la Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba. La création d'un centre complet de formation pédagogique au sein du Collège de Saint-Boniface ne devrait que créer une saine émulation avec l'institution homologue de Fort Garry.

Relevons, en passant, que la lettre de l'Université de Manitoba au Secrétariat des relations fédérales-provinciales-culturelles reconnaît le droit et la compétence du Collège de Saint-Boniface d'assumer la formation pédagogique de maîtres francophones. Ce témoignage a été d'un grand réconfort aux autorités du Collège au moment où certains Franco-Manitobains voulaient précisément mettre en doute ce droit et cette compétence. Par ailleurs, cette contestation nous porte à croire que le Collège est peu ou mal connu en certains milieux et qu'il devrait voir à améliorer ses relations extérieures avec le public en général et avec les éducateurs en particulier.

#### 6- Equivalence de diplômes

Un professeur formé par le département de pédagogie du Collège de Saint-Boniface pourra-t-il enseigner dans le secteur des écoles anglophones du Manitoba? pourra-t-il faire reconnaître son diplôme dans les autres provinces canadiennes? Nous posons ici tout l'épineux problème de l'équivalence des diplômes académiques et professionnels dans une société où la mobilité de la main-d'œuvre s'accroît. C'est un problème qui a une dimension non seulement inter-provinciale mais internationale et auquel doivent faire face les diverses facultés



ou départements de nos universités et l'ensemble des associations professionnelles de notre société. En ce qui nous concerne, nous ne pouvons qu'exprimer l'espoir que le secrétariat permanent que les Ministères de l'Education des dix provinces canadiennes viennent d'établir se penche très bientôt sur le problème urgent de l'équivalence des certificats d'enseignement à l'échelle canadienne.





## V - RECOMMANDATIONS

- 1- Nous recommandons que le gouvernement du Manitoba amende la loi scolaire pour permettre l'enseignement en français de toutes les matières, depuis la maternelle jusqu'à la douzième année inclusivement.
- 2- Nous recommandons que le Secrétariat des relations fédérales-provinciales-culturelles avec la Société Franco-Manitobaine entreprenne au plus tôt une vaste campagne d'éducation populaire pour préparer les francophones du Manitoba à s'intégrer dans le nouveau système scolaire que le gouvernement est à préparer à leur intention, campagne qui devrait mettre à profit tous les agents de culture française déjà en existence dans la province.
- 3- Nous recommandons au gouvernement d'exécuter promptement son projet d'école-pilote franco-manitobaine depuis la maternelle jusqu'à la douzième année inclusivement. Au niveau du secondaire on devrait mettre à profit la longue expérience du Collège de Saint-Boniface.
- 4- Nous recommandons au Ministère de l'Education de désigner au plus tôt le Collège de Saint-Boniface comme le centre de formation pédagogique des professeurs destinés aux écoles franco-manitobaines.
- 5- Nous recommandons qu'aussi rapidement que possible après sa désignation le Collège de Saint-Boniface présente au Secrétariat des relations fédérales-provinciales-culturelles un budget provisoire.
- 6- Nous recommandons que, sitôt le budget approuvé et voté, le Collège de Saint-Boniface engage le chef de son département de pédagogie et son ou sa secrétaire afin qu'au plus tôt:
  - a- on définisse les programmes de formation pédagogique à offrir, l'ordre et le temps de leur mise en place;



- b- on recrute des professeurs requis pour les cours académiques et professionnels en vue;
  - c- on repère et on achète et on catalogue des revues et des volumes de pédagogie;
  - d- on complète l'équipement audio-visuel requis pour l'enseignement prévu;
  - e- on trouve des maîtres-critiques qui présideront aux stages d'enseignement pratique;
  - f- on établit des prévisions budgétaires à court terme et à long terme permettant aux gouvernements fédéral et provincial d'en venir à une entente sur le financement de l'entreprise totale.
- 7- Nous recommandons que le Collège de Saint-Boniface accepte, si possible, dès septembre 1970 la première classe de son département de pédagogie, tellement nous semble grande l'urgence de créer des structures et des institutions qui viennent stopper la rapide détérioration de la langue et de la culture françaises au Manitoba.
- 8- Nous recommandons au Collège de Saint-Boniface de ne pas isoler ses aspirants-maîtres mais de plutôt les intégrer à l'ensemble de son corps étudiant afin qu'ils se sentent étudiants à part entière et soient incités à poursuivre leurs études académiques.
- 9- Nous recommandons que la décision de créer un centre de formation pédagogique au Collège de Saint-Boniface, aussitôt prise, reçoive une large publicité dans les quatre provinces de l'Ouest canadien et que soit planifiée au plus tôt la visite des écoles secondaires ou post-secondaires susceptibles de fournir des candidats à la carrière enseignante.



- 10- Nous recommandons que le Collège de Saint-Boniface s'entende avec la Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba pour que leurs services pédagogiques soient complémentaires et non concurrents, comme le laisse espérer la cordiale collaboration qui existe déjà entre les deux institutions.
- 11- Nous recommandons que par les Secrétariats des relations fédérales-provinciales un dialogue s'établisse entre le Collège de Saint-Boniface et le Collège Saint-Jean d'Edmonton en vue d'établir une collaboration.
- 12- Nous recommandons au Collège de Saint-Boniface d'équiper au plus tôt un laboratoire de langues et un atelier d'art et d'artisanat.
- 13- Nous recommandons au Collège de Saint-Boniface de développer son service de relations extérieures, en particulier auprès des enseignants franco-manitobains.
- 14- Nous recommandons qu'on s'occupe au plus tôt d'établir l'équivalence des diplômes ou certificats qui seront décernés aux étudiants en pédagogie du Collège de Saint-Boniface de façon à leur assurer plus de mobilité dans le choix de leur emploi.
- 15- Nous recommandons qu'on fasse une planification spéciale du recyclage des actuels enseignants francophones qui voudraient passer aux écoles franco-manitobaines et que des bourses généreuses soient prévues pour ceux qui voudraient étudier à plein temps pour être prêts au plus tôt à assumer leurs nouvelles fonctions.
- 16- Nous recommandons que le gouvernement manitobain voit à assurer, avec bourses d'études, la formation professionnelle d'administrateurs scolaires francophones.





Membres du Comité Ad Hoc qui ont signé le présent Mémoire

Soeur Antoinette Bergeron, S.d.S.	professeur à la Faculté d'Education de l'Université de Manitoba
Abbé Laval Cloutier	directeur du cours secondaire du Collège de Saint-Boniface
M. Origène Fillion	surintendant-adjoint de la Division Scolaire de Saint- Boniface
M. Antoine Gaborieau	professeur, termine sa Maîtrise en Education à l'Université de Manitoba
M. Laurent Gagné	directeur de l'Ecole du Précieux-Sang, Norwood
Soeur Edmée Labossière, S.N.J.M.	de l'Académie Saint-Joseph, Saint-Boniface
R.P. Arthur Lacerte, O.M.I.	supérieur provincial des Oblats de Marie Immaculée
M. Céleste Muller	inspecteur d'écoles (retraité)
Père Stéphane Valiquette, S.J.	recteur du Collège de Saint-Boniface

Saint-Boniface, Manitoba, le 2 mars 1970



APPENDIX H

Report of the Committee of Inquiry



August 13, 1971

The Honorable Gérard Pelletier  
Secretary of State  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario


The Honorable Edward Schreyer  
Premier  
Legislative Buildings  
Winnipeg, Manitoba


The Honorable Allan Blakeney  
Premier  
Legislative Buildings  
Regina, Saskatchewan


The Honorable Harry E. Strom  
Premier  
Legislative Buildings  
Edmonton, Alberta

Sirs,

As members of the Committee of Inquiry on French language teacher-training in the Western Provinces, we hereby submit our report.

  
André Raynauld, President

  
H.B. Neatby, Member

  
Paul Wozynski, Member





## INTRODUCTION

1. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism concentrated on defining the principle of equality and devising measures by which this principle could be applied in practice. More precisely, it tried to foster the existence and the development of the two official languages and of the two major cultural groups, while taking into consideration the cultural contributions of other ethnic groups.
2. The second volume of its Report was devoted to Education. The significance of education for the future of a language and a culture is obvious. The minority schools exist within a given cultural context and are part of a provincial educational system. Thus, the provinces determine and administer the policies which govern minority schools. Federal aid to these institutions depends upon special arrangements with the provincial authorities.
3. The second volume of the Royal Commission concluded that a high priority should be given to the training of teachers for French language minority schools because the academic qualities of a school, the development of the students and the standard of the written and spoken language are largely determined by the teachers.



4. Among the forty-six recommendations of the second volume there are three which relate directly to this study:

Recommendation 18

...that the teachers destined for majority - language schools and for official language minority schools be trained in separate institutions.

Recommendation 19

...that the teachers' College at Moncton become the training institution for teachers for official-language minority schools in the Atlantic provinces, and that one training institution be established to serve the needs of the four western provinces.

Recommendation 29

...that for students attending the French-language teacher - training institution for the western provinces and for Francophone students from Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia attending the Teachers' College at Moncton, the federal grant to the province be 25% of the cost per student. We further recommend that, for the western provinces, the federal grant should cover 75% of the capital costs of the training institution. For the teachers' College at Moncton, the grant should cover 50% of the capital cost which can be attributed to out-of-province students.



5. On November 6, 1969, the federal government formally accepted the recommendations of Volume II of the Report of the Royal Commission and stated that it was prepared to provide the necessary financial support. It promptly initiated a series of consultations with provincial authorities because, since education falls within provincial jurisdiction, the adoption of these recommendations would require the consent and cooperation of the provinces. The provinces held several discussions with the representatives of their Francophone communities on the question of creating a regional institution for the training of French language teachers in western Canada. The provincial governments could not agree on the location of this institution. To resolve the deadlock the federal government reached an agreement with the three prairie provinces, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta - to resolve the problem by means of arbitration. British Columbia was prepared to leave the decision up to these three provinces. The government of Alberta subsequently, made it clear that, while not objecting to the formation of an arbitration committee, it wished to reserve the right to accept or reject the committee's recommendations. Thus, the arbitration committee has now become committee of inquiry.
6. The Committee, composed of three members, began its work early in July 1971. It was agreed that its report would be submitted





on the 16th of August.

Its terms of reference read as follows:

a) consult governments and others concerned on the question of francophone teacher-training facilities for the western provinces, on the basis of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the present situation in the West;

b) make more precise recommendations in writing concerning French-language teacher-training in the western provinces.

7. The Committee interpreted its terms of reference as a request to study the present situation in the three prairie provinces Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta - in terms of the actual needs for the training of French language teachers. We visited the west from the 12th to the 20th of July, where we consulted the representatives of the three governments: Premiers, Ministers of Education, Deputy-Ministers and departmental officials. We also met officials of universities as well as the directors of the Collège Saint-Boniface, Collège Saint-Jean and Collège Mathieu. Finally, we had the opportunity at Winnipeg, Regina and Edmonton to spend some time with representatives of the Francophone minority groups and to learn their views on the training of French language teachers in the west<sup>1</sup>.

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1 The appendix lists the names of the people interviewed.



8. These discussions made us aware of the rapid evolution of the legislation relating to French as a language of instruction. We also noted changes within the universities in their attitude towards the colleges of Saint-Boniface and Saint-Jean. We learned too of the progress being made within these colleges. We were struck by the increasing interest of Francophones in French language teaching and, at the same time, by their strong sense of provincial identity.
9. As a result of our inquiries we have divided our Report into two parts. In the first we describe the present situation in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, giving special attention to those factors which are important for the future development of teaching in French. In the second part we make some recommendations. We have taken into account both the cultural milieu of the Francophones in western Canada and the educational structures which already exist in each province. There remains the central question: should there be one or several institutions in western Canada for the training of French language teachers? The answer to this question will depend on what is feasible in view of the present situation and the potential for future development.



PART I

10. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism recommended one teacher-training institution for the western provinces because it was convinced that separate institutions "would not be practicable, the number of teachers required being too small to justify a teachers' college in each province"<sup>1</sup>. The size of enrolment is clearly a significant factor. Although it is impossible to establish an optimum enrolment it is obvious that anything less than four or five hundred students in a four-year programme would seriously limit the number of courses and options which could be offered. It is also true that the total enrolment of prospective teachers for French-language or "bilingual" schools for the four western provinces will not exceed this minimum for the next few years at least. Our investigations, however, have convinced us that a single institution is not feasible.
11. We do not recommend that a single teacher-training institution be established to serve the needs of the four western provinces.
12. The administrative difficulties posed by a single regional institution could be overcome. The graduates of this institution would have to be certified by the Department of Education of the province in which they wanted to teach. The curriculum would therefore have to be acceptable to each of the Departments of Education. This could be assured, however, by an Advisory Council

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1 Volume II, paragraph 448.





with representation from each province, by a programme extending over at least three years, and by arrangements for some practice teaching in the schools of the province to which the prospective teacher would be returning. From an administrative point of view, therefore, a single regional institution would be feasible.

13. The financial arrangements would be complicated, but again the difficulties would not be prohibitive. The federal government has stated that it is prepared to assist with both the capital and operating costs. Each provincial government could be expected to pay some proportion of the costs involved in training teachers for its own French-language or bilingual schools. An equitable allocation of costs would require careful negotiations but there is no reason to believe that the negotiations would not be successful.
14. The insuperable difficulty is that even if a single institution was established it would not serve the western region. Our interviews in the prairie provinces made it crystal clear that any one institution, in whatever province it was located, would be considered a provincial institution. It would serve only one province because it would not draw an appreciable number of candidates from the other provinces. It would be a regional institution in name only.



15. No truly regional institution is possible because the Francophone groups in the western provinces do not form a regional community. In each province, the Francophone groups have been shaped by their own distinctive traditions, their history, their institutions, by the provincial structures within which their associations operate, and by the relationships which have been established with the other citizens and institutions of the province. They are not prepared to sacrifice the provincial institutions which now exist. Their identity as members of a Francophone community is provincial rather than regional. Any viable solution to the training of teachers for French or bilingual schools must reflect this reality.
16. This means that teacher-training in French must be an extension of organizations and institutions which already exist in western Canada. The need for this training is everywhere recognized. Governments, universities and the leaders of the French Canadian organizations are all agreed that the need exists. Indeed, in each of the three prairie provinces some preliminary steps have been taken. The objective must be to accelerate and extend these developments. Instead of trying to create a regional institution which would be isolated from the existing institutions, the appropriate solution is to work within the context of the established provincial structures.



17. Before making any suggestions, we must first present in very summary form the present situation in each of the three prairie provinces. This will serve two purposes. It will show why we have concluded that a single regional teacher-training institution is not feasible. It will also provide the background for the suggestions at the conclusion of this report. Ours was a committee of inquiry and not of research, so our observations may lack precision. We are, nonetheless, confident that we have been informed of the most important aspects of the situation in each province.

A. Manitoba

18. The Francophone population of Manitoba by mother-tongue is larger than the Francophone population in either Saskatchewan or Alberta. In 1961, it was 60,899, or 6.6% of the total population. In 1951, the total had been 54,199 although this small number constituted 7.0% of the total population at that time. These statistics must be treated with caution. The number of Franco-Manitobans is larger if ethnic origin is used as the criterion; the number would probably be smaller if it included only those who speak mainly French in their daily lives. The significant figure would be the number of Manitobans who want to preserve or foster their identity as Franco-Manitobans. The census data unfortunately provides no statistics for this.





19. The enrolments in schools where French is a language of instruction gives some indication of the will to retain a Francophone identity. These schools are available as an option for Francophone students except for those areas where the French-speaking population is very small. They offer a special cours de français and may also use French as the language of instruction for science sociale. It can be assumed that parents who send their children to these schools have done so deliberately. The enrolment in these schools in 1970-71 was 10,828. Some idea of the proportion of Franco-Manitobans enrolled in these schools is indicated by the fact that the total French-speaking population in the age-group of 5 to 19 was 17,985<sup>1</sup>. This figure, however, includes some who have already left school so that the potential number of Francophone students would be smaller.
20. There are other indicators which show a will to live as Franco-Manitobans. There is a French language weekly newspaper, La Liberté et le Patriote, founded in 1913. There is a French language radio station and a television station, both linked with Radio-Canada. There is Le Centre Culturel in Saint-Boniface with a boîte à chansons and a local theatre group, Le Cercle Molière. Les Intrépides are a well-known choral group now touring in France. There is also a large number of very active French-Canadian associations in the province. These diverse

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1 Figures supplied by D.B.S.



activities have been given new vitality by the financial assistance from the federal and provincial governments but they exist because the local Francophone population initiated them and supports them.

21. Numbers alone do not explain this cultural activity. French-Canadians in Manitoba are more conscious of their identity because they are concentrated in certain areas of the province. The majority live within a circle with a radius of fifty miles and its centre is Saint-Boniface. Had they been more widely scattered, it would have been difficult to foster Francophone institutions. Without these institutions, the process of assimilation would have been more pronounced.
22. Some assimilation has nevertheless taken place. The gap between the number of Franco-Manitobans by ethnic origin and by mother-tongue is proof enough. There are some suggestions that this process has been accelerating during the last decade. The census data for 1971 is not yet available but many of the people to whom we spoke believed that television and the migration to urban centres posed serious threats to the survival of the Francophone community.
23. The Franco-Manitobans are nonetheless encouraged by some recent developments. Indeed, it is not too much to say that their hopes for their future and their will to foster their distinctive identity have been greatly strengthened. In part this can be



attributed to the nation-wide interest in bilingualism and biculturalism and to the expanding federal assistance for French language minority groups. In Manitoba, however, there has been an additional impetus as a result of certain changes in the structures and the administration of provincial education.

24. One of the significant changes was the re-structuring of the regional school units. These new units are based in large part on the ethnic distribution within the province with the result that the French Canadian population is concentrated in a few of these units and forms a large majority within these units. Not only is the student body mainly French, but also the teachers, the principals and the superintendents of the Region.
25. More recently the provincial government has amended its Public Schools Act. Bill 113 and the regulations which followed have established the legal equality of French and English as languages of instruction. Instruction in French is no longer restricted to français and science sociale; all subjects except English may now be taught in French where enough pupils can be grouped together. The next school year, 1971-72, will be the first year under these new regulations but already it is estimated that about 60 schools will take advantage of them. In most grades a French programme will be introduced in the lower grades but as these students advance the programme will be extended. Within a decade students who have done





almost all of their schoolwork in French will be graduating from high schools. There is no need to stress the importance of these French language schools for the Franco-Manitoban minority.

26. These schools will need teachers who are trained to teach the elementary and secondary curriculum in French. A French-language teacher training institution is therefore urgently needed in Manitoba. Indeed a training programme might have been established at the Collège de Saint-Boniface a year ago had there not been the possibility that a regional institution would be created. It was widely assumed in Manitoba that this institution would be located in Saint-Boniface and it seemed wiser to wait until plans and financial arrangements for the regional training college could be completed. The delay has already created some inconvenience and it is not surprising that all of the Manitobans to whom we talked urged that a decision on the regional institution be made as soon as possible.
27. Le Collège de Saint-Boniface is the obvious institution in Manitoba to undertake the training of French-language teachers. The college was incorporated in 1871 and was one of the founding colleges of the University of Manitoba a few years later. In recent years its curriculum has been revised and it now offers a three-year baccalauréat ès arts, the degree being officially awarded by the University of Manitoba. The enrolment for 1970-71



was 172 full-time and 94 part-time students. The faculty and student body are predominantly Francophone and the college itself is located in a predominantly French section of the city. It can therefore provide potential French-language teachers a French-language milieu for both academic and social activities.

28. The courses at the college are taught in French, with the exception of courses in English literature, but the number of courses offered is not large. Students may specialize in Français, Histoire, Mathématiques, Philosophie, Psychologie and Religion, and may take some introductory courses in the sciences and social sciences. With some extension of the offerings in the arts and sciences it would be possible for the college to provide the range of academic courses required of a teacher training institution.
29. At present the college offers no courses in Education. Prospective teachers must register at the University of Manitoba or the University of Brandon. The Faculty of Education at the University of Manitoba has recognized the need for special training for those who will be teaching français or science sociale and offers special courses in methodology for the teaching of these subjects. The President of the University and officials from the Faculty of Education have assured us, however, that they recognize the need for a special training program for



the teachers of the new French-language schools and that they will cooperate in the establishment of this programme at the Collège de Saint-Boniface.

30. This cooperation will be essential because for some years at least, the enrolment of prospective teachers at the College will be small. It is impossible to make any accurate forecast. It is estimated that there are now some six or seven hundred certified teachers in the province who could and would teach in the new French-language schools. Many of these, however, would need refresher courses or will want to improve their qualifications. Annual replacements and the expansion of the French-language schools may absorb from forty to fifty teachers a year. It is therefore not unreasonable to estimate an eventual enrolment of two hundred and fifty in a four-year programme at Saint-Boniface. This would be viable; this is the present enrolment in Education at the University of Brandon. The college, however, will have to expand its faculty and for some years to come it will only be able to offer a restricted number of Education courses. Close cooperation with the Faculty of Education at the University of Manitoba will be required, especially during the early years of the programme.
31. We are not in a position to suggest what form this cooperation should take. It is obvious however, if the Collège de Saint-Boniface is to become the teacher-training institution for the





French-language schools of Manitoba, that all the training for teaching in French should be given at the Collège. This might involve the transfer to the Collège of some of the Francophone professors now on the Faculty of Education staff. It might also be necessary for some students at the Collège to take some of the more specialized courses on the University of Manitoba campus even though these would be offered in English. The objective should be to offer as many courses as possible at the Collège but small enrolment and the consequent higher costs will limit the number of options which the Collège will be able to offer.

32. It will be noted that we have not included any out-of-province students in our discussion of enrolment. This has been deliberate because in our opinion it is unlikely that there will be more than nine or ten students annually from Saskatchewan and Alberta. In our opinion the Collège de Saint-Boniface will be primarily a provincial institution and all plans for its development should be based on this premise. Within Manitoba, however, it will play an essential role in teacher-training. The cost per student will inevitably be higher than elsewhere in the province because of the small enrolment and the special problems of a French-language institution. For this reason we will be suggesting that, the federal government should provide some financial assistance.



B. Saskatchewan

33. The situation in the province of Saskatchewan is very different. In 1961 the Francophone population by mother-tongue was 36,163, or 3.9% of the total population; the respective figures for 1951 were 36,815 and 4.4%. It is unlikely that the Francophone population will increase significantly in the foreseeable future in a province in which the total population is relatively stable. It is even possible that the number of Francophones by mother-tongue will continue to decline.
34. This does not mean that there is no desire to maintain an identity as French-speaking Canadians. No precise statistics were available but we were told that approximately 2,500 students were attending schools in which the cours de français is taught and in which some other subjects may be given in French. There are 8,648<sup>1</sup> Francophone children by mother-tongue in the age group from 5 to 19 in the province, so that the proportion receiving some teaching in French is smaller than in Manitoba. The number is nonetheless significant. There are also fewer cultural activities in French but again we were impressed by the number of Francophone associations, by the vigour of local choral groups and the importance of the two French-language radio stations.
35. The Francophones in Saskatchewan face unique difficulties. They form the majority of a dozen or more communities but these



communities are widely scattered throughout the province. Even more serious, these are all rural centers in which the population is relatively stable or even declining. There are no distinctive French-speaking communities in the urban centers of the province.

This means that there is no geographical focus, no dominant cultural center and no one place in which the leaders of the Francophone community are located. L'Association Culturelle Franco-Canadienne de la Saskatchewan stressed this point in its submission to us when it argued that Francophone communities are so isolated that they all "threaten to be swallowed up in the heavily preponderant English milieu".

36. The Francophone schools in the province are more accurately described as bilingual than as French-language schools. The language of instruction may be French for up to 75% of the school day in the lower grades but this declines to a maximum of 40% by the end of the secondary school programme. The schools in which this instruction in French is permitted are designated by the provincial government after it has been shown that there is sufficient popular demand in a community. There are now twelve designated schools in Saskatchewan, only one of which is a secondary school. In other schools the cours de français may be taught for a period not exceeding one hour a day. These schools may have made a significant contribution to the survival





of French as a language in Saskatchewan in the past. We are convinced, however, that the extension of designated schools is necessary in order to provide a more adequate foundation for the resurgent vitality of Francophones in the province.

37. The fact that the Francophone communities are widely scattered helps to explain why the province has no French language institution at the post secondary level. Le Collège Mathieu at Gravelbourg was once a classical college affiliated with the University of Ottawa, but teaching there is now confined to the secondary school level. As a classical college it served the Francophone communities of southern Saskatchewan although it also drew some students from northern Saskatchewan and from outside the province. Gravelbourg, however, has a population of less than two thousand and it is not even certain that it is large enough to justify the establishment of a community college, much less a university. Since teacher-training is now more and more confined to universities, and a university degree is the norm rather than the exception for teachers, it seems improbable that Collège Mathieu will ever become a center for French-language teacher training.
38. The Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan does have a Bilingual Programme. Some fifteen courses will be taught in French in 1971-72, nine of them within the French Department. Students in this programme are expected to take a minimum of 40%



of their courses in French. There were 27 students in 1970-71, about half of whom were Francophone. Some students from the Faculty of Education select courses from this programme and can qualify for a Bachelor of Education "mention française".

39. There is only a limited demand for French-speaking teachers in Saskatchewan, apart from those needed to teach French as a second language. We were told that the replacement rate for teachers in the designated schools of the province would be approximately ten per year. It is therefore impossible to envisage a French-language teacher training institution in the province. It would be possible to strengthen the Bilingual Programme on the Regina campus so that prospective French-language teachers could take their first year at university in French. To complete their training in French, however, they would have to leave the province.

#### C. Alberta

40. The Francophone population of Alberta again has unique characteristics. In 1961 the total French population by mother-tongue was 42,276 or 3.2% of the total population; the equivalent figures for 1951 were 34,196 or 3.6%. The actual increase of Francophones by mother-tongue was thus greater in Alberta than in either of



the other two prairie provinces during the decade although the total number in Manitoba is still much larger. The total population of Alberta has also been expanding more rapidly and it is clear that the new arrivals included many Francophones.

The 1971 census is expected to show that this trend is continuing. The Francophone population, while relatively small, thus has the stimulus of a continuing infusion of new recruits.

41. Most of the French-speaking communities in Alberta are to be found in the northern half of the province. There are therefore less dispersed than in Saskatchewan. Nonetheless they are concentrated in rural areas and there is no large Francophone community. The distinctive feature of the Franco-Albertan society is the importance of Edmonton. Edmonton has no urban concentration of Francophones comparable to Saint-Boniface but it does have a significant and growing number of Franco-Albertans. This urban group is more influential than its numbers would suggest. It has made it possible for Edmonton to become the focus of French language activity within the province and has provided many of the leaders of French Canadian organizations and institutions. The role of Edmonton is likely to become more important in the future.
42. The desire of many Franco-Albertans to maintain their language and culture is obvious. Their associations are active and their





activities are diverse. They have a weekly newspaper Le Franco Albertain, and a local radio station in Edmonton. There are local theatre and choral groups. Federal grants have made it possible in Alberta, as in the other provinces, to bring French plays and chansonniers from Québec and to show French films.

43. French is permitted as a language of instruction in provincial schools although at the secondary school level it must not exceed 50% of the school day. In 1970-71, 8,601 students were enrolled in these bilingual schools; the total Francophone population by mother-tongue for the age group 5 to 19 was 11,228 <sup>1</sup>. The high proportion attending bilingual schools is further evidence of the concern of Franco-Albertans for their linguistic heritage.
44. These schools however, illustrate the contrast between the situation in Manitoba and in Alberta. Manitoba is moving towards French-language schools whereas in Alberta the official policy is to maintain bilingual schools. Already in Manitoba about 1/3 of the instruction in Francophone schools is given in French; in Alberta it is closer to 1/5 and is only 1/10 at the secondary level. In Manitoba French has been given the same legal status as English in the schools.

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1 Figures provided by D.B.S.



English is still the official language of instruction and the exceptions allowed for the use of French are also permitted for other minority languages. Manitobans of all origins tend to talk in terms of biculturalism whereas Albertans are more likely to talk of multiculturalism.

45. A Commission on Educational Planning is now considering the future pattern of education in the province. It is possible that this Commission will recommend greater flexibility at the local school level and so allow a greater variety of schools to emerge. This could facilitate the establishment of more Francophone schools in the urban centers of the province. Even this, however, would not likely change the basic character of these schools. They would still be bilingual schools within the broader context of multilingual approach to education. English would almost certainly retain its position as the preponderant language of instruction in all schools.
46. Franco-Albertans have developed institutions which reflect the provincial milieu. Le Collège Saint-Jean in Edmonton illustrates this point. The Collège was originally a classical college, and was affiliated for a time with the University of Ottawa. It seems clear that over the years the Collège suffered because it was isolated from the mainstream of educational developments within the province. In 1963 it entered into an



agreement with the University of Alberta whereby certain courses taught at the Collège were accepted towards a University of Alberta degree. In 1970 a new five-year agreement was signed by which Collège Saint-Jean became a college of the University of Alberta. The agreement states that "the nature of the College will be to provide a bilingual and bicultural (French and English) section of the University of Alberta as part of the University".

47. Le Collège Saint-Jean thus differs from Le Collège de Saint-Boniface in its structure and its aims. It can be described as a bilingual rather than a French-language college. French is the dominant language of instruction and of communication but because only a limited number of courses are taught at the College most students have to take some courses in English at the University of Alberta. Even at the College, four of the fourteen members of the faculty teach in English. The bilingual character of the college is also indicated by the importance given to the teaching of French as a second language. The Collège is important to the Francophone community because it offers some opportunities to study and communicate in French; it is important to the University because it offers the same opportunities to Anglophones who wish to learn French.





48. Candidates for a Bachelor of Education can register at the Collège Saint-Jean. Almost half the students in 1970-71 were in Education and it is expected that this proportion will be maintained as enrolment grows. Some of the academic and education courses are offered in French but students have to take some of the courses in English in order to complete their degree programme. Again this reflects what might be called the Alberta compromise. It is, designed to prepare teachers for bilingual schools and also to prepare teachers of French for the English-language schools of the province. Like all compromises it has its disadvantages. The proportion of French as a language of instruction is increasing gradually. On the other hand, there is not enough teaching in French in Alberta schools to justify a completely French-language teacher training programme. The combination of training of those who will teach in French and those who will teach French as a second language is probably the only feasible role for the Collège.
49. The Collège is primarily an Alberta institution but it does attract some students from outside the province, mainly from British Columbia and from northern Saskatchewan. These students will never constitute more than a small minority of the total enrolment but the Collège does at least play a regional role to some extent by providing its services to these out-of-province students.



50. The Collège is not yet a viable institution. The total enrolment in Arts and Science and in Education was only 99 in 1970-71. The projection for the end of the five-year agreement is for an enrolment of 436. At the moment the Collège is a heavy financial burden for the University. If the projected enrolment does not materialize the University may feel that the burden is excessive and decide not to renew the agreement. If this happens the Collège may not survive. Its loss would be a tragedy for the Franco-Albertan community.
51. We realize that this summary description of the Francophone situation in the three prairie provinces is incomplete and superficial. It does explain however why we are convinced that one regional teacher training institution is impossible. The Francophone communities in each province have different structures and different traditions. They have développé their own distinctive institutions in response to their particular needs. More specifically, both the Collège de Saint-Boniface and the Collège Saint-Jean can play a significant role in teacher-training but neither of them could become a regional institution which would adequately serve the needs of all of the western provinces. The wisest policy is to strengthen the teacher-training facilities within the existing institutions.



PART II

52. Our position so far was to reject the idea of a single teacher training institution in French for the western provinces. But our terms of reference invite us to go further. On the one hand, the Federal Government must encourage the utilization of the two official languages in minority areas. On the other hand, the needs for assistance in training francophone teachers in the western provinces are necessary and urgent.
53. The provincial governments have the primary responsibility for administering and financing the training of teachers for provincial schools. In the western provinces, however, where the Franco-phone population is small, teacher training for Francophone schools imposes special burdens. Teachers must be trained in a French language milieu in order to develop their facility in that language. This requires institutions in which both classroom and extra-curricular activities are conducted in French. There is also a need for professors whose qualifications are as good as their English speaking counterparts in the province and who have the additional qualification of being able to teach in French. The total enrolment of prospective teachers at these institutions will inevitably be smaller than at the major English language universities in the province. Most classes will be smaller and so costs will be higher. For the more specialized courses where the enrolment may fall below four or five, the costs could be prohibitive.





54. In accordance with the general propositions of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, we recommend as a basic principle that the federal government pay the additional costs involved in training teachers for the French language schools in western Canada.
55. It is relatively easy to establish the principle but it is difficult to apply it in practice. The difficulties, however, must not be allowed to obscure the purpose of these federal grants. In each case the objective is to extend and improve the quality of French language teaching within the existing provincial school systems.
56. The training of French language teachers must take into consideration the situation of the Francophone minority within the provinces. The students will come from and will be returning to this distinctive cultural milieu. The improvement of language skills must be one of the priorities of this teacher training because the francophones in the West like all linguistic minorities, require special opportunities to develop their command of their mother tongue. For this reason the language milieu at the training institution is of exceptional importance. Since this milieu goes beyond the teacher training programme to include all curricular and extra-curricular activities our proposals will not be narrowly confined to the formal training of teachers. The broader provincial context is also important. It is therefore necessary to en-



sure that as far as possible the form and standards of the training offered in both French and English are equivalent.

A. Manitoba

57. The Collège de Saint-Boniface is the logical institution for training teachers for the French language schools of Manitoba. French is already the language of communication in and out of the classroom. The College also offers many of the academic courses normally required in a teacher training programme. We take it for granted that a french language programme in education in Manitoba, should be introduced at the College and that all courses in education in French should be given at the College.
58. Special efforts must be made to ensure that this programme is not academically inferior to English language programmes elsewhere in the province. It should also offer opportunities to attain the same level of certification. For these reasons a four year programme must be introduced. It is obvious that the enrolment at the College will not justify the wide range of courses offered at the University of Manitoba. Some students from Saint-Boniface may have to take some of their courses on the larger campus in English. The aim however must be for the College to offer the basic courses in education and to offer as wide a range of specialized courses as possible.



59. We recommend that the federal government pay 75% of the costs of renovations and new buildings required for a teacher training programme in French at the Collège de Saint-Boniface. The federal proportion of these capital costs may seem unduly high. It is reasonable, however, if one considers the small capital costs which would be involved if the same students attended the University of Manitoba. It must also be remembered that the capital costs incurred by the College for its other students are a contribution to developing the milieu required for the training of the teachers although these costs will not be directly subsidized by the federal government.
60. We recommend that the federal government pay the additional operating costs incurred by providing teacher training in French at the Collège de Saint-Boniface. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism adopted this principle in its report. It recommended however, that a federal grant of 25% of the total operating costs would be a reasonable approximation of these additional costs. This formula had the merit of simplicity. Unfortunately the additional costs will be higher in the early years of a programme, when an adequate library must be established and when student enrolment will be small; afterwards, they will decline as enrolment increases. We are convinced that it would be fairer to base the federal grant on an estimate of the actual additional costs rather than on a constant percentage of the total.





61. There will be difficulties in calculating the additional costs. We cannot suggest any precise accounting procedure which could be followed. There are, however, certain indicators which should be useful guides. The staff-student ratio of the Faculty of Education at the University of Manitoba might be taken as a norm, for example, and the difference from the comparable staff-student ratio at the College would then be the indication of the cost differential. Another indicator might be the total operating cost per student at both institutions. Before using these ratios one would have to make sure that a minimum level of academic quality has already been achieved at the College.

B. Saskatchewan

62. There is no institution in Saskatchewan which is likely in the near future to provide the training required for the teachers of the designated schools of the province. The Bilingual Programme on the Regina Campus is primarily concerned with teaching French as a second language. This is a worthy cause but it does not come within our terms of reference. If it could be demonstrated, however, that this Bilingual Programme was attracting students who intended to teach in French-language schools the situation would be different. Even an appropriate programme covering the first year of training would then merit support. Under these circumstances we would suggest some federal assistance.



63. Most of the prospective teachers for the French language schools of Saskatchewan will have to take some or all of their training outside of the province. We recommend that the federal government offer bursaries to Saskatchewan students to cover their transportation costs and half of their university fees at a French language teacher training institution. The purpose of this recommendation is to offer some encouragement to these students to take teacher training at a French language institution. We also recommend that for students from Saskatchewan enrolled in a teacher-training programme the federal government pay to the host institution the amount normally contributed by the provincial government for students in this category. In this way the host province will not have to pay for the training of teachers who are likely to return to Saskatchewan. At the same time it will be less expensive for the federal government to make these payments than to support a teacher training institution in Saskatchewan.

C. Alberta

64. In Alberta the Collège Saint-Jean is the appropriate institution to train teachers for French language schools. Many of our comments about the development of the programme at Saint-Boniface also apply to this institution. There may be less danger of a programme which falls short of the four year programme available to English-language students in Alberta because the College is an integral part of the



University of Alberta. On the other hand, there is a greater need to increase the number of courses taught in French and to strengthen the milieu.

65. The Collège Saint-Jean can expand its enrolment considerably without undue strain on the capacity of its present buildings. Expansion may require some classroom alterations and some new equipment, such as a language laboratory. Although the total amount will be considerably less than in the case of the Collège de Saint-Boniface the grant should be calculated on a similar basis. We recommend that the federal government pay 75% of the costs of renovations and equipment required for the teacher training programme at the Collège Saint-Jean.
66. The formula for the federal grant on operating costs should be the same. We recommend that the federal government pay the additional operating costs incurred by providing teacher training in French at the Collège Saint-Jean. The federal proportion of the total operating costs will probably be higher than at Saint-Boniface until the enrolment increases. We would also suggest that some special allowance be made for establishing closer contact with the secondary schools in French language communities in Alberta, northern Saskatchewan and possibly even in British Columbia. The enrolment at the College should largely come from the graduates of these schools. Efforts should be made to en-





courage these students to come to the College even if many of them do not take Education. It would benefit the qualified students who might not otherwise think of attending university; it would benefit Collège Saint-Jean by increasing its total Francophone enrolment. The expense involved should be considered an additional cost for the College.

67. Those are the conclusions reached in the course of our brief inquiry in the western provinces. It is our sincere hope that the Report will lead to immediate action. It is our duty to the Francophones, and the provincial governments who introduced the necessary changes.



## APPENDIX

The Committee met the following people during its investigations.

Without their help this report could not have been prepared. We are especially grateful because we were not able to inform them of our itinerary in advance and so our meetings had to be arranged at very short notice. The fact that so many people did find time to talk to us attests to their interest in the training of French language teachers. We take this opportunity to thank them for their generous cooperation. In particular we wish to thank Mme Lyse Fournier, Judge A. Monnin, Mr. L. Ferguson and Mr. J. M. Olivier for their efforts in arranging our schedule. Our only regret is that our hurried mid-summer visit made it impossible to see some people whom we would have liked to consult.



MANITOBA: July 13 and 14 - 13 et 14 Juillet.

Members of the Provincial Government  
Membres du Gouvernement provincial

The Honorable Edward Schreyer, Premier of Manitoba  
 The Honorable Saul A. Miller, Minister of Education  
 Mr. Laurent L. Desjardins, MLA, Special Assistant to Premier

Department of Education - Ministère de l' Education

Mr. Wesley Lorimer, Deputy Minister of Education  
 Mr. G.M. Davies, Assistant Deputy Minister of Education  
 Mr. A.H. Corriveau, Director of French Programme  
 Mr. B. Scott Bateman, Chairman, University Grants Commission

University of Manitoba

Dr. Ernest Sirluck, President  
 Dr. R.L. Hedley, Acting Dean, Faculty of Education  
 Dr. Marcel Bonneau, Professor, Faculty of Education

Collège de Saint-Boniface

M. Claude Bernier, Président  
 M. l' Abbé Georges Damphousse, Procureur  
 M. Guy Delaquis, Secrétaire général  
 M. Jean Bérubé, Responsable de l' entretien  
 M. Marcel Lemieux, Bibliothécaire

Membres de la communauté franco-manitobaine  
Members of the Franco-Manitoba Community

Mlle Jeannette Arcand, professeur, comédienne-Cercle Molière  
 M. Paul Baril, enseignant, vice-président des Educateurs franco-manitobains  
 (EFM)  
 M. Richard Benoit, surintendant, Division scolaire de la Montagne  
 Mme G. Bérubé, Saint-Boniface  
 M. Aimé Delaquis, enseignant, fonctionnaire, au Ministère de l' Education,  
 section française





Dr. Hubert et Mme Delaquis, médecin, Saint-Claude, président,  
 Division scolaire de la Montagne

M. Albert Dubé, éducateur franco-manitobain

M. Louis Dupuis, journaliste, Liberté et Patriote

M. et Mme O. Fillion, surintendant, Division Scolaire de Saint-Boniface

M. Georges Forest, président, Association Parents-Maîtres  
 de langue française

M. Etienne Gaboury, architecte, ancien président de la S.F.M.

M. Laurent Gagné, directeur, Ecole du Précieux Sang

M. Maurice Gauthier, sous-ministre, Affaires des coopératives

M. Georges Guilbault, surintendant, Division scolaire Seine

M. Gilles Guyot, industriel, président, Division scolaire  
 de Saint-Boniface

Mgr Antoine Hacault, évêque auxiliaire de Saint-Boniface  
 ancien recteur du Collège de Saint-Boniface

Dr. Robert Lafrénière, médecin, Sainte-Anne

Soeur Marcelle Lemaire, présidente, Directorat d'éducation de  
 la S.F.M.

M. et Mme Albert Lepage, président de la Société  
 franco-manitobaine, directeur de l' Ecole Secondaire  
 de Sainte-Anne

R. Père D. Maccabbée, s.j., Montréal, professeur au collège  
 pendant les cours d' été

Mlle Irène Mahé, journaliste, La liberté et le Patriote

M. Roland Mahé, directeur du Cercle Molière, professeur de  
 Beaux-Arts

M. Guy de Margerie, commerçant, vice-président de la S.F.M.

M. André Martin, annonceur, CKSB

Soeur M. Melançon, bibliothécaire, département de l'éducation

M. et Mme A. Monnin, Saint-Boniface, juge

M. et Mme Denis Nadeau, LaBroquerie, président de la Division  
 scolaire de la Rivière Seine

M. et Mme André Ouellette, Sous-Ministre de la Santé et du Bien-Etre

M. et Mme Fernand Paguin, agronome, président, Association des  
 commissaires d' écoles de langue française

Dr. Bruce Pellegrin, professeur, Université de Manitoba

Mlle Aimée Pelletier, Collège de Saint-Boniface, personnel

M. l' Abbé Raymond Roy, curé, Cathédrale de Saint-Boniface

M. et Mme A. St-Hilaire, commissaire d' école, Division de la  
 Rivière Rouge

Mme Frank Simon, Saint-Boniface

Liaison Officer, Secretary of State Department  
Agent de liaison, Secrétariat d' Etat

M.L. Ferguson (Winnipeg)

SASKATCHEWAN: July 16 and 17 - 16 et 17 Juillet

Members of Provincial Government - Membres du Gouvernement provincial

The Honorable G. MacMurchy, Minister of Education  
 Mr. E. Cowley, Ministerial Assistant



Department of Education - Ministère de l'Éducation

Mr. L. Bergstrom, Deputy Minister of Education

University of Saskatchewan, Regina Campus

Mr. Bernard Wilhelm, Director, Bilingual Programme

Membres de la communauté française de Saskatchewan

Members of French-Canadian Community of Saskatchewan

M. Roger Lalonde, Président, l' Association canadien-français  
de Saskatchewan

M. R.A. Pinsonneault, Directeur Executif, l' Association cana-  
dienne-française de Saskatchewan

M.G. Leblanc, Maire de Gravelbourg

M. J. Gauthier, Vice-président, Chambre de Commerce, Gravelbourg

Père L. Bosc, Recteur du Collège Mathieu, Gravelbourg

Dr. G. Archambault, représentant du cercle locale de l' ACFS à  
Gravelbourg

Liaison Officer, Secretary of State Department

Agent de liaison, Secrétariat d' Etat

Mr. R. Mitchel (Regina)

ALBERTA: July 15 and 19 - 15 et 19 Juillet

Members of Provincial Government

Membres du Gouvernement provincial

The Honorable H. Strom, Premier

The Honorable R.C. Clarke, Minister of Education

Department of Education - Ministère de l'Éducation

Mr. R.E. Rees, Deputy Minister

University of Alberta

M. Louis A. Desrochers, Chancellor

Dr. M. Wyman, Président

Dr. W.F. Allan, Vice Président, Academic

Dr. H.T. Coutts, Dean, Faculty of Education

Collège Universitaire Saint-Jean

Father F.J. McMahon, Doyen

M. G.E. Durocher, Bibliothécaire

Rencontre avec les étudiants - Interview with the students

Mlle Gisèle Bordeleau



M. Gérald Gagnon  
 Mme Irène Lafrance  
 M. Yvon Mahé  
 Mme Laureenne Nobert  
 M. Marcel Tremblay

Membres de la communauté franco-albertaine  
Members of the Franco-Albertan Community

M. Laurent Beaudoin, Principal de l' école de Beaumont,  
 vice-président du French Specialists' Council de l' A.T.A.  
 et de l' A.E.B.A.  
 M. André Collin, rédacteur de l' hebdomadaire français "Le  
 Franco-Albertain"  
 M. Paul Denis, sous-secrétaire, Association canadienne-  
 française de l' Alberta  
 M. Alain Dexter, Directeur des Programmes, Station de radio  
 (française) CHFA  
 M. Jacques Moquin, surintendant des écoles, Commission sco-  
 laire de Bonnyville, Président du French Specialists'  
 Council de l' A.T.A., ancien président général de l'  
 A.E.B.A. (Association des Enseignants bilingues de l'  
 Alberta)  
 Dr. Roger Motut, vice-doyen, Département des langues romanes,  
 Université de l' Alberta, ancien président général de l'  
 A.C.F.A.  
 R.P. Jean Patoine, secrétaire, Association canadienne-française  
 de l' Alberta.

Special Interviews - Rencontres particulières

Mrs. Gertrude Laing, former member of Royal Commission on  
 Bilingualism and Biculturalism  
 Dr. Walter H. Worth, President, Worth Commission on Educational  
 Planning in Alberta  
 Mr. N.P. Hrynyk, Associate Executive Secretary, Alberta Teacher's  
 Association

Liaison Officer, Secretary of State Department  
Agent de liaison, Secrétariat d' Etat

M. J.M. Olivier (Edmonton)

Ottawa: July 22, Department of Secretary of State  
22 Juillet, Secrétariat d' Etat

M. Jules Leger, Under-Secretary of State - Sous secrétaire d'Etat  
 Mr. Max Yalden, Assistant Under-Secretary of State -Sous-secrétaire  
 d' Etat adjoint  
 M. Pierre Emond, Executive Assistant - Directeur de cabinet  
 M. Maurice Héroux, Chief of Federal-Provincial Relations, Language  
 Administration Branch - Chef des relations fédérales-provinciales,  
 Programmes de langues.





## APPENDIX I

### Chronological Events Matrix



## CHRONOLOGICAL EVENTS MATRIX

1969

- September 3 - Letter from L. L. Desjardins to Stephane Valiquette, s.j. Rector St. Boniface College - Study the possibility of creating a Teacher Training Institute at the college.
- September 17 - Creation of Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relation.
- September 25 - Letter from S. Valiquette to L. L. Desjardins - Accepts the study. Notes the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee to conduct the study.
- October 23 - Interim report of Ad Hoc Committee.
- November 3 - Reactions of E.F.M. to Interim Report of Ad Hoc Committee.
  - Reactions of President of French Trustees Association to Interim Report of Ad Hoc Committee.
- November 7 - Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier's declaration concerning the federal policy with respect to the recommendations of Volume II of the B and B Commission.
- November 10 - Reactions of S.F.M. to Interim Report of the Ad Hoc Committee.
- December 6 - Premier Edward Schreyer's speech to the annual general meeting of the S.F.M.
- December 15 - Official request by the Manitoba government to the Federal government relative to the creation of the Institute.
- December 23 - Letter from G. Pelletier, Secretary of State, to Premier E. Schreyer concerning need for an agreement between the four western provinces.

1970

- January 6 - Letter from Premier Edward Schreyer to Secretary of State, Gerard Pelletier, concerning discussions between the four western provinces.



1970 (cont'd)

- January 6 - Letter from H. E. Duckworth, Vice-President, University of Manitoba, to Secretariat concerning the teaching of second languages and the creation of a teacher training institute at St. Boniface College.
- January 12 - Second report of Ad Hoc Committee.
- January 19 - Third report of Ad Hoc Committee.
- February 11 - Report by Jean Gisiger, Manitoba Teachers Society: number of francophone teachers in Manitoba and their qualifications.  
- Critical Report by Secretariat (A. Corriveau) concerning the Ad Hoc Committee reports.
- February 12 - Final report of Ad Hoc Committee.
- February 13 - Letter from L. L. Desjardins to Clement Cormier on possibility of studying the creation of a teacher training institute in Manitoba.
- February 16 - Letter from L. Courcelles, Educateurs Franco-Manitobain, concerning the preparation of a report on the creation of a teacher training institute in Manitoba.  
- Report by St. Boniface College relative to the site of a teacher training institute.
- February 26 - Report by Dr. R. Roy, Winnipeg School Division, relative to the location of the institute.
- February 27 - Study by M. Bonneau, Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba, concerning the survival of French culture in Manitoba.  
- Letter from H. E. Duckworth, Vice-President, University of Manitoba, concerning the development of biculturalism in Manitoba.
- March 2 - Brief from Ad Hoc Committee on the opportunity of conferring responsibility to St. Boniface College, regarding the training of Franco-Manitoban teachers.
- March 6 - Minutes of meeting of the Fédération Canadienne-française de l'Ouest.
- March 9 - Report by Scott Bateman, University Grants





1970 (cont'd)

Commission on the possible costs of creating an institute.

- March 12 - Report by Clement Cormier on the creation of an institute in Manitoba.
- March 18 - Report by E.F.M.
- June 19 - Letter by L. L. Desjardins to Gerard Pelletier concerning the recent developments relative to the creation of an institute.
- June 26 - Letter of R. C. Clark, Minister of Education, Alberta, to Roger Molut, President of the Association Canadienne-française de l'Alberta: suggestion by Clark that the decision as to site of the institute in western Canada be made by the French-Canadian Associations of the provinces involved.
- October 20 - Letter of R. C. Clark, Minister of Education, Alberta, to Gerard Pelletier, Secretary of State, on the subject that Collège St-Jean of Edmonton would be an acceptable site for the institute.
- October 23 - Meeting between the French leaders of Manitoba and Alberta at St. Boniface College.
- November 5 - Letter by L. L. Desjardins to Gerard Pelletier indicating that the question of site be submitted to arbitration.
- December 15 - Meeting between the Ministers of Education of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Gerard Pelletier in Regina.

1971

- January 11 - Letter from Premier Edward Schreyer, Manitoba, to W. C. Bennett, Premier of British Columbia, concerning the decision relative to the institute by the Prairies Economic Council.
- January 26 - Copy of brief submitted to Premier Edward Schreyer by Paul Lewans of the Conseil d'Education Bilingue de la Saskatchewan, proposing that Gravelbourg be considered as possible site for the institute.
- April 16 - Letter from Gerard Pelletier to Premier Schreyer relative to the composition of



1971 (cont'd)

the arbitration committee.

- April 27 - Letter from Premier Edward Schreyer to Gerard Pelletier accepting the arbitration committee.
- August 13 - Report of Arbitration Committee.
- November 4 - Memo from Scott Bateman, University Grants Commission, to Saul Miller, Minister of Education, Manitoba, concerning revised costs of creating an institute.

1972

- January 31 - Letter from Gerard Pelletier to Premier Edward Schreyer relative to financial participation of the Federal Government in establishing the institute in Manitoba subsequent to the Arbitration Committee's decision.
- March 28 - Press release by the Government of Manitoba. L. L. Desjardins announces the creation of the institute at St. Boniface College.
- May 8 - Press release by St. Boniface College announcing that O. Fillion has been named director of the institute.



## APPENDIX J

Individuals, Committees, and Organizations





## INDIVIDUALS, COMMITTEES, AND ORGANIZATIONS

Backeland, Gerald

Executive assistant to Laurent L. Desjardins and the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations.

Bateman, Scott B.

Chairman, University Grants Commission, Government of Manitoba.

Bonneau, Marcel

Professor, Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Brown, J. M.

Dean, Faculty of Education, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba.

Cormier, Clement c.s.c.

Chancellor, Université de Moncton, Moncton, New Brunswick. Conducted a study for the Secretariat on the possibility of establishing a French teacher training institute in Manitoba.

Corriveau, Arthur

Director, Romance Language Curriculum Branch, Department of Education. Government of Manitoba - seconded to the Secretariat as a researcher.

Courcelles, Louis

Principal of St. Claude Collegiate, St. Claude, Manitoba, and President of the Educateurs Franco-Manitobains.

Desjardins, Laurent L.

Member of the Manitoba Legislative Assembly. Joined the ranks of the New Democratic Party which formed the government after the June, 1969 election. Desjardins became legislative assistant to Premier Edward Schreyer and Director of the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations.

Duckworth, H. E.

Vice-President, Academic University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba.



Marion, Fernand c.s.v.

Assistant superintendent, Seine River School Division and director of the Directeurat de l'Education de la Société Franco-Manitobaine. Marion was seconded from Seine River to the Secretariat as a researcher.

Monin, Alfred M.

Judge of the County Court and président du Conseil d'Administration du Collège de St-Boniface.

Paquin, Fernand

Président de l'Association des Commissaires de Langue Française du Manitoba.

Pelletier, Gerard

Secretary of State, Government of Canada.

Schreyer, Edward

Premier, Province of Manitoba.

Valiquette, Stephane s.j.

Recteur du Collège Universitaire de St-Boniface and Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee.

Ad Hoc Committee

The Ad Hoc Committee was set up after L. L. Desjardins, director of the Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations requested, in a letter to Stephane Valiquette, s.j., Rector of St. Boniface College, that a study be undertaken to review the implications of, and development of a rationale for, locating the teacher training institute at St. Boniface College.

ACLFM

The "Association des Commissaires de Langues Française du Manitoba".

E.F.M.

Educateurs Franco-Manitobains.

S.F.M.

Société Franco-Manitobaine, a political pressure group representing the Franco-Manitoban community.



## Secretariat

Secretariat of Dominion-Provincial Cultural Relations  
set up by Premier Edward Schreyer to deal with the  
problems associated with bilingualism in Manitoba.













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